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Abstract
Cryptosystems rely on the assumption that the computer end-points can securely
store and use cryptographic keys. Yet, this assumption is rather hard to justify
in practice. New software vulnerabilities are discovered every day, and malware is
pervasive on mobile devices and desktop PCs.
This thesis provides research on how to mitigate private key compromise in three
dierent cases. The rst case considers compromised signing keys of certicate au-
thorities in public key infrastructure. To address this problem, we analyse and
evaluate existing prominent certicate management systems, and propose a new
system called Distributed and Transparent Key Infrastructure, which is secure even
if all service providers collude together.
The second case considers the key compromise in secure communication. We de-
velop a simple approach that either guarantees the condentiality of messages sent
to a device even if the device was previously compromised, or allows the user to de-
tect that condentiality failed. We propose a multi-device messaging protocol that
exploits our concept to allow users to detect unauthorised usage of their device keys.
The third case considers the key compromise in secret distribution. We develop
a self-healing system, which provides a proactive security guarantee: an attacker
can learn a secret only if s/he can compromise all servers simultaneously in a short
period.
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Introduction and background
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Key management is the hardest part of
cryptography and often the Achilles heel of
an otherwise secure system.
Bruce Schneier [Sch96, Chapter 8].
Alice wants to communicate with Bob securely. Depending on what they want
to do, e.g. to process on-line payment or to exchange private messages, they use
dierent cryptographic protocols. Unfortunately, even if the protocol they use is
secure, an attacker might still be able to learn the private communication between
Alice and Bob by attacking the security assumption about secure key management.
In fact, most attacks in practice are aimed at key management of cryptosystems
rather than the cryptographic algorithms. So, successful key management is critical
to the security of cryptosystems.
Key management mainly deals with the key generation, distribution, and stor-
age. The attacks on key management are mainly trying to (A) compromise the
authenticity of public keys; and (B) make unauthorised uses of private keys.
This thesis presents research on the solutions defending against the above attacks,
with a focus on the following three cases.
Case 1 In public key cryptography, the authenticity of public keys is mainly as-
sured by certicate authorities (CAs). If a CA is compromised, then the
authenticity of public keys cannot be guaranteed. The rst case considers
how to provide authenticity of public keys when CAs are compromised by
an attacker.
2
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Case 2 In the presence of software bugs and malware, an attacker might be able to
learn a victim's private keys by attacking the victim's devices. If all private
keys are obtained by the attacker, then the security of associated systems is
broken. The second case considers how to mitigate the damage caused by
compromised private keys, with an application to secure messaging.
Case 3 In secret distribution schemes, a secret is distributed to a set of servers in
the way that reconstructing the secret requires a sucient number of servers
to work together. If an attacker is able to gradually compromise a sucient
number of servers, then the attacker will be able to reconstruct all distributed
secrets. The third case considers how to provide a better security guarantee
against such an attacker.
1.1 Key compromise in web PKI
Public key cryptography is widely used in network protocols to secure communi-
cations. To ensure security, it is important to use the correct public keys of the
communication parties. For example, suppose a user wishes to log in to her bank
account through her web browser. The web session will be secured by the public
key of the bank through the TLS protocol [DR08, TP11]. If the user's web browser
accepts an inauthentic public key for the bank, then the trac (including log-in
credentials) can be intercepted and manipulated by an attacker.
The authenticity of keys is assured at present by certicate authorities (CAs).
In the given example, the browser is presented with a public key certicate for the
bank, which is intended to be unforgeable evidence that the given public key is the
correct one for the bank. A public key certicate is a digital document declaring that
the recorded subject owns the public key presented in the certicate. It contains a
public key, the identity of the key owner, and a signature of an entity that has veried
the certicate's contents are correct. In a typical web PKI scheme, the signer is a
trusted party called certicate authority (CA), usually a company (e.g. VeriSign
and Comodo) which charges customers to issue certicates for them. The user's
browser is pre-congured to accept certicates from certain known CAs. A typical
installation of Firefox has about 100 root certicates in its database. Each root CA
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can empower many intermediate CAs. The EFF SSL observatory has observed more
than 1500 CAs [The].
Unfortunately, the CA model is broken. The main weakness of the CA model is
that CAs must be assumed to be trustworthy. If a CA is dishonest or compromised,
then the CA's private key may be misused to issue certicates asserting the authen-
ticity of fake keys; those keys could be created by an attacker or by the CA itself.
In practice, the assumption of honesty does not scale up very well. As already men-
tioned, a browser typically has hundreds of CAs registered in it, and the user cannot
be expected to have evaluated the trustworthiness and security of all of them. This
fact has been exploited by attackers [Eck11, Ley12, MS0, Rob11, Ste11, FMC11]. In
2011, two CAs were compromised: Comodo [App11] and DigiNotar [Bla12]. In both
cases, certicates for high-prole sites were illegitimately obtained (e.g. Google,
Yahoo, Skype, etc.). In the second case, these certicates reportedly used in a man
in the middle (MITM) attack [Art11].
Another problem with the CA model is the certicate revocation management.
When a mis-issued certicate is detected, or when a private key associated to
a genuine certicate is lost or compromised, then this certicate should be re-
voked immediately. The CA model itself does not provide any eective way for
managing certicate revocation. In common practice, Certicate Revocation Lists
(CRL) [CSF+08, Riv98, Lan12], On-line Certicate Status Protocol (OCSP), and
certicate revocation trees [Koc98, NN98, LK12] are used to handle certicate revo-
cation. In order to remove the need for on-the-y revocation checking, they mostly
involve periodically pushing revocation lists to browsers. However, such solutions
create a window during which the browser's revocation lists are out of date until the
next push.
Assuming an attacker is able to obtain a copy of CAs' private keys, Case 1
considers how to securely manage public key certicate issuance and revocation.
1.2 Key compromise in secure communication
Encryption is the main mechanism used to protect the condentiality of messages
sent between computers. It relies on the assumption that the computer end-points
can securely store and use cryptographic keys. If this assumption does not hold,
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then encryption does not guarantee condentiality. Yet, this assumption is rather
hard to justify in practice. New software vulnerabilities [CVE] are discovered ev-
ery day, and malware is pervasive on mobile devices such as phones and tablets
[FFC+11] as well as on traditional platforms like desktop PCs. Although the se-
curity architecture of mobile devices running Android and iOS is an improvement
over the PC security architecture, thanks to better security sandboxing of apps that
limits attacks spreading between apps, it does not seem likely that completely secure
platforms will be built soon.
Assuming an attacker is able to obtain a copy of private keys of a user or a
server, Case 2 considers how to reduce the damage caused from compromised keys
by detecting unauthorised usage of private keys.
1.3 Key compromise in secret distribution
Secret distribution is a concept for distributing a secret amongst a group of servers.
It enables a secret owner to distribute his secrets to many servers and reconstruct
them when needed. One way to achieve it is using secret sharing schemes. A secret
sharing scheme allows a user to split a secret into shares, so that each share is held by
a server. Then, when the user wants to retrieve the secret, the servers can combine
their shares to recover the data. Unfortunately, if the servers become compromised
(say by malware) one by one over a long period, then an attacker would eventually
be able to compromise suciently many servers, and use the accumulated shares to
reconstruct the secrets.
Assuming an attacker is able to gradually obtain a copy of all secrets of servers
over a long time period, Case 3 considers how to protect the condentiality of
distributed secrets.
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1.4 Aims and Contributions
Aims
The aim of this thesis is providing potential solutions to the above identied prob-
lems. The main research objectives are:
 to identify and dene adversary models and security goals for each of the above
problems;
 to design cryptosystems to achieve our dened security goals;
 to formally verify the security of proposed solutions.
Contributions
The contributions to each of the three cases are listed as follows:
Case 1  We identify new properties for web certicate management, and pro-
vide a critical analysis on the existing web PKI alternatives. In par-
ticular, we classify 15 prominent proposals into four categories, and
provide a qualitative analysis on selected proposals based on 16 iden-
tied criteria. (See Chapter 3.)
 We propose a new system for managing web certicates, called Dis-
tributed Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI). It prevents attacks
that use mis-issued certicates, provides a transparent way for certi-
cate management, veries output from trusted parties, and is secure
even if all service providers collude together. In addition, we provide
an evaluation on its performance, a comparison between the proposed
system and its predecessors, and discussions on variety of concerns
related to DTKI. (See Chapter 4.)
 We provide formal machine-checked verication of the core security
property of DTKI by using the Tamarin prover [MSCB13]. Loosely
speaking, the core security property guarantees that if the required
(crowd-sourced) checkings have been successfully veried, and domain
owners have successfully veried their initial certicate, then DTKI
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can prevent attacks from an adversary with compromised keys from
trusted parties. Otherwise, DTKI enables users to detect attacks af-
terwards. (See Chapter 4.)
Case 2  Our rst contribution to Case 2 develops the idea of malware dam-
age detection and containment. This recognises that no architecture
is immune from software vulnerabilities and consequent malware, and
therefore it is useful to nd new ways of limiting the impact that they
have. We complement traditional software mitigation techniques (such
as sandboxing and privilege limitation) by enabling a victim to detect
that private keys have been compromised. To make this precise, we
develop an attacker model in which platforms are periodically com-
promised. That means that they can be compromised by an attacker
at any time, but we assume that the victim periodically takes steps
to remove malware and eliminate vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, the
compromise could have revealed long-term keys. We thus propose se-
curity goals that aim to detect the subsequent usage of such keys by
the attacker. (See Chapter 5.)
 Second, we propose an approach for a messaging application to trans-
parently manage ephemeral encryption/decryption keys. This ap-
proach is simple but eective. It detects subsequent usage of com-
promised long-term keys by the attacker, while avoiding the use of
expensive and inconvenient manual process for re-authenticating and
distributing keys through the underlying PKIs (e.g. applying for a
new certicate from a CA), unless attacks are detected.
We call this approach \key usage detection" (KUD), and we develop
two protocols for it. The rst is a basic protocol that makes strong
assumptions about the participants being simultaneously on-line, and
serves mostly to explain the concepts. The second protocol is a more
fully developed messaging application, supporting multiple devices per
user and allowing the receiver to be oine at the time the sender sends
a message. (See Chapter 5.)
 Our third contribution to Case 2 is the security analysis, which shows
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that the protocols satisfy precise properties expressing software dam-
age containment. Informally, if an attacker controlled device has been
recovered from a compromised state to a secure state, then our system
can either guarantee the condentiality of the communications during
the secure state; or automatically detect the fact that the long term
key is compromised and has been used by an attacker, and therefore
the victim will be prompted to manually revoke the key and generate a
new one. We use the Tamarin prover to prove several key properties
of our protocol. (See Chapter 5.)
Case 3  We introduce a scheme based on bilinear pairings for distributed cloud
storage, which we call \self-healing" distributed storage. It satises a
list of requirements that is necessary for secure secret distribution. It is
also optimal in round communication between a client and servers, i.e.
it requires only one round communication per-server in both phases for
data distribution and for data reconstruction, and does not require any
client involvement for the periodic update. In addition, it requires only
two exponentiation operations on the client side for data encryption
or reconstruction, and provides a proactively secure channel. One
notable feature of the system is that even though the service secrets
change in each time period, the public key to be known by data owners
remains constant. This feature could be used as a building block that
allows us to tackle a more general server authentication issue, where
the servers are compromisable cross time periods. (See Chapter 6.)
 We formalise a security model for this kind of \self-healing" system.
Since there might be robust malware that cannot be removed from a
server, our security model allows the adversary to permanently com-
promise servers. We provide a rigorous formal security proof of the
proposed system under the dened security model. Our proof also
shows that the proposed scheme provides IND-CCA2 security (See
Chapter 6.)
 To the best of our knowledge, the proposed system is the rst secure
self-healing distributed storage, with formal security model and proof.
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(See Chapter 6.)
1.5 Thesis structure
We proceed this thesis in the following way. After introducing the background in
Chapter 2, we present our main work in three parts, namely Part II, Part III, and
Part IV.
Part II presents our solutions to Case 1, by rst evaluating the existing PKI sys-
tems in Chapter 3, and proposing our system with formal security proof in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 identies desired features and security concerns of web certicate manage-
ment systems, classies the existing proposals for certicate management into four
categories, and evaluates these proposals and concludes the observed characters of
dierent categories. Chapter 4 proposes a new system for certicate management,
called DTKI, with formal security analysis, performance evaluation, and a compar-
ison with its predecessors. The full code required to understand and reproduce our
security analysis is presented in Appendix A. In particular, the code also includes
the complete DTKI models.
Part III presents our solutions to Case 2. It, in Chapter 5, formalises the asso-
ciated security model, and details our basic key usage detection (KUD) approach
with a more fully developed messaging application. A formal security proof and
performance evaluations of the messaging application are also presented in the same
chapter. Similar to the previous part, the code required to understand and reproduce
our security analysis of the KUD messaging application is presented in Appendix B.
Part IV presents our solutions to Case 3 in Chapter 6. Before proposing our
self-healing scheme for distributed storage, it rst formalises a security model for
such systems. After introducing our scheme in great detail, we formally prove the
security of the proposed scheme under the dened security model.
Finally, Part V concludes the thesis.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
This chapter introduces related background knowledge. It rst presents some crypto
preliminaries, and then introduces Tamarin prover | a tool for automatic security
protocol verication.
2.1 Crypto preliminaries
The following problems are assumed hard in cryptography.
2.1.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm problem is a signicant element in cryptology, and is the
root of many cryptographic security assumptions. Let G be a cyclic group of order
p, and g be a generator of G.
Denition 2.1 (Discrete Logarithm (DL) Problem). Given (g;X) such that X = gx
for some random x 2 Zp, the discrete logarithm problem is to compute x.
2.1.2 Die-Hellman Problem
The Die-Hellman problem was proposed by Die and Hellman in 1976 [DH76].
Denition 2.2 (Die-Hellman Problem). Given (g; ga; gb) for some random a; b 2
Zp, the computational Die-Hellman problem is to compute gab.
There are several versions of this problem. We normally refer the Die-Hellman
problem as computational Die-Hellman (CDH) problem. The decisional version
of the CDH problem [Bon98] is dened as follows.
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Denition 2.3 (Decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) Problem). Given (g; ga; gb; Q)
for some random a; b 2 Zp and Q 2 G, the decisional Die-Hellman problem is to
distinguish between Q = gab and Q random.
Another related problem is called \q-Die-Hellman inversion (DHI) problem"
[BB04a], dened as follows.
Denition 2.4 (q-Die-Hellman Inversion (DHI) Problem). Given (g; gx; gx
2
; : : : ;
gx
q
) 2 (G)q+1, for x random the q-Die-Hellman inversion problem is to compute
g1=x.
2.1.3 Bilinear paring
We rst dene a bilinear map, as follows.
Denition 2.5 (Bilinear Map). Let G1, G^1 be two cyclic groups of a suciently large
prime order p. A map e : G1G^1 ! G2 is said to be bilinear if e(ga; hb) = e(g; h)ab is
eciently computable for all g 2 G1, h 2 G^1 and a; b 2 Zp; and e is non-degenerate,
i.e. e(g; h) 6= 1.
In the above denition, when G1 = G^1, the pairing is called symmetric. Let
e : G1  G1 ! G2 be a bilinear map, and g be a generator of G1 whose order
is p. We dene the bilinear Die-Hellman (BDH) problem [BF03], the decisional
bilinear Die-Hellman (DBDH) problem [Jou02], and the q-decisional bilinear Die-
Hellman inversion (q-DBDHI) problem [BB04b], as follows.
Denition 2.6 (Bilinear Die-Hellman (BDH) Problem). Given (g; ga; gb; gc) for
some random a; b; c 2 Zp, the bilinear Die-Hellman problem is to compute e(g; g)abc.
Denition 2.7 (Decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman (DBDH) Problem). Given (g; ga;
gb; gc; Q) for some random a; b; c 2 Zp and Q 2 G2, the decisional bilinear Die-
Hellman problem is to distinguish between Q = e(g; g)abc and Q random.
The q-Decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman Inversion (q-DBDHI) problem was rst
used by Boneh and Boyen [BB04b], and proved to be dicult in the generic group
mode by Dodis and Yampolskiy [DY05].
Denition 2.8 (q-DBDHI Problem). Given (g; gx; gx
2
; : : : ; gx
q
) 2 (G1)q+1 and Q 2
G2, the q-DBDHI problem is to distinguish between Q = e(g; g)
1=x and Q random.
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2.1.4 Secret sharing
Secret sharing is a protocol for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants.
Each of the participants will obtain a share of the secret, in the way that the secret
can only be reconstructed when at least a sucient number of shares are combined
together. The smallest sucient number is called a \threshold" of the system. If
the size of the group is n and the threshold is t, then such a system is called (t; n)-
threshold secret sharing scheme.
The Shamir secret sharing scheme [Sha79] is one of the classic secret sharing
schemes. The main idea of Shamir secret sharing scheme is derived from the polyno-
mial interpolation. For example, one needs at least two points to dene a line. So, if
the line is a secret, and points on the line are the shares, then it is a (2; n)-threshold
secret sharing scheme. Similarly, t points are sucient to dene a polynomial of
degree t   1. Thus, it can be applied to obtain a (t; n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme.
Let Fq be a nite eld of order q, such that q is a prime power and q > n. The
(t  n)-Shamir secret sharing is explained as follows.
Distributing a secret The secret s can be distributed as follows:
 choose a random polynomial f 2 Fp of degree t  1 < n, such that f(0) = s 2
Fp;
 generates shares for each of the participants, such that the ith-share for the
ith-participant is (i; f(i)), where i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, and
f(i) = s+
t 1X
j=1
cj  ij mod p
where all cj 2 Fp are random coecients.
Reconstructing a secret Given any t out of n shares, let's say (i; f(i)) for i 2
f1; 2; : : : ; tg. The secret s can be recovered as follows:
 reconstructs the polynomial f by applying Lagrange interpolation to the re-
ceived shares, such that
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f(x) =
tX
i=1
f(i)
tY
j=1;j 6=i
x  j
i  j mod p
 recovers the secret by computing f(0) mod q, such that
f(0) =
tX
i=1
f(i)
tY
j=1;j 6=i
 j
i  j mod p
2.1.5 Knowledge Proof
The proof of knowledge is a protocol enabling a prover to convince a verier that
the prover knows some secrets without showing the secrets to the verier. Zero-
knowledge proof enables a prover to convince a verier the truth of an assertion,
without revealing anything but the validity of proof. If a proof of knowledge is also a
zero knowledge proof, then it is called a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK).
The Schnorr identication protocol [Sch89] is one of the simplest and frequently used
honest verier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
Let G be a cyclic group of order p, and g 2 Zp be a generator of G. The prover's
goal is to prove that y = gx for some x. The Schnorr identication protocol is
described as follows:
 The prover generates a random number r 2 Zp, commits to r by sending
a = gr to the verier;
 The verier generates a challenge c 2 Zp and sends it to the prover;
 The prover computes the proof t = r + cx mod p;
 The verier veries the proof by checking whether gt = ayc or not. If gt = ayc,
then the proof is valid. Otherwise, the proof is invalid.
The above interactive honest verier ZKPK can be transferred to a non-interactive
version through a Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86]. To do so, rather than asking
the verier to generate a challenge c, the prover computes c = h(m; a), where h
is a secure cryptographic hash function, and m is the message contains g, y, the
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prover's identity, and possibly some other information. So, a verier can recompute
c and veries the proof in the same way. The Schnorr signature scheme is one of its
application, where m is the to be signed message.
Another proof of knowledge related to this thesis is the Chaum-Pedersen proto-
col [CP92]. It is a protocol for proving the equality of two discrete logarithms. The
application of which in our thesis is to prove that (g; gx; gy; gxy) is a DDH tuple.
Let G be a cyclic group of order p, and g be a generator of G. The prover's aim
is to prove that (g; y; w; u) is a DDH tuple, such that (g; y; w; u) = (g; gx; gr; grx).
We describe the Chaum-Pedersen honest verier ZK protocol as follows.
 The prover generates a random s 2 Zp, and sends (a = gs; b = ws) to the
verier;
 The verier generates a random challenge c 2 Zp, and sends it to the prover;
 The prover calculates the proof t = s+ cx mod p and sends the proof to the
verier;
 The verier veries the proof. If gt = ayc and wt = buc, then the proof is
valid. Otherwise, the proof is invalid.
To make the above proof non-interactive, rather than letting the verier to gen-
erate a challenge c, the prover can generate c = h(w; u; a; b). The proof (c; t) is valid
if c = h(w; u; g
t
yc
; w
t
uc
). Otherwise, the proof is invalid.
2.2 Tamarin Prover
Tamarin prover is a symbolic security protocol verication tool. It supports an un-
bounded number of instances, and supports reasoning about protocols with mutable
global state. The adversary in Tamarin prover is in Dolev-Yao model, i.e. it car-
ries the message exchanged in the protocol. With Tamarin prover, cryptographic
functions are assumed to be secure.
In Tamarin prover, protocols and adversary models are specied using multi-
set rewriting rules on the multiset that models the state of the protocol. Security
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properties are expressed in a guarded fragment of rst order logic that allows quan-
tication over timepoints.
A multiset is a generalisation of set, allows multiple instances of elements in the
multiset. An element contained in the multiset is called a \fact", which is a ground
message, or a message derived from a ground message according to the rules. A
fact is of the form F(t1; : : : ; tk), where F is the fact symbol, and (t1; : : : ; tk) are k
terms for some k. A fact is either linear or persistent. A linear fact can only be
consumed once, whereas a persistent fact can be consumed arbitrarily. There are
some reserved facts. A persistent fact K(m) denotes that the adversary has the
knowledge of m. Linear facts In(m) and Out(m) denote that message m is sent
or received by the protocol, respectively. A linear fact Fr(n) denotes that a name
n is freshly and randomly generated. A fresh generated name is unknown to the
attacker.
A rule, denoted [l]  [a]! [r], is a sequences of facts, where the set l of facts is
called premises, the set a of facts is called actions, and the set r of facts is called
conclusions. Rules can only be applied if all the premises are in the multiset. A rule
application can rewrite its premises, and can introduce new facts.
In Tamarin prover, a theory species a security protocol together with its secu-
rity properties; a lemma is a rule to specify only security properties; and an axiom
is a rule to specify an assumption of the protocol. Since Tamarin's property speci-
cation language is a fragment of rst-order logic, it contains logical connectives (|,
&, ==>, not, ...) and quantiers (All, Ex). The #-prex is used to denote timepoints,
and \E @ #i" expresses that the event E occurs at timepoint i.
Tamarin prover is capable of automatic verication in many cases, and it also
supports interactive verication by manual traversal of the proof tree. If the tool
terminates without nding a proof, it returns a counter-example. Counter-examples
are given as so-called dependency graphs, which are partially ordered sets of rule in-
stances that represent a set of executions violating the specied properties. Counter-
examples can be used to rene the model, and give feedback to the implementer and
designer.
Part II
Key compromise in web PKI
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CHAPTER 3
EVALUATING WEB PKIS
3.1 Introduction
Certicate authorities serve as trusted parties to help secure web communications.
They verify the identity of domains, and issue certicates declaring that the binding
between a domain name and a public key is correct. Web browsers accept such
a binding if the associated certicate is valid and issued by a certicate authority.
Unfortunately, recent attacks using mis-issued certicates show this model is severely
broken. Much research has been done to enhance web certicate management.
However, none of it has been widely adopted yet, and it is hard to judge which one
is the winner.
To analyse the existing issues and evaluate existing proposals, Clark and Van
Oorschot [CvO13] have presented an analysis on TLS mechanism and issues, by
concerning themselves with crypto weakness and implementation issues of HTTPS,
and trust issues of certicate management. However, they left the log-based cer-
ticate management systems out of the analysis. The use of public logs is now the
dominant trend in managing web certicates. The main idea of log-based certicate
management systems is to make certicate management transparent by using public
audit-able logs to record all issued certicates. Clients will only accept a certicate
if it is recorded in the log. Site owners can compare their own local record with the
log to check whether a mis-issued certicate has been recorded in the log. This gives
the site owners the ability to verify issued certicates for their sites, and make the
certicate management transparent.
Kim et al. [KHP+13] have presented a comparison of web certicate management
mainly based on the duration of compromise and duration of unavailability. The
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former shows, given the compromise of a domain's private key, how long the domain
can be impersonated; and the later concerns the unavailability time period of a
domain's certicate in a system.
The above two works are broad and they evaluate web certicate management
systems from dierent perspectives. However, some important aspects are not con-
sidered in the existing work. For example, oine verication is one of the desired
properties that have been left out from the above analyses. This property ensures
that internet users can verify a received certicate without having to communicate
with other parties. This is extremely useful when a user needs to connect from a
captive portal in an airport or in a hotel, since the user's device cannot make other
connections before they paid for the internet connection. In addition, this property
also reduces the communication cost for certicate verication, as the verier is not
required to have extra connections for verifying a certicate.
Another important property not considered by the existing works is trust agility
[Mar11] | it allows users to freely make decisions on which certicate management
service provider they wish to trust, for establishing secure communications with
domain servers. In particular, we discovered a new aspect of trust agility, namely
independence of trust. It requires that one or more service providers cannot not
inuence another service provider's services. It is in particular useful in the scenario
where there exists a set of service providers, and users need to put their trust in
a subset of these service providers for certicate management. If a system does
not oer this feature, then it means that even if the set of service providers chosen
by a user is trustworthy, a malicious service provider that is not trusted by the
user can still inuence the certicate verication result, and put the user in the
risk of accepting fake certicates. Since the independence of trust is more strict,
it is possible that a system oers the generic trust agility, but it does not oer
independence of trust. In this case, users are free to make their trust decisions,
but servers that are not trusted by the user are still able to aect the certicate
management services delivered to the user.
In addition, we observed the problem of oligopoly, which has not been consid-
ered before. The present-day certicate authority model requires that the set of
global certicate authorities is xed and known to every browser, which implies an
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oligopoly. Currently, the majority of CAs in browsers are organisations based in
the USA, and it is hard to become a browser-accepted CA because of the strong
trust assumption that it implies. This means that a Russian bank operating in
Russia and serving Russian citizens living in Russia has to use an American CA for
their public key. This cannot be considered satisfactory in the presence of mutual
distrust between nations regarding cybersecurity and citizen surveillance, and also
trade sanctions which may prevent the USA oering services (such as CA services)
to certain other countries.
To help research in securing the web certicate management, and to have a
better understanding on the problem, we classify prominent proposals into dierent
categories, and provide a qualitative analysis on selected proposals based on 15
criteria.
3.2 Desired Features and security concerns
To evaluate dierent systems in a systemic way, we list the desired features and
security concerns for web certicate management systems.
1. Trust
 Trust agility [Mar11] allows users to freely decide which entities they want
to trust for conrming public key information of domain servers, and to
revise their decision at any time.
In particular, we observed one aspect of the trust agility that has not been
discovered in the literature, namely the independence of trust. It requires
that the trust relations between service providers will not inuence the
trust relations between clients and the service providers they trust. In
other words, one or more service providers cannot not inuence another
service provider's service to its clients.
 Free of trusted parties is the property says that no party is required to
be trusted for certicate issuance and revocation. This is the strongest
one in all trust-related features.
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 Veriable trusted parties is the property says that the behaviour of trusted
parties is transparent to and can be eciently veried by users.
 Anti-oligopoly is a new property we identied. It prevents the monopoly
or oligopoly of certicate management services.
To achieve anti-oligopoly, the trust on any service provider (e.g. CAs)
should be minimised, and the system should support self-issued certi-
cates.
2. Availability
 Oine verication is a feature such that in a system, clients can verify
a given key or certicate without having to connect from other parties.
This feature is desired when a user needs to connect from a captive
portal| a login page or payment page | before using the internet. The
use of captive portal is very common in public places, for example, air-
ports or hotels. When a user is presented a captive portal, the user cannot
establish a connection with any party to check the obtained public key
as no internet is available. In addition, this feature also reduces the com-
munication cost and network latency, as it does not require additional
connections.
 Built-in key revocation requires the system to have its own mechanism to
eectively manage certicate revocation, rather than relaying on existing
revocation protocols (e.g. certicate revocation list (CRL) or on-line
certicate status protocol (OCSP)).
The current certicate revocation management protocols (e.g. CRL and
OCSP) have dierent limitations and cannot oer satisfactory services.
So it is necessary for systems to have an integrated revocation mechanism
to eectively manage certicate revocations.
 Scalability is the property enabling a system to handle increasing real
world workload. It is important that a system is capable to support
enrolment from existing and potential future HTTPS servers.
 Multiple certicate support says that the certicate verication system
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allows a domain to have multiple certicates. The fact that many sites
have multiple certicates emphasises the importance of this feature.
 Timely key verication says that the period from the time a domain
owner establishes a key and the time a user can verify the key is short.
This is a feature that has not been prominent in the literature. This
feature is useful when a domain server updates its certicates. A system
that does not oer this feature would cause the problem that the newly
issued certicate cannot be veried and will not be accepted by web
browsers within a short time period after the certicate issuance. This
reduces the availability.
3. Security
 First connection protection is the feature that protects the rst connection
between two communication parties.
This is useful to prevent attacks on 'trust on rst use'-based systems. In
addition, it is likely to be the rst connection when a user connects from
a captive portal. So the system should protect users' rst connection to
a domain server.
 Denial of service (DoS) attack protection is the security guarantee that
prevents attacks on the key verication infrastructure in order to denial
the verication services.
This feature is useful to prevent attacks that attempt to block the veri-
cation servers to stop users verifying the received certicates.
 Use of mis-issued certicate prevention measures whether the system can
prevent MITM attacks launched by an attacker with mis-issued certi-
cates. In other words, even if an attacker has obtained a mis-issued cer-
ticate, web browsers should still not accept this certicate. This gives
users extra security guarantee against compromised CAs.
 Use of mis-issued certicate detection measures whether the system pro-
vides features allowing one to detect MITM attacks launched by using
mis-issued certicates.
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This is a weaker security guarantee, as it can only detect attacks rather
than prevent attacks. However, CAs are business, and they are willing
to maintain their reputation to keep their customers. So they might not
launch attacks if their attacks will be detected. So this feature still oers
some sensible security guarantee.
 Provably secure measures if the security of a given system is formally
veried.
It is well-known that security protocols are notoriously dicult to get
right, and the only way to avoid this is with systematic verication.
4. Usability
 No user involvement is a feature related to usability, such that the key
verication result and the decision of accepting or rejecting a certicate
do not need the extra involvement of users.
This is an important feature to have, as users are not qualied to make
decisions on the browser warnings, and they will likely to click through
security warnings [AF13].
5. Privacy
 Protecting browsing history says that the system does not leak users
browsing history to other parties. In a PKI, if a user needs to ask another
party to verify a received certicate, then the user's browsing activity is
leaked to the verication party, as the subject of the to be veried cer-
ticate would very likely to be the website that the user is going to visit.
3.3 Analysis of existing proposals
Several protocols are proposed to strengthen the current certicate management
system. According to the principles of each design, we classify leading certicate
management systems into three categories, namely dierence observation, scope re-
striction, and certicate management transparency (shown in Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1: Existing prominent proposals
Category Existing Proposals
Classic CA-based certicate management system;
Dierence observation
Perspectives ('08) [WAP08]; DoubleCheck ('09) [AK09];
Convergence ('11) [Mar11]; Certicate Patrol ('11) [Cer]; CertLock ('11) [SS11]; TACK ('12) [MP12].
Scope restriction Public key pinning ('11) [Lan11]; DANE ('11) [Bar11b];CAge ('13) [KWH13].
Certicate management transparency
Sovereign Keys ('12) [Eck12]; Certicate Transparency ('12) [LLK13];
AKI ('13) [KHP+13]; CIRT('14) [Rya14]; ARPKI ('14) [BCK+14]
3.3.1 Classic CA model
CA-based certicate management system is the current deployed PKI. It is highly
usable and scalable. Unfortunately, it requires users to fully trust all certicate
authorities, and the trust cannot be modied without sacricing users' ability to
securely communicate with some domains securely. As a result, it does not provide
trust agility, implies an oligopoly (on CA), and cannot easily prevent nor detect
MITM attacks using mis-issued certicates.
3.3.2 Dierence observation
Dierence observation is a concept aiming to detect untrustworthy CAs, by enabling
a browser to verify if the received certicates are dierent from those that other
people are being oered [WAP08, AK09, Cer, SS11, Mar11].
Perspectives In 2008, Wendlandt, Andersen and Perrig implemented a Firefox
addon, called Perspectives [WAP08]. It is proposed to improve the security of trust-
on-rst-use authentication by asking dierent observers (a.k.a. notary servers) to
detect inconsistent public keys of the same server. In Perspectives, observers are
decentralised and independent. Each observer stores all observed keys or certicates
with corresponding timestamps, and periodically checks updates and revocations.
When a client wants to make a secure connection with a domain server, the client
requests the server's public key from the server and from multiple observers, then
compares the received keys. If the obtained public keys are consistent, the client
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considers the public key is trustworthy and uses this key to establish a secure connec-
tion. Otherwise, it might indicate that an attacker has launched man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack by oering a dierent public key to the client. So the client needs
to make a decision on whether to use the obtained key or not.
 Strength
Perspectives makes MITM attacks using mis-issued certicates dicult to
launch without being detected, as an attacker would have to additionally inter-
cept all connections between observers and the victim. In addition, it provides
trust agility as users can choose which observer they want to use for certicate
verication. Moreover, since it supports self-signed certicates, and does not
require a xed set of observers, it provides anti-oligopoly.
 Weakness
With Perspectives, if a server has multiple public keys or certicates, then
clients will likely get a warning of receiving inconsistent public keys. This is
due to the fact that a client might receive two dierent genuine certicates of
the same domain from the domain server and an observer. In addition, a new
public key or a new server will suer an unavailability period in the system.
Since observers periodically check new public keys and revocations, the latest
information about new public keys and revocations will not be immediately
available from the observers. So, Perspectives does not oer timely key veri-
cation. Also, when a browser receives the latest genuine one from the server,
and the revoked one from observers, then the browser will show a pop-up win-
dow warning the user that two dierent keys are observed, although what the
server provided is a valid certicate. Such faulty warnings reduce usability of
the system. Moreover, if two dierent certicates are detected, then the user
needs to make a decision on whether to continue the connection. However,
users are not qualied to make such a decision and they are likely to click
through the warnings [AF13]. Furthermore, any observer can learn a user's
browsing history when the user requests verication on a certicate. Last,
it does not work when a user needs to connect from a captive portal, as no
internet is available for connecting to an observer.
3.3. Analysis of existing proposals 25
DoubleCheck In 2009, Alicherry and Keromytis [AK09] proposed DoubleCheck
to solve the issue of leaking user browsing history, and the issue that new keys
might suer an unavailable period in Perspectives. The main idea is to query the
certicate from a target server twice: once through a TLS connection, and once
through Tor [DMS04].
 Strength
Compared to Perspectives, it additionally protects user browsing history, and
new keys does not suer an unavailability period. Moreover, it can be deployed
without requiring any new infrastructure.
 Weakness
The use of Tor adds extra time cost (up to 15 seconds [SS11]) for each certi-
cate verication. In addition, a use is likely to get a warning when a server has
multiple certicates. Also, when a warning is given, a user will need to make
a decision on which certicate to trust, and they are likely to click through
the warning. Moreover, it will not work when a user needs to connect from a
captive portal.
Convergence Marlinspike proposed Convergence [Mar11], a Firefox addon and
an improvement on Perspectives, in Black Hat 2011. In Convergence, to protect
users' browsing history, instead of directly communicating with notary servers (i.e.
observers), users randomly choose one notary server to pass the client request to
other notary servers, through an onion routing like mechanism. So the intermediate
notary server does not know what a requester is requesting, and the end notary
server does not know who is the requester. In addition, to reduce the number of
connections a user has to make, users store veried certicates in their browser cache
and only query notary servers when they received a dierent one. Moreover, rather
than querying the certicate of a domain server from a notary server, users send the
certicate received from the server to notary servers. The notary server will request
a certicate from the domain server if the received certicate does not match the
notary's cache.
 Strength
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As an improvement of Perspectives, it additionally supports timely key veri-
cation, does not require user to make decisions on which certicate to trust,
and it protects user privacy. Moreover, it oers oine verication if the site
has been visited before.
 Weakness
Similar to Perspectives, Convergence does not support multiple certicates,
and does not protect users when they are connected to a captive portal.
Certicate Patrol Certicate Patrol [Cer] is another Firefox add-on for managing
web certicates. It monitors and stores all SSL certicates a browser has obtained.
Since the validity period of a certicate is fairly long, it is unlikely a certicate is
changed in a short time. So, when a dierent certicate is observed, it is possible that
one of them is a mis-issued certicate used by attackers. With Certicate Patrol, if
the newly received certicate is dierent from the previously stored certicate of the
same domain, the browser will display to the user the dierence between the two
certicates, and the user needs to make a decision on whether to trust the newly
received one.
 Strength
It is a lightweight tool to protect user browsing history, and to oer an extra
layer of security { it helps users to detect any change of the previously received
certicate.
 Weakness
This addon will not work if a domain has multiple certicates, and it requires
users to make decisions. In addition, it does not protect user's rst connection
to a website nor protect user connection from a captive portal.
CertLock CertLock [SS11] is a Firefox addon for monitoring CAs' location. In
particular, it observes the country of the CA who issued the received certicate. On
the detection that two CAs from dierent countries have issued certicates for the
same site, the browser will display a warning to the user.
 Strength
CertLock helps users to detect attacks in some specic scenario. For example,
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a site authorised certicate authority CA1 in country A to issue certicate for
its domain. A malicious government agency in country B wants to intercept
the communication between users and the site. The malicious government
agency can compel a certicate authority CA2 located in country B to issue
fake certicates for the site, then uses this mis-issued certicate to launch
MITM attacks. CertLock can help users to detect such attacks.
 Weakness
CertLock won't be able to detect attacks using fake certicates that are issued
by CAs in the same country. In addition, a false warning will be displayed if a
site has switched from a CA in country A to a CA in country B. In addition,
it still relies on the CA trust model, so it does not oer trust agility nor anti-
oligopoly. Also, it cannot protect user's rst connection and cannot protect a
user who is connected to a captive portal.
TACK In 2012, Marlinspike and Perrin proposed trust assertions for certicate
keys (TACK) [MP12] to remove the need of trusting CAs. In TACK, a domain
server generates a TACK private/public key pair, and uses the TACK private key
to certify its TLS public keys. After a client observes a consistent TACK public
key of a domain multiple times, it pins the public key to the domain name, and
trusts this \pin" for a period, and accepts the public key if it is certied by the
private key corresponding to the observed TACK public key. If a certicate becomes
compromised and the observed information has not been pinned, then the client must
delete the observed TACK information and re-start the observation process. To be
scalable, TACK will need an online pin store, where users can share their observed
pins. However, the problem of how to design a secure pin store for users to share
their observations, while prevent attackers to spoof or poison the store, remains
unsolved.
 Strength
TACK removes the need of CA, oers trust agility, does not require users to
any trusted party1, and provides anti-oligopoly. Once local observations are
built, TACK allows oine verication, supports multiple certicates.
1Here, we only consider the TACK without having an online pin store
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 Weakness
Since TACK relies on visit patterns by clients to pin the domain's public key,
the rst several connections to a domain server will not be protected, and every
new TACK key pair or new domain suers an initial unavailability period. In
addition, the revoked key will still be accepted by the client if the client still
trusts its previous observation.
To be scalable, TACK requires an on-line store to share TACK keys observed
by dierent clients. The use of such on-line stores make TACK dicult to
provide the independence of trust required by trust agility. Because a client
Alice, might choose to trust some stores or clients for the TACK keys they
observed. However, the store or clients trusted by Alice might put their trust
on other stores and clients. This transitive trust relation could eect Alice's
trust option and Alice's observation on the TACK keys. Currently, it is hard
to judge whether TACK oers the independence of trust required by trust
agility, as the online store is not designed yet.
3.3.3 Scope restriction
Scope restriction is the concept aiming to reduce the power of CAs by restricting
the domain scope that a CA can vouch for.
Public key pinning (PKP) Public key pinning (a.k.a. certicate pinning) is a
mechanism for domain servers to specify which CAs are authorised to certify public
keys for a given domain. Langley et al. implemented it in Google Chrome [Lan11].
Scalability is a main challenge for key pinning, due to the need of pre-knowledge
of the mapping between each domain server and CAs. Public key pinning extension
for HTTP [EPS14] addresses the scalability challenge by allowing a domain server
to declare the authorised CAs for its sites in an HTTP header.
 Strength
As PKP is a way to restrict CAs' power by specifying which CAs are authorised
for a given website, it protects user communications against attackers who
have mis-issued certicates from CAs that are not authorised for the victim.
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In addition, PKP allows a website to have multiple certicates, does support
oine verication, and is scalable with the PKP extension for HTTP.
 Weakness
The weakness of PKP is that it cannot completely protect all user connections.
For example, it cannot protect when a user does not have a pin of a website,
which is generally the case for the rst connection. Also, it cannot protect
the connection when the pin is expired in the user browser. Moreover, it
cannot eectively detect attacks when a CA has mis-issued certicates for the
domains that the CA is pinned for. Furthermore, it does not oer trust agility
nor anti-oligopoly.
DANE DNS-based authentication of named entities (DANE) [Bar11a, HS12] binds
the public key information to a domain name by using Domain Name System Se-
curity Extensions (DNSSEC). More specically, DANE enables a domain server
to certify its public keys by storing the public keys in its domain name system
(DNS) records. This DNS record is valid only if it is correctly signed as specied
in DNSSEC [WB13]. So, the parent domain servers are the authority of their child
domains. In other words, only the parent domain can certify public keys of its
child domains. In this way, DANE limits the damage of dishonest or compromised
authorities.
 Strength
Compared to PKP, DANE is highly scalable since it is based on DNSSEC.
In addition, it can protect a user even when the user connects from a captive
portal.
 Weakness
The security of DANE strongly relies on the trustworthiness of parent do-
mains according to the DNS hierarchy. As a result, ICANN, top-level do-
mains (TLDs), and second-level domains (SLDs) become to be very powerful
and fully trusted CAs. So, DANE does not provide trust agility and anti-
oligopoly. In addition, domain servers cannot choose which CA they want to
get service from, as they have to get their keys to be certied by their parent
domain.
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CAge In 2013, Kasten, Wustrow and Halderman proposed CAge [KWH13] to
restrict the scope of domains that a CA can certify public keys for. According to
the data observed in [HDWH12], they show that only a small number of CAs have
signed certicates for TLDs. Based on this observation, CAge suggests to limit a
CA's certication scope by only allowing a CA to issue certicates on a restricted
set of TLDs. CAge limits the scale of MITM attacks, but cannot completely solve
this problem.
 Strength
As all systems in the category of scope restriction, CAge reduces the damage
from a compromised CA by limiting the set of domains that a CA can vouch
for.
 Weakness
Since CAge is still based on the CA trust model although with restrictions on
a CA's ability, it does not oer trust agility and anti-oligopoly. In addition,
domain servers have less exibility to choose which CA they want to use,
because only a subset of CAs will be eligible for certifying keys for given
domains.
3.3.4 Certicate management transparency
Certicate management transparency is the concept aiming to make CAs' behaviour
transparent. The basic idea is to use a publicly visible log to record issued certi-
cates. So interested parties can check the log to detect any mis-issued certicates.
Sovereign Keys Sovereign Keys (SK) [Eck12] aims to get rid of browser certicate
warnings, by allowing domain owners to establish a long term (\sovereign") key and
by providing a mechanism by which a browser can hard-fail if it doesn't succeed in
establishing security via that key. A sovereign key is a long-term key used to cross-
sign operational TLS keys, and it is stored in an append-only log on a \timeline
server", which is abundantly mirrored.
When a browser connects to a website, it sends a query to a mirror of the
\timeline server" to check if the site has a sovereign key. If the site does have a
sovereign key, then the browser only accepts a certicate for this site if the certicate
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is issued by CAs and is cross-signed by the sovereign key. If the certicate is not
cross-signed, then rather than emit certicate warnings, the browser will try to nd
a way to make a sovereign key connection to the site. There are several ways to
establish a connection without having a cross-signed certicate. The strongest way
is to compute a hash of the sovereign key, and use that as the .onion address of
the Tor hidden service which allows the secure connection. Weaker ways include
stapling to the sovereign key and trying to connect through other means such as
proxy and VPN, until the browser gets a veried connection.
 Strength
SK introduces the rst log-based PKI. It eliminates browser certicate warn-
ings, reduces the trust put on CAs, allow a site to have multiple certicates,
and prevents attacks from an attacker who compromised CAs.
 Weakness
Sovereign Keys doesn't have an ecient way for the timeline server and mirrors
to prove their correct behaviour. The only way for verifying it is to download
an verify the entire log. So internet users and domain owners have to trust
mirrors of time-line servers. Additionally, it doesn't provide any mechanism for
key revocation, either of TLS keys or sovereign keys. If a domain owner loses
the sovereign private key, they lose the ability to switch to new TLS keys,
and may even lose control of their domain, until the sovereign key expires.
Another security concern is that if a site does not have a sovereign key yet,
then a determined attacker could register his own sovereign key for the site
and intercept secure connections made to the site.
Certicate transparency Certicate transparency (CT) [LLK13] is proposed by
Google aiming to allow domain owners to eciently detect mis-issued certicates,
by making certicate issuance transparent.
The basic idea is to use public audit-able logs to record all issued certicates. In
this way, interested parties can monitor the log to verify all of CAs' behaviour. To
enforce CAs to publish all issued certicates into the log, web browsers only accept
certicates if a veriable evidence is provided to prove that the certicate is present
in the log.
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In more detail, domain owners request from the log maintainer signed conrma-
tions saying that their certicates are included in the log, and then they can pro-
vide this conrmation together with the corresponding certicate to web browsers.
Browsers only accept a certicate if both the certicate and the signed conrmation
are valid. Browsers also need to periodically verify received signed conrmation
against the public log to check if the certicate is indeed being inserted in the log.
To reduce the trust put on CAs and log maintainers, CT uses an append-only
log which is organised as an append-only Merkle tree. In the tree, data items (i.e.
certicates or references to certicates) are stored left-to-right in chronological order
at the leaves, and added by extending the tree to the right. This structure enables
the log maintainer to provide two types of veriable cryptographic proofs: (a) a
proof that the log contains a given certicate, and (b) a proof that a snapshot of
the log is an extension of another snapshot (i.e., only appends have taken place
between the two snapshot). The time and size for proof generation and verication
are logarithmic in the number of certicates recorded in the log. To ensure the log
maintainer is behaving correctly, CT requires monitors to check the consistency of
logs.
 Strength
Since CAs' behaviour is transparent, CT does not require users to blindly
trust CAs, i.e. the behaviour of CAs are veriable. This makes CT to oer
trust agility. In addition, CT enables domain owners to readily detect any
mis-issued certicates.
 Weakness
A main weakness of CT is that users still have to trust \monitors" for verifying
the behaviour of logs. In addition, CT does not provide an ecient scheme for
key revocation. Also, CT does not provide anti-oligopoly, because although
the set of log servers are not xed, it doesn't have any method to allocate
dierent domains to dierent logs. In CT, when a domain owner wants to
check whether mis-issued certicates are recorded in logs, he needs to contact
all existing logs, and download all certicates in each of the logs, because there
is no way to prove to the domain owner that no certicates for his domain is
in the log, or to prove that the log maintainer has showed all certicates in
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the log for his domain to him. Thus, to be able to detect fake certicates, CT
has to keep a very small number of log maintainers. This prevents new log
providers being exibly created, creating an oligopoly. Another limitation is
that CT can only detect mis-issued certicates, rather than prevent attacks
that use mis-issued certicates.
Accountable key infrastructure Accountable key infrastructure (AKI) [KHP+13]
also uses public logs to make certicate management more transparent.
Similar to SK, AKI allows domain owners to dene their own security policy by
specifying several additional attributes of a certicate, such as which CA and log
maintainer a domain owner wants to get services from, what is the minimum number
of CA signatures to validate a certicate for her domain, etc. To obtain a certicate,
a domain owner contacts at least a minimum number of CAs that she wishes to trust
based on the policy, and to cross sign her public key with her security policy. Then
she requests log maintainers to update her certicate, and expects a signed proof
that the certicate is recorded in the log. Clients only accept a certicate if the
certicate satises dened security policy, and is currently recorded in the log.
To be able to manage key revocations, AKI stores only the current valid cer-
ticates of domains in a public log. The log is organised as a hash tree, where
certicates stored in leaves ordered lexicographically.
To detect mis-behaviours, AKI uses the \checks-and-balances" idea that allows
parties to monitor each other's behaviour. So AKI limits the requirement to trust
any party. Moreover, AKI prevents attacks that use fake certicates rather than
merely detecting such attacks (as in CT).
 Strength
AKI extends the previous architectures in several ways. First, it allows mul-
tiple CAs to sign a single certicate. Additionally, the domain can specify
in its certicate which CAs and logs are allowed to attest to the certicate's
authenticity. These features provide resilience against a certicate signed by a
compromised or unauthorised CA. AKI can also handle key loss or compromise
through cool-o periods. For example, if a domain loses its private key and
registers a new certicate not signed by its old private key, the new certicate
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will be subject to a cool-o period (e.g., three days) during which the certi-
cate is publicly visible but not usable. This ensures that even if an adversary
obtains and registers a fake certicate, the domain has the opportunity to
contact the CAs and logs to resolve the issue.
 Weakness
To ensure that any log server can provide a proof for a domain's certicate,
AKI logs maintain a globally consistent view of the entries that they have for
a given domain name. This applies for every certicate operation (registra-
tion, update, and revocation), meaning that even frequent certicate updates
(such as in the case of short-lived certicates) are subject to successful log
synchronisation. In addition, AKI requires that each domain name only has
one active and valid certicate associate with it at any given time. Moreover,
AKI needs to rely on third parties called validators to ensure that the log is
maintained without improper modications, and to assume that CAs, public
log maintainers, and validators do not collude together.
Certicate issuance and revocation transparency Certicate issuance and
revocation transparency (CIRT) [Rya14] improves certicate transparency by pro-
viding transparent key revocation, and reducing reliance on trusted parties.
To provide an eective way for certicate revocation, CIRT proposes a new log
structure that consists of two tree structures presenting the same set of data. The
rst tree is called a ChronTree, which is an append-only Merkle tree (as in CT)
ordered chronologically. The second tree is called LexTree, which is a Merkle tree
ordered lexicographically by the subject of the certicate. The ChronTree stores in
the leaves a pair (C; h), where C is a certicate appended in the ChronTree, and h is
the hash root value of the LexTree in which the last inserted data is C. The LexTree
stores h(di) in every node for some i, where d is an ordered list of certicates that
has the same subject. The last element in the list is the current valid certicate of
the subject.
This log structure enables the log maintainer to provide ecient proofs that (A)
some data is present in the log, (B) any data having a given attribute (e.g. an
identity) is absent from the log, (C) some data is the latest valid one in the log, and
(D) the current log is extended from a previous version.
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Loosely speaking, by proving a proof that a certicate C is the last element in
an ordered list d, and h(d) is present in the LexTree of the log, a verier is ensured
that C is the currently valid certicate, i.e. not revoked. Due to the use of two
dierent trees presenting the same set of data, it is crucial to ensure that the data
presented by the two trees are consistent. To verify the consistency of the two trees,
CIRT distributes the monitoring role among user browsers. To do so, each user
browser veries if a randomly selected certicate stored in the ChronTree is also
in the LexTree. If the number of such random verication is big enough, then the
consistency between the two trees is likely to be veried.
 Strength
CIRT provides a solution for managing both certicate issuance and revoca-
tion by using a new log structure, and reduces reliance on trusted parties by
using user side random verications. It also allows a domain to have multiple
certicates, and to update keys timely. In addition, similar to all other sys-
tems in certicate management transparency category, it does not need users
to be involved.
 Weakness
A weakness of CIRT is that it can only detect attacks that use fake certicates;
it cannot prevent them. Also, since CIRT was proposed for email applications,
it does not support the multiplicity of log maintainers that would be required
for web certicates.
Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure Attack Resilient Public-Key In-
frastructure (ARPKI) [BCK+14] is an improvement on AKI. In ARPKI, a client can
designate n service providers (e.g. CAs and log maintainers), and only needs to con-
tact one CA to register her certicate. Each of the designated service providers will
monitor the behaviour of other designated service providers. As a result, ARPKI
prevents attacks even when n 1 service providers are colluding together, whereas in
AKI, an adversary who successfully compromises two out of three designated service
providers can successfully launch attacks [BCK+14].
 Strength
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ARPKI is the rst formally veried log-based PKI system. Its security proper-
ties are proved by using a protocol verication tool calledTamarin prover [MSCB13].
The verication uses several abstractions during modelling. For example, they
represent its underlying log structure (a Merkle tree) as a list.
 Weakness
The weakness of ARPKI is that all n designated service providers have to
be involved in all the processes (i.e. certicate registration, conrmation, and
update), which would cause considerable extra latencies and the delay of client
connections.
3.4 Observations
Based on the above analysis, we observed the advantage and weakness in each cate-
gory. This section discusses the observations based on dierent perspectives, i.e. on
the property perspective and on the system perspective. In addition, this section
summarises our observation regarding to the leading proposals in Table 3.2.
3.4.1 Property Perspective
We summarise our observations on dierent system categories according to the per-
spective of identied properties.
Trust agility
The current CA model does not provide this feature, since any compromised CA
can issue valid certicates for any domain server. Similarly, systems in the category
of Scope restriction also do not provide this feature, because they merely restrict
the set of domains that CAs can issue certicates for. Most systems in dierence
observation oer this feature, as any one can be a notary server, and users can select
which notary servers they want to trust, and any notary server will not be inuenced
by other notary servers.
Anti-oligopoly
Systems in the category of dierence observation normally provide this feature,
as the number of observers are not xed. In addition, the certicate verication
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Table 3.2: Evaluation of proposals
Desired Features Classic Dierence observation Scope restriction Cert Mngmt Trans
CA-based Perspectives Convergence TACK PKP DANE CT ARPKI
Trust
Trust agility  p p p1   p p
Free of trusted parties    p1    
Veriable of trusted parties       p p
Anti-oligopoly  p p p    
Availability
Oine verication
p  
2 p p p p p
Built-in key revocation        p
Scalability
p p p 1 p p p p
Multiple certicate support
p   p p p p 
Timely key verication
p  p  p p p p
Security
First connection protection
p p p  p p p p
DOS attack protection
p  
3 p1 p p p p
Use of mis-issued certicate prevention  p p p 
4 
4  p
Use of mis-issued certicate detection  p p p 
4 
4 p p
Provably secure        p
Usability
No user involvement
p  p  p p p p
Privacy
Protecting browsing history
p  p p1 p p p p
p
{ The subject oers this feature.

 { The subject oers this feature but with other concerns.
 { The subject does not oer this feature.
  { Not applicable.
1 We consider the case without using an on-line crowed-sourced pin store. If an online pin store is used, then the result might be
dierent depending on how the store is designed. (The pin store has not been proposed yet.)
2 This feature is satised if and only if the received public key/certicate can be found in the local cache.
3 This feature is satised if and only if the received public key certicate can be found in the local cache, and the subject of the
certicate has not updated its certicate.
4 This feature is satised if the malicious CA is not authorised for the victim domain.
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result relies on the out-of-band checking through a dierent path. So, as far as the
observed certicates are the same one, the client will accept it. Thus, the role of
CA is minimised.
Oine verication
In the current CA model, clients only need to verify the validity of the received
certicate. So, it satises oine verication. Systems in the category of scope
restriction also provide this feature, as the way they work is similar to the current
CA model, but with some restrictions.
Most systems in the category of certicate management transparency oer this
feature as well, because in these systems the proofs to be veried about a certicate
are provided together with the certicate. In contrast, most systems in the dierence
observation category don't oer this feature, because with these systems, clients have
to make additional connections to verify the certicates they obtained.
Built-in key revocation
Most systems in the category of dierence observation and scope restriction do
not provide this feature. Most systems in the category of certicate management
transparency do oer this feature. For example, CIRT proposed a way to manage
certicate revocation by using an advanced log structure; and AKI and ARPKI
manage certicate revocation by only recording the latest certicates of domains in
their logs.
Multiple certicate support
The current CA model oers this feature. Systems in the category of dierence
observation generally don't provide this feature. Because when clients see dierent
certicates of the same website from dierent paths or observers, a warning will be
displayed to clients even if the received certicates are all genuine. Systems in the
category of scope restriction and certicate management transparency provide this
feature.
Timely key verication
Systems in dierence observation are likely to not provide this feature, as the ob-
servers might not be always up to date with all domains.
First connection protection
Systems such as Certicate Patrol, Certlock, and TACK in dierence observation
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do not provide this feature, because they verify the certicate based on what has
been observed in the previous connections.
Denial of service (DoS) attack protection
The CA model oers this feature. All systems in the category of scope restriction
and most systems in the category of certicate management transparency provide
this feature as well. However, some systems in dierence observation require out-
of-band observation, so they will not provide this feature, as the verication server
can be blocked.
Use of mis-issued certicate prevention
All systems in dierence observation, and some systems in the category of certicate
management transparency, provide this feature. In contrast, systems in the category
of scope restriction do not provide this feature if the mis-issued certicate is issued
by a CA who is authorised for the victim domain. For example, DANE cannot
prevent MITM attacks when the fake certicate used by an attacker is issued by the
parent domain of the victim domain.
Use of mis-issued certicate detection
All systems in dierence observation and in certicate management transparency
provide this feature.
3.4.2 System Perspective
As shown in the table, systems in the category of dierence observation provide
better trust-related features. However, they can have diculties to provide a better
availability, because the observer might not have the latest update, the systems in
general do not provide an eective key revocation management, and they require
user involvement to make decisions. Moreover, they can suer from DoS attacks on
the observers.
Systems in the category of scope restriction provide better usability and avail-
ability. However, they have only restricted the power of each trusted parties, but
internet users still need to trust them. This can limit the damage from attacks
launched by malicious CAs, but cannot completely solve the problem.
Systems in the category of certicate management transparency provide better
security and availability. However, anti-monopoly might be a problem for these
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systems. It is desired to provide a fully distributed system and still be able to
remove the need of trusted parties.
Summary As discussed above, dierent systems in dierent categories have dier-
ent pros and cons. Systems in the category of certicate management transparency
is a new research trend, and they seem to provide more desired features than systems
in other categories.
3.5 Conclusion
The current certicate authority trust model is broken. As a result, the communi-
cations between internet users and web servers might be vulnerable to man-in-the-
middle attacks. Interested malicious parties could intercept user communication
and steal user credential data.
Many security-enhanced alternatives have been proposed. Our evaluation shows
that four main concepts are used to design web certicate management systems.
They have dierent advantages and shortcomings, and as yet there is no clear win-
ner. We hope our evaluation framework would help the ongoing research on web
certicate management alternatives.
CHAPTER 4
DISTRIBUTED TRANSPARENT KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a new log-based architecture for managing web certicates,
called Distributed Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI). DTKI minimises the
presence of oligopoly, prevents attacks that use fake certicates, provides a way
to manage certicate revocation, and is secure even if all service providers (e.g. CAs
and log maintainers) collude together. We also provide formal machine-checked
verication of core security properties of DTKI, by using the Tamarin prover.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We rst provide an overview of
DTKI in x4.2, then detail the public log structure in x4.3, and our main protocol in
x4.4. Our security verication and performance evaluation are presented in x4.5 and
x4.6, respectively. The comparison with other systems in the category of certicate
management transparency is given in x4.7, and more discussions are presented in
x4.8.
4.2 Overview
Distributed Transparent Key Infrastructure (DTKI) is an infrastructure for manag-
ing keys and certicates on the web in a way that is transparent, minimises oligopoly,
and allows verication of the behaviour of trusted parties. In DTKI, we mainly have
the following agents:
Certicate log maintainer (CLM): A certicate log maintainer maintains a database
of all valid and invalid (e.g. expired or revoked) certicates for a particular set of
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domains for which it is responsible. It commits to the digest of its log, and is able to
provide eciently veriable proofs of presence or absence of a certicate in its log.
Certicate log maintainers behave transparently and their actions can be veried.
To minimise oligopoly, DTKI does not x the set of certicate logs.
Mapping log maintainer (MLM): The mapping log maintainer maintains asso-
ciation between certicate logs and the domains they are responsible for. It also
commits to digests of the log, and provides the proof of presence of a current asso-
ciation, and behaves transparently. Clients of the mapping log are not required to
blindly trust the maintainer, because they can eciently verify the obtained proofs
with respect to the obtained associations.
Mirror: Mirrors are servers that maintain a full copy of the mapping log and
certicate logs. In other words, mirrors maintain distributed copies of logs. Anyone
(e.g. ISPs, CLMs, CAs, domain owners) can be a mirror. Unlike in SK, mirrors are
not required to be trusted in DTKI, because all information provided by a mirror
must accompany by proofs. The proofs are eciently veriable, and are associated
to the digest committed by log maintainers.
Certicate authority (CA): They check the identity of domain owners, and create
certicates for them. However, in contrast with today's CAs, the ability of CAs in
DTKI is limited since the issuance of a certicate from a CA is not enough to
convince web browsers to accept the certicate (proof of presence of the certicate
in the relevant certicate log is also needed).
In DTKI, each domain owner has two types of certicate, namely TLS certicate
and master certicate. Domain owners can have multiple TLS certicates but can
have only one master certicate. A TLS certicate contains the public key of a
domain server for a TLS connection, whereas the master certicate contains a public
key, called \master verication key". The corresponding secret key of the master
certicate is called \master signing key". Similar to the \sovereign key" in SK
[Eck12], the master signing key is only used to validate a TLS certicate (of the same
subject) by issuing a signature on it. This limits the ability of certicate authorities
since without having a valid signature (issued by using the master signing key), the
TLS certicate will not be accepted. Hence, the TLS secret key is the one for daily
use; and the master signing key is rarely used. (The master signing key will only be
used for validating a new certicate, or revoking an existing certicate.)
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After a domain owner obtains a master certicate or a TLS certicate from a
CA, he needs to make a registration request to the corresponding CLM to publish
the certicate into the log. To do so, the domain owner signs the certicate using
the master signing key, and submits the signed certicate to a CLM determined
(typically based on the top-level domain) by the mapping log maintainer. The
certicate log maintainer checks the signature, and accepts the certicate by adding
it to the certicate log if the signature is valid. The process of revoking a certicate
is handled similarly to the process of registering a certicate in the log.
When establishing a secure connection with a domain server, the browser receives
a certicate from the domain server and proofs from a mirror. The expected proofs
include a proof that the certicate is not revoked, a proof that the certicate is
recorded in the certicate log, and a proof that this certicate log is authorised to
manage certicates for the domain. Users and their browsers should only accept a
certicate if the certicate is issued by a CA, and validated by the domain owner,
and all proofs are successfully veried.
Fake master certicates or TLS certicates can be easily detected by the domain
owner, because the attacker will have had to insert such fake certicates into the log
(in order to be accepted by browsers), and is thus visible to the domain owner.
In order to fool a victim, an attacker will have to insert fake certicates into the
log. So domain owners can easily detect such attacks by checking the log.
Rather than relying solely on trusted monitors to verify the healthiness of logs
and the relations between logs, DTKI uses a crowdsourcing-like way to ensure the
integrity of the log, and to ensure the relations between the mapping log and certi-
cate logs, and between certicate logs. In particular, the monitoring work in DTKI
can be broken into independent little pieces, and thus can be done by distributing
the pieces to users' browsers. In this way, users' browsers can perform randomly-
chosen pieces of the monitoring role in the background (e.g. once a day). Thus, web
users can collectively monitor the integrity of the logs. We envisage parameters in
browsers allowing users to control how that works.
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Table 4.1: The methods supported by the log.
Method Input Output
Size T The size of the Merkle tree T .
Root T The root value of the Merkle tree T .
Last T The data stored in the rightmost side leaf of the Merkle tree T .
This proof can only work if T is a ChronTree.
PoP (T; d) Proof of Presence: The proof that d is in T .
PoC (T; d) Proof of Currency : The proof that d is the latest added data. This
proof can only work if T is a ChronTree.
PoE (T; dg0) Proof of Extension: The proof that the Merkle tree T is an exten-
sion of another Merkle tree whose digest is dg0. This proof can only
work if both trees are ChronTrees.
PoA (T; a) Proof of Absence: The proof that any data d having attribute a is
absent from the Merkle tree T . This proof can only work if T is a
LexTree.
4.3 The public log
DTKI uses append-only logs to record all requests processed by the log maintainer,
and allows log maintainers to generate proofs that can be eciently veried. These
proofs mainly include that some data (e.g. a certicate or a revocation request)
has or has not been added to the log; and that a log is extended from a previous
version. So, the log maintainer's behaviour is transparent to the public. In DTKI,
to provide all needed proofs, the public log is constructed by using two types of data
structures, namely chronological data structure and ordered data structure.
We rst present the two types of data structures encapsulating the desired prop-
erties, together with concrete implementations using Merkle tree [Mer87]. Then, we
explain how to use the data structure to construct our public logs.
4.3.1 Data structures
We use the notion of digest to uniquely characterise a set of data, such that the
size of a digest is a constant. In our implementation (that will be presented later),
the digest of a set of data is the root hash of a Merkle tree storing the set of data.
Table 4.1 summarises the methods that our log supports, according to our detailed
implementation.
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Abstract data structures
A chronological data structure is an append-only data structure, i.e. the only allowed
change operation is adding some data. Let S be a sequence of data, and N and dg be
the size and digest of S, respectively. With a chronological data structure, we have
that d 2 S for some data d, if and only if there exists a proof p of size O(log(N)),
called the proof of presence of d in S, such that p can be eciently veried; and for
all sequence S 0 with digest dg0 and size N 0 < N , we are able to show that S 0 is a
prex of S, if and only if there exists a proof p0 of size O(log(N)), called the proof
of extension of S from S 0, such that p0 can be eciently veried.
The chronological data structure enables one to prove that some data (e.g. a
certicate) is in a set of data (e.g. the log), and a version of the set of data is an
extension of a previous version. The size of these proofs are small, i.e. O(log(N)),
and the proofs can be eciently veried. This is useful for our public log since it
enables users to verify the history of a log maintainer's behaviours.
Unfortunately, the chronological data structure does not provide all desired fea-
tures needed for our log. For example, it is very inecient to verify that some
data (e.g. a certicate revocation request) is not in the chronological data structure
(the cost is O(N)). To provide missing features, we need to use the ordered data
structure.
An ordered data structure is a data structure allowing one to insert, delete, and
modify stored data. In addition, with an ordered data structure, we have d 2 S
(resp. d =2 S) for some data d, if and only if there exists a proof p of size O(log(N)),
called the proof of presence (resp. absence) of d in (resp. not in) S, such that p can
be eciently veried.
With an ordered data structure, however, the size of proof that the current
version of the data is extended from a previous version is O(N). As the chronological
data structure and the ordered data structure have complementary properties, we
will use the combination of them to organise our log. We rst dene the concrete
data structures, then introduce how to construct the two data structures in detail,
and nally show how to use them to construct our public logs.
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Chronological data structure implementation
Possible implementations of chronological data structure include append-only Merkle
tree [Mer87] and append-only skip list, as proposed in [LLK13] and [MB03], respec-
tively. Our implementation of the chronological data structure is called ChronTree,
which is based on the Merkle tree structure. We consider a secure hash function
(e.g. SHA256), denoted h.
A ChronTree T is a binary tree whose nodes are labelled by bitstrings such that:
 every leaf node is labeled by a data item being stored in the ChronTree; and
 every non-leaf node in T has two children, and is labelled with h(t`; tr) where
t` (resp. tr) is the label of its left child (resp. right child); and
 the subtree rooted by the left child of a node is perfect, and its height is greater
than or equal to the height of the subtree rooted by the right child.
Here, a subtree is \perfect" if every non-leaf node of the subtree has two children
and all leaves of the subtree have the same depth.
Note that a ChronTree is a not necessarily a balanced tree. The two trees in
Figure 4.1 are examples of ChronTrees where the data stored are the bitstrings
denoted d1; : : : ; d6.
h(h(d1; d2); d3)
h(d1; d2)
d1 d2
d3
r
(a) ChronTree Ta
h(h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4)); h(d5; d6))
h(d5; d6)
d5 d6
h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4))
h(d1; d2)
d1 d2
h(d3; d4)
d3 d4
r
`
`
(b) ChronTree Tb
Figure 4.1: Example of two ChronTrees, Ta and Tb.
Given a ChronTree T with N leaves, we use S(T ) = [d1; : : : ; dN ] to denote the
sequence of bitstrings stored in T . Note that a ChronTree is completely dened
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by the sequence of data stored in the leaves. Moreover, we say that the size of a
ChronTree is the number its leaves.
Intuitively, a proof of presence of d in T contains the minimum amount of infor-
mation necessary to recompute the label of the root of T from the leaf containing
d. The algorithm that outputs the unique proof is dened as follows.
Given a bitstring d and a ChronTree T , the proof of presence of d in T exists if
there is a leaf n1 in T labelled by d; and is dened as (w; [b1; : : : ; bk]) such that:
 w is the position in f`; rg of n1 (that is, the sequence of left or right choices
which lead from the root to n1), and jwj = k; and
 if n1; : : : ; nk+1 is the path from n1 to the root, then for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg, bi is
the label of the sibling node of ni.
Given d, (w; seq) and (h;N), to verify that (w; seq) proves the presence of d in
the ChronTree T such that Root(T ) = h and Size(T ) = N , a verier should check
jwj = jseqj, and verify if the nal output of following algorithm f(w; seq; d) is equal
to h. For some value t, the algorithm is dened as follows:
 f(null; []; t) = t
 f(w  `; [b1; : : : ; bk]; t) = f(w; [b2; : : : ; bk]; h(t; b1))
 f(w  r; [b1; : : : ; bk]; t) = f(w; [b2; : : : ; bk]; h(b1; t))
Example 4.1. Consider the ChronTree Tb of Figure 4.1. The proof of presence of
d3 in Tb is the tuple (w; seq) where:
 w = `  r  `
 seq = [d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)]
To verify the above proof, one needs to check if the reconstructed hash value
is equal to the root hash of Tb, i.e. whether h(h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4)); h(d5; d6)) =
Root(Tb) or not.
The proof of currency is the same as the proof of presence, but there is an extra
constraint for the verier to check, namely that the path w to the leaf (e.g., the
path from the root to d6 in Tb of Figure 4.1) is of the form r  r : : :  r.
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Let T and T 0 be ChronTrees of size N and N 0, digest h and h0, respectively,
such that N 0  N , S(T ) = [d1; : : : ; dN 0 ; : : : ; dN ], and S(T 0) = [d1; : : : ; dN 0 ] for some
bitstrings d1, : : :, dN 0 , : : :, dN . In the binary representation of a number, we consider
that the rightmost bit is at position 0. For example in 01001100, the smallest position
of the bit 1 is 2.
The proof of extension of T 0 into T is the list of nodes in the ChronTree required
to verify that the rst N 0 data items S(T 0) are equal in both trees. We dene an
algorithm that outputs the unique proof.
Let m be the smallest position of the bit \1" in the binary representation of N 0;
and let (d; w) be the (m+ 1)-th node in the path of the node labelled by dN 0 to the
root in T , where d is a bitstring and w 2 f`; rg indicates the position of this node.
Finally, let (w; seq0) be the proof of presence of d in T . The proof of extension of T 0
into T is dened as the sequence seq of bitstrings such that
 if N 0 = 2k for some k, then seq = seq0; otherwise
 seq = djjseq0, where jj is the concatenation operation.
Example 4.2. The proof of extension of Ta into Tb (Figure 4.1) is the sequence
seq = [d3; d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)]. In more detail, since the size N
0 of Ta is 3 and
the binary representation of which is 11, we have that m = 0. In addition, since
the size does not satisfy N 0 = 2k
0
for some k0 2 N, we have that seq = d3jjseq0,
where d3 is the (m+ 1)-th node (i.e. the rst node) in the path of the node labelled
by dN 0 to the root in Tb, and seq
0 = [d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)] is the sequence in the
proof (w; seq0) of presence of d3 in Tb. Thus, the proof of extension of Ta into Tb is
[d3; d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)].
Let w1  w2 and w01  w2 be the position of the node labelled by dN 0 in T and T 0,
respectively. Given (N; h), (N 0; h0), and seq = [d1; : : : ; dk], the verication of the
above proof seq of extension is dened as follows:
 if N 0 = 2k0 for some k0 2 N, then verify that (w1; seq) is the proof of presence
of a node labelled by h0 in T ;
 otherwise, we have jw1j = k   1, and if we denote w1 = ak  : : :  a2 and if
S = [i1; : : : ; ip] is the increasing sequence of integer such that 8j 2 S, aj = r;
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and 8j 2 f2; : : : ; kg nS, aj = ` then we have that (w1; [b2; : : : ; bk]) is the proof
of presence of b1 in T , and (w
0
1; [bi1 ; : : : ; bip ]) is the proof of presence of b1 in
T 0.
Example 4.3. Figure 4.1 is the graphical representation of the verication of the
proof of extension of Ta into Tb. Given size and root of Ta and Tb, one can derive
the shape of the trees (so the position of the node labelled by dN 0 in T and T
0), and
verify the proof (generated in the previous example). In more detail, since N 0, which
is the size of Ta, does not satisfy N
0 = 2k
0
for some k0 2 N, the verier knows that
w1 = k   1, where k = jseqj = 4. So, we have w1 = `  r  ` = a4  a3  a2, w01 = r,
w2 = null, and S = [b3], where b3 is the third elements, i.e. h(d1; d2), in seq. Thus,
the nal check the verier needs to perform is that (`  r  `; [d4; h(d1; d2); h(d5; d6)])
proves the presence of d3 in Tb, and (r; [h(d1; d2)]) proves the presence of d3 in Ta.
Ordered data structure implementation
Possible implementations of the ordered data structure include lexicographically
ordered Merkle tree ([Rya14]), and authenticated dictionaries [AGT01]. Our imple-
mentation of the ordered data structure is called LexTree, which is the combination
of a binary search tree and a Merkle tree. The idea is that we can regroup all the
information about a subject into a single node of the binary search tree, and while
being able to eciently generate and verify the proof of presence. We consider a
total order on bitstrings denoted . This order could be the lexicographic order in
the ASCII representations but it could be any other total order on bitstrings.
A LexTree T is a binary search tree over pairs of bitstrings
 for all two pairs (d; h) and (d0; h0) of bitstrings in T , (d; h) occurs in a node
left of the occurrence of (d0; h0) if and only if d  d0 lexicographically;
 for all nodes n 2 T , n is labelled with the pair (d; h(d; h`; hr)) where d is some
bistring and (d`; h`) (resp. (dr; hr)) is the label of its left child (resp. right
child) if it exists; or the constant null otherwise.
Note that contrary to a ChronTree, the same set of data can be represented by
dierent LexTrees depending on how the tree is balanced. To avoid this situation,
we assume that there is a pre-agreed way for balancing trees.
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d6, h(d6; h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5); h(d10; h(d8; h7; h9); h(d12; h11; null)))
d10, h(d10; h(d8; h7; h9); h(d12; h11; null))
d8, h(d8; h7; h9)
d7, h7 d9, h9
d12, h(d12; h11; null)
d11; h11
d4, h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5)
d2; h(d2; h1; h3)
d1; h1 d3; h3
d5; h5
Figure 4.2: An example of a LexTree Tc, where hi = h(di; null; null) for all i =
f1; 3; 5; 7; 9; 11g
Example 4.4. The tree in Figure 4.2 is an example of LexTree where d1  d2 
: : :  d12.
Similar to ChronTree, the verication of the proof of presence of some data d in
a LexTree T is to reconstruct the hash value of the root of T .
Example 4.5. Consider the LexTree T of Figure 4.2. The proof of presence of d8
in T is the tuple (h`; hr; seqd; seqh) where:
 h` = h7 and hr = h9; and
 seqd = [d10; d6]
 seqh = [h(d12; h11; null); h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5)]
The proof of absence of some data d in a LexTree can be done by showing that
two data items di and dj for some i and j are adjacent in the left-right traversal of
LexTree, while lexicographically we have dj < d < dj; this is also O(log(N)).
Example 4.6. Consider the Tc of Figure 4.2, and some data d such that d7  d 
d8. The proof of absence of d in Tc is the tuple (null; null; seqd; seqh) where:
 seqd = [d7; d8; d10; d6]
 seqh = [h9; h(d12; h11; null); h(d4; h(d2; h1; h3); h5)]
To verify this proof, one needs to verify that both d7 and d8 are present in Tc, and
d8 is the smallest one larger than d7 lexicographically according to their positions
in Tc, as shown in Figure 4.2.
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4.3.2 The mapping log
To minimise oligopoly, DTKI uses multiple certicate logs, and does not x the set
of certicate logs and the mapping between domains and certicate logs. The map-
ping log records associations between domain names and certicate log maintainers,
and its maintainer can provide eciently veriable proofs regarding the current as-
sociation. Due to the large number of domains, it would be rather inecient to
explicitly associate each domain name to a certicate log. To address this problem,
we use a class of simple regular expressions to present a group of domain names,
and record the associations between regular expressions and certicate logs in the
mapping log. For example, (*n.org, Clog1) and ([a-h].*n.com, Clog1) mean that
certicate log maintainer Clog1 is authorised for all domains end with :org and all
domains start with letters from a to h end with :com.
Intuitively, the mapping log is organised by using a chronological data structure,
and stores received requests together with the request time, and four digests of
dierent ordered data structures representing the status of the log. Each record is
of the form
h(req; t; dgs; dgbl; dgr; dgi)
In this formula, as presented in Figure 4.3, req is the request received by the mapping
log at time t; dgs1 stores information about certicate log maintainers (e.g. the
certicate of the certicate log maintainer, and the current digest of the certicate
log clog); dgbl stores the identity of blacklisted certicate log maintainers; dgr stores
the mapping from a regular expression to the identity of certicate log maintainers,
and dgi stores the mapping from the identity of certicate log maintainers to a set
of regular expressions.
In more detail, each record of the mapping log contains digests after processing
the request req (received by the mapping log maintainer at time t) on the digest
stored in the previous record. Each of the notations is explained as follows:
 req includes add(rgx; id), del(rgx; id), new(cert), mod(cert; signfcert0gsk;
signfn; dg; tgsk0), bl(id), and end, respectively corresponding to a request to
1We simplied the description here: we should say the ordered data structure represented by
dgs stores the information, rather than the digest dgs stores it. We will use this simplication
through the thesis.
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add a mapping (rgx; id) of regular expression rgx and identity id of a clog, to
delete a mapping (rgx; id), to add a certicate cert of a new clog, to change
the certicate of a clog from cert to cert0, to blacklist id of an existing clog,
and to close the update request; where sk and sk0 are signing keys associated
to the certicate cert and cert0, respectively; cert and cert0 share the same
subject, and n and dg are the size and the digest of the corresponding clog at
time t, respectively;
 dgs is the digest of an ordered data structure storing the identity information
of the form (cert; signfn; dg; tgsk for the currently active certicate logs, where
cert is the certicate for the signing key sk of the certicate log, and n and dg
are respectively the size and digest of the certicate log at time t. Data are
ordered by the domain name in cert.
 dgbl is the digest of an ordered data structure storing the domain names of
blacklisted certicate logs. Data are ordered by the domain names.
 dgr is the digest of an ordered data structure storing elements of the form
(rgx; id), which represents the mapping from regular expression rgx to the
identity id of a clog, data are ordered by rgx;
 dgi is the digest of an ordered data structure storing elements of the form
(id; dgirgx), which represents the mapping from identity id of a clog to a digest
dgirgx of ordered data structure storing a set of regular expressions, data are
ordered by id.
The requests are used for modifying mappings or the existing set of certicate
log maintainers. For example, when a request del(rgx; id) (or add(rgx; id)) has been
processed, the mapping between the certicate log with identity id and regular ex-
pression rgx is revoked (resp. created). After appending all needed update requests
in an update, the end will be appended in the mapping log to indicate that the
current update process is done.
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h(req; t; dgs; dgbl; dgr; dgi)
request req received at time t, where req includes
add(rgx; id), del(rgx; id), new(cert),
mod(cert; signfcert0gsk; signfn; h; tgsk0), bl(id), and end.
dgs is the digest of an ordered data structure storing
(cert; signfn; dg; tgsk)
dgbl is the digest of an ordered data structure storing the
identity of blacklisted certicate logs
dgr is the digest of an ordered data structure storing
(rgx; id)
dgi is the digest of an ordered data structure storing
(id; dgirgx), where dgirgx is the digest of an ordered data
structure storing a set of rgx associated to the corre-
sponding id
Figure 4.3: A gure representation of the format of each record in the mapping log.
4.3.3 Certicate logs
A certicate log mainly stores certicates for domains according to the mappings
presented in the mapping log. In particular, a certicate log is organised by using a
chronological data structure, and each record of the log is of the form
h(req;N; dgrgx)
where req is the received request and is processed at the time such that the mapping
log is of size N ; dgrgx represents an ordered data structure storing a set of map-
pings from regular expressions to the information associated to the corresponding
domains, such that the domain name is an instance of the regular expression. The
stored information of a domain includes the identity and the master certicate of the
domain, and two digests dga and dgrv each presents an ordered data structure stor-
ing a set of active TLS certicates and a set of expired or revoked TLS certicates,
respectively.
Elements in a record (as shown in 4.4) of a certicate log are detailed as follows.
 req includes reg(signfcert; t; `reg'gsk), rev(signfcert; t; `rev'gsk, upadd(h(id); h),
and updel(h(id); h). In which, the request reg(signfcert; t; `reg'gsk) (or
rev(signfcert; t; `rev'gsk) is a request to register (resp. revoke) a certicate
cert signed by using the master key sk, at an agreed time t, where `reg' and
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`rev' are constant. upadd(h(id); h) (or updel(h(id); h)) is the request to update
the certicate log by adding (resp. deleting) certicates of identity id accord-
ing to the changes of mlog, where h is the digest presenting the status of id
at time t. The status of id includes its master certicate, and the set of its
active certicates and the set of its revoked certicates.
 N is the size of mlog at the time req is processed;
 dgrgx is the digest of an ordered data structure storing a set of elements of the
form (rgx; dgid), represents the status of the certicate log after processing
the request req, and stores all the regular expressions rgx that the certicate
log is associated to. dgid is the digest of an ordered data structure storing
a set of elements of the form (h(id); h(cert; dga; dgrv)). It represents all do-
mains associated to rgx. id is an instance of rgx and is the subject of master
certicate cert. dga and dgrv are digests of two ordered data structures each
of which respectively stores a set of active and revoked TLS certicates. In
addition, data in the structure represented by dgrgx and dgid are ordered by
rgx and h(id), respectively; data in the structure represented by dga and dgrv
are ordered by the subject of TLS certicates.
Note that requests upadd(h(id); h) and updel(h(id); h) are made according to the
mapping log. Even though these modications are not requested by domain owners,
it is important to record them in the certicate log to ensure the transparency of
the log maintainer's behaviour. Request upadd(h(id); h) states that the certicate
log maintainer is authorised to manage certicates for the domain name id from
now on, and the current status of certicates for id is represented by h, where
h = h(cert; dga; dgrv) for some master certicate cert and some digest dga and dgrv
representing the active and revoked certicates of id. h is the value obtained from
the certicate log that is previously authorised to manage certicates for domain
id. Similarly, request updel(h(id); h) indicates that the certicate log cannot manage
certicates for domain id any more according to the request in the mapping log.
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h(req;N; dgrgx)
req can be
reg(signfcert; t:`reg'gsk,
rev(signfcert; t; `rev'gsk),
upadd(h(id); h),
or updel(h(id); h)
N is the size of the
mapping log at the time
that req is processed
dgrgx is the digest of an ordered
data structure storing a set of el-
ements of the form (rgx; dgid)
dgid is the digest of an ordered data
structure storing a set of elements
of the form (h(id); h(cert; dga; dgrv))
dga is the digest of an or-
dered data structure storing
all valid certicates of id
dgrv is the digest of an ordered
data structure storing all
revoked certicates of id
Figure 4.4: A gure representation of the format of each record in the certicate
log.
4.3.4 Synchronising the mapping log and certicate logs
The mapping log periodically (e.g. every day) publishes a signature signft; dg;Ngsk,
called signed Mlog time-stamp, on a time t indicating the publishing time, and the
digest dg and size N of the mapping log. Similarly, certicate log maintainers also
publishes their signed Clog time-stamp periodically. Mirrors need to download these
signed data, and update their copy of logs when the logs are updated. A signed
time-stamp is only valid for a short period (e.g. one day). Note that mirrors can
provide the same set of proofs as the log maintainers, since they have a complete
copy of the logs. Mirrors are not required to be trusted, because they do not need to
sign anything, and a mirror which altered a log cannot convince browsers to accept
it since the mirror cannot forge a signed time-stamp.
When a mapping log maintainer needs to update the mapping log, he requests
all certicate log maintainers to perform the required update, and expects to receive
the digest and size of all certicate logs once they are updated. After the mapping
log maintainer receives these conrmations from all certicate log maintainers, he
publishes the series of update requests in the mapping log, and appends an extra
constant request end after them in the log to indicate that the update is done.
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Log maintainers only answer requests according to their newly updated log if
the mapping log maintainer has published the update requests in the mapping log.
If requests received during the log update period, log maintainers will answer to the
request according to the version of their log before the update started.
We say that the mapping log and certicate logs are synchronised, if certicate
logs have completed the log update according to the request in the mapping log. Note
that a mis-behaving certicate log maintainer (e.g. one recorded fake certicates in
his log, or did not correctly update his log according to the request of the mapping
log) can be terminated by the mapping log maintainer by putting the certicate
log maintainer's identity into the blacklist, which is organised as an ordered data
structure represented by dgbl (as presented in 4.3.2).
4.4 Detailed implementation
Distributed transparent key infrastructure (DTKI) contains three main protocols,
namely certicate publication, certicate verication, and log verication. In the
certicate publication protocol, domain owners can upload new certicates and re-
voke existing certicates in the certicate log they are assigned to; in the certicate
verication protocol, one can verify the validity of a certicate; and in the log veri-
cation protocol, one can verify whether a log behaves correctly.
Let Alice be an internet user who wants to securely communicate with a domain
owner Bob who maintains the domain example:com.
4.4.1 Certicate publication
To insert or revoke certicates in the certicate log, the domain owner Bob needs to
know which certicate log is authorised to record certicates for his domain. This
can be done by communicating with the maintainer of (a mirror of) the mapping
log. We detail the protocol for requesting the mapping for Bob's domain.
Request mappings Upon receiving the request, the mirror locates the certicate
of the authorised certicate log maintainer, and generates proofs that
a) the provided information is the latest information; and
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vk(skmlog), cache := (dg
0
mlog; N
0
mlog; t
0
mlog; 
0
mlog)
Domain owner Bob
mlog, mlog
Mirror
request forexample:com
- P1 := proof that h = h(req; t; dg
s; dgbl; dgr; dgi)
is the rightmost leaf in the tree represented by dgmlog
- Locate cert of the authorised CLM for example:com
- P2 := proof of presence that (cert; signfn; dg; tgsk)
in the ordered data structure presented by dgs
- Locate the subject id of cert in the
ordered data structure represented by dgr
- P3 := proof of presence that (rgx; id) in the
ordered data structure represented by dgr
- m := (mlog; cert; signfn; dg; tgsk; rgx; id; h)
(m;P1; P2; P3)
- Verify all signatures
- Verify that example:com is an instance of rgx
- Verify that id is the subject of cert
- Verify (P1; P2; P3)
(dg0mlog; N
0
mlog)
P4 := proof of extension of (dg
0
mlog; N
0
mlog) into (dgmlog; Nmlog)
P4
Verify P4
Figure 4.5: The protocol presenting how domain owner Bob requests a mapping
for his domain example:com with a mirror of mapping log. In which, 0mlog =
signft0mlog; dg0mlog; N 0mloggskmlog , and mlog = signftmlog; dgmlog; Nmloggskmlog
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b) the certicate for the certicate log maintainer is recorded in the log;
c) the certicate log maintainer is authorised for the domain.
Loosely speaking, proof a) is the proof that both dgs and dgr are present in
the latest record of the mapping log; proof b) is the proof that the certicate with
subject id is present in dgs; and proof c) is the proof that the mapping from regular
expression rgx to identity id is present in the digest dgr (as presented in the mapping
log structure), such that example:com is an instance of rgx, and id is the identity
of the certicate log maintainer. All proofs should be linked to the latest digest
signed by the mapping log maintainer. If Bob has previously observed a version of
the mlog, then a proof that the current mlog is an extension of the version that Bob
observed will also be provided.
Bob accepts the response if all proofs are valid. He then stores the veried data
in his cache for future connection until the signed digest is expired.
In more detail, after a mirror receives a request from Bob, the mirror ob-
tains the data of the latest element of its copy of the mapping log, denoted h =
h(req; t; dgs; dgbl; dgr; dgi), and generates the proof of its presence in the digest (de-
noted dgmlog) of its log of size N . Then, it generates the proof of presence of the
element (cert; signfn; dg; tgsk) in the digest dgs for some signfn; dg; tgsk. This proves
that the certicate log associated to cert is still active. Moreover, it generates the
proof of presence of some element (rgx; id) in the digest dgr, where id is the sub-
ject of cert and example:com is an instance of the regular expression rgx. This
proves that id is authorised to store the certicates of example:com. The mirror
then sends to Bob the hash h, the signature signfn; dg; tgsk, the regular expression
rgx, the three generated proofs of presence, and the latest signed Mlog time-stamp
containing the time tmlog, and digest dgmlog and size Nmlog of the mapping log.
Bob rst veries the received signed Mlog time-stamp with the public key of
the mapping log maintainer embedded in the browser, and veries whether tMlog
is valid or not. Then Bob checks that example:com is an instance of rgx, and
veries the three dierent proofs of presence. If all checks hold, then Bob sends
the signed Mlog time-stamp containing (t0Mlog; dg
0
mlog; N
0
mlog) that he stored during
a previous connection, and expects to receive a proof of extension of (dg0mlog; N
0
mlog)
into (dgmlog; Nmlog). If the received proof of extension is valid, then Bob stores the
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current signed Mlog time-stamp, and believes that the certicate log with identity
id, certicate cert, and size that should be no smaller than n, is currently authorised
for managing certicates for his domain.
Insert and revoke certicates At the rst time when Bob wants to publish a
certicate for his domain, he needs to generate a pair of master signing key, denoted
skm, and verication key. The latter is sent to a certicate authority, which veries
Bob's identity and issues a master certicate certm for Bob. After Bob receives his
master certicate, he checks the correctness of the information in the certicate.
The TLS certicate can be obtained in the same way.
To publish the master certicate, Bob signs the certicate together with the
current time t by using the master signing key skm, and sends it together with the
request AddReq to the authorised certicate log maintainer whose signing key is
denoted skclog. The certicate log maintainer checks whether there exists a valid
master certicate for example:com; if there is one, then the log maintainer aborts
the conversation. Otherwise, the log maintainer veries the validity of time t and
the signature.
If they are all valid, the log maintainer updates the log, generates the proof of
presence that the master certicate for Bob is included in the log, and sends the
signed proof and the updated digest of the log back to Bob. If the signature and
the proof are valid, and the size of the log is no smaller than what the mirror says,
then Bob accepts and stores the response as an evidence of successful certicate
publication. If Bob has previously observed a version of the clog, then a proof that
the current clog is an extension of the version that Bob observed is also required.
Figure 4.6 presents the detailed process to publish the master certicate certm.
After a log maintainer receives and veries the request from Bob, the log maintainer
updates the log, generates the proof of presence of (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in
dgid, (rgx; dgid) in dgrgx, and h(reg(signfcertm; t; `reg'gskm); Nmlog; dgrgx) is the last
element in the data structure represented by dgclog, where id is the subject of certm
and an instance of rgx; reg(signfcertm; t; `reg'gskm) is the register request to adding
certm into the certicate log with digest dgclog at time t. The log maintainer then
issues a signature on (dgclog; N; h), where N is the size of the certicate log, and
h = h((rgx; dgid); dgrgx; P ), where P is the sequence of the generated proofs, and
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sends the signature 2 together with (dgclog; N; rgx; dg
id; dgrgx; dga; dgrv; P ) to Bob.
If the signature and the proof are valid, and N is no smaller than the size n contained
in the signed Mlog time-stamp that Bob received from the mirror, then Bob stores
the signed (dgclog; N; h), sends the previous stored (dg
0
clog; N
0) to the certicate log
maintainer, and expects to receive a proof of extension of (dg0clog; N
0) into (dgclog; N).
If the received proof of extension is valid, then Bob believes that he has successfully
published the new certicate.
Note that it is important to send (dg0clog; N
0) after receiving (dgclog; N), because
otherwise the log maintainer could learn the digest that Bob has, then give a pair
(dg00clog; N
00) of digest and size of the log such that N 0 < N 00 < N . This may open a
window to attackers who wants to convince Bob to use a certicate which was valid
in dg00clog but revoked in dgclog.
In addition, if Bob has run the request mapping protocol more than once, and has
obtained a digest that is dierent from his local copy of the corresponding certicate
log, then he should ask the certicate log maintainer to prove that one of the digests
is an extension of the other.
The process of adding a TLS certicate is similar to the process of adding a
master certicate, but the log maintainer needs to verify that the TLS certicate is
signed by the valid master signing key corresponding to the master certicate in the
log.
To revoke a (master or TLS) certicate, the domain owner can perform a process
similar to the process of adding a new certicate. For a revocation request with
signfcert; tgskm , the log maintainer needs to check that signfcert; t0gskm is already in
the log and t > t0. This ensures that the same master key is used for the revocation.
4.4.2 Certicate verication
When Alice wants to securely communicate with example:com, she sends the con-
nection request to Bob, and expects to receive a master certicate certm and a signed
TLS certicate signfcert; tgskm from him. To verify the received certicates, Alice
checks whether the certicates are expired. If both of them are still in the validity
time period, Alice requests (as described in 4.4.1) the corresponding mapping from
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vk(sk), skm, cache := (dg
0
clog; N
0; h01; 0)
Domain owner Bob
sk, clog
Mirror
1 := signfcertm; tgskm
(AddReq; certm; t; 1)
- Check that there is no existing master certicate for Bob
- Verify certm, t, 1
- add certm; t; 1 to the log
- dgclog := digest of the log
- N := size of the log
- P1 := proof of presence of h(reg(signfcertm; t; `reg'gskm);
Nmlog; dg
rgx) is the N th element in dgclog
- P2 := proof of presence of (rgx; dg
id) in dgrgx
- P3 := proof of presence of (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid
- P := [P1; P2; P3]
- m := (rgx; dgid; dgrgx; dga; dgrv; P )
- 2 := signfdgclog; N; h(m)gsk
(dgclog; N;m; 2)
- Verify 2
- Verify each proof in P
(dg0clog; N
0)
P4 := proof of extension of (dg
0
clog; N
0) into (dgclog; N)
P4
Verify P4
Figure 4.6: The protocol presenting how domain owner Bob communicates with a
mirror of the certicate log to publish a master certicate certm.
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vk(sk); certm; (cert; t); cache := (dg
0
clog; N
0; t0A; h
0; 0)
Alice's browser
sk, clog
Mirror
(VerifReq; tA; cert; certm)
- Locate rgx, certm, cert
- dgclog := digest of the log
- N := size of the log
- P1 := proof of presence of h(req;Nmlog; dg
rgx)
is the N th element in dgclog
- P2 := proof of presence of (rgx; dg
id) in dgrgx
- P3 := proof of presence of (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid
- P4 := proof of presence of cert in dg
a
- P := [P1; : : : ; P4]
- m := (dga; dgrv; rgx; dgid; req;Nmlog; dg
rgx; P )
-  := signfdgclog; N; tA; h(m)gsk
(dgclog; N;m; )
- Verify tA and signature with vk(sk)
- Verify each proof in P
(dg0clog; N
0)
P5 := proof of extension of (dg
0
clog; N
0) into (dgclog; N)
P5
Verify that P5
Figure 4.7: The protocol for verifying a certicate with a mirror of the corresponding
certicate log.
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a mirror to nd out the authorised certicate log for example:com, and communi-
cates with the (mirror of) authorised certicate log maintainer to verify the received
certicate.
Note that this verication requests extra communication round trips, but it gives
a higher security guarantee. An alternative way is that Bob provides both certicates
and proofs, and Alice veries the received proofs directly.
The Figure 4.7 presents the detailed process of verifying a certicate. After
Alice learns the identity of the authorised certicate log, she sends the verication
request V erifReq with her local time tA and the received certicate to the certicate
log maintainer. The time tA is used to prevent replay attacks, and will later be
used for accountability. The certicate log maintainer checks whether tA is in an
acceptable time range (e.g. tA is in the same day as his local time). If it is, then
he locates the corresponding (rgx; dgid) in dgrgx in the latest record of his log such
that example:com is an instance of regular expression rgx, locates (h(id); h(certm;
dga; dgrv)) in dgid and cert in dga, then generates the proof of presence of cert in
dga, (h(id); h(certm; dg
a; dgrv)) in dgid, (rgx; dgid) in dgrgx, and h(req;Nmlog; dg
rgx)
is the latest record in the digest dgclog of the log with size N . Then, the certicate
log maintainer signs (dgclog; N; tA; h), where h = h(m) such that m = (dg
a; dgrv;
rgx; dgid; req;Nmlog; dg
rgx; P ), and P is the set of proofs, and sends (dgclog; N; ) to
Alice.
Alice should verify that Nmlog is the same as her local copy of the size of mapping
log. If the received Nmlog is greater than the copy, then it means that the mapping
log is changed (it rarely happens) and Alice should run the request mapping protocol
again. If Nmlog is smaller, then it means the certicate log maintainer has misbe-
haved. Alice then veries the signature and proofs, and sends the previously stored
dg0clog with the size N
0 to the log maintainer, and expects to receive the proof of
extension of (dg0clog; N
0) into (dgclog; N). If they are all valid, then Alice replaces the
corresponding cache by the signed (dgclog; N; tA; h) and believes that the certicate
is an authentic one.
In order to preserve privacy of Alice's browsing history, instead of asking Alice
to query all proofs from the log maintainer, Alice can send the request to Bob who
will redirect the request to the log maintainer, and redirect the received proofs from
the log maintainer to Alice.
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With DTKI, Alice is able to verify whether Bob's domain has a certicate by
querying the proof of absence of certicates for example:com in the corresponding
certicate log. This is useful to prevent TLS stripping attacks, where an attacker
can maliciously convert an HTTPS connection into an HTTP connection.
4.4.3 Log verication
Users of the system need to verify that the mapping log maintainer and certicate
log maintainers did update their log correctly according to the requests they have
received, and certicate log maintainers did follow the latest mappings specied in
the mapping log.
These checks can be easily done by a trusted monitor. However, to reduce the
need of trusted parties, DTKI uses a crowdsourcing-like method, based on random
checking, to monitor the correctness of the public log. The basic idea of random
checking is that each user randomly selects a record in the log, and veries whether
the request and data in this record have been correctly managed. If all records
are veried, the entire log is veried. Users only need to run the random checking
periodically (e.g. once a day). We provide some examples of the random checking.
Example 4.7 presents the random checking process to verify the correct behaviour
of the mapping log.
Example 4.7. Suppose verier has randomly selected the kth record of the mapping
log, and the record has the form h(add(rgx; id); tk; dg
s
k; dg
bl
k ; dg
r
k; dg
i
k). The verier
should check that all digests in this record are updated from the (k   1)th record by
adding a new mapping (rgx; id) in the mapping log at time tk.
Let the label of the (k   1)th record be h(reqk 1; tk 1; dgsk 1; dgblk 1; dgrk 1; dgik 1),
then to verify the correctness of this record, the verier should run the following
process:
 tk > tk 1;
 verify that dgsk = dgsk 1 and dgblk = dgblk 1; and
 verify that dgrk is the result of adding (rgx; id) into dgrk 1; and
 verify that dgik is the result of replacing (id; dgirgxk 1 ) in dgik 1 by (id; dgirgxk ); and
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 verify that dgirgxk is the result of adding rgx into dgirgxk 1 .
Note that all proofs required in the above are given by the log maintainer. If the
above tests succeed, then the mapping log maintainer has behaved correctly for this
record.
Every time a certicate log maintainer is blacklisted by the mapping log main-
tainer, Bob checks the authenticity of the master certicate for his domain stored
in the corresponding certicate log.
In addition, we need to ensure that the mapping log maintainer and certicate log
maintainers behaved honestly. In particular, we need to ensure that the mapping log
maintainer and certicate log maintainers did update their log correctly according to
the request, and certicate log maintainers did follow the latest mappings specied
in the mapping log.
The verication on the certicate log is similar to the mapping log. However,
there is one more thing needed to be veried { the synchronisation between the
mapping log and certicate logs. This verication includes that the certicate log
only manage the certicates for domains they are authorised to (according to the
mapping log); and if there are modications on the mapping, then the corresponding
certicate log maintainer should add or remove all certicates according to the
modied mapping. We present an example to show what a verier should do to
verify that the certicate log was authorised to add or remove a certicate.
Example 4.8. Suppose the verier has randomly selected the kth record of a certi-
cate log, and the record has the form h(reg(signfcertTLS; t; `reg'gsk); Nk; dgrgxk ), where
dgrgxk is the digest of ordered sequence of format (rgx; dg
id
k ), dg
id
k is the digest of or-
dered sequence of format (h(id); h(certm; dg
a
k ; dg
rv
k )), certm is a master certicate,
and certTLS is a TLS certicate. Let dg
rgx
k 1 be the digest in the k   1th record, and
similarly for dgidk 1, dg
a
k 1 ,dg
rv
k 1. Let the subject of certTLS be id
0. The verier
should verify the following tests:
 Verify that signfcertTLS; tgsk is correctly signed according to certm; and
 Verify that certm is not expired, and shares the same subject id0 with certTLS,
and id0 = id; and
 Verify that dgak is the result of adding certTLS into dgak 1; and
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 Verify that dgidk is the result of replacing
(h(id); h(certm; dg
a
k 1; dg
rv
k 1)) by (h(id); h(certm; dg
a
k ; dg
rv
k )) in dg
id
k 1; and
 Verify that dgrvk = dgrvk 1; and
 Verify that dgrgxk is the result of replacing (rgx; dgidk 1) by (rgx; dgidk ) in dgrgxk 1;
and
 Verify that (rgx0; id00) is in the dgrNk of the N thk element of the mapping log,
such that rgx0 = rgx, and id0 is the identity of the certicate log.
If the above tests succeed, then the certicate log maintainer behaves correctly on
this record.
4.5 Security Analysis
We consider an adversary who can compromise the private key of all infrastructure
servers in DTKI. In other words, the adversary can collude with all log servers and
certicate authorities to launch attacks.
Main result Our security analysis shows that
 if the distributed random checking has veried all required tests, and domain
owners have successfully veried their initial master certicates, then DTKI
can prevent attacks from the adversary; and
 if the distributed random checking has not completed all required tests, or do-
main owners have not successfully veried their initial master certicates, then
an adversary can launch attacks, but the attacks will be detected afterwards.
We analyse the main security properties of the DTKI protocol using theTamarin
prover [MSCB13]. Since Tamarin prover supports an unbounded number of in-
stances and reasoning about protocols with mutable global state, it is suitable for
our log-based protocol. We provide all source codes and les required to understand
and reproduce our security analysis at Appendix A. In particular, these include the
complete DTKI models and the veried proofs.
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Modeling aspects We used several abstractions during modeling. We model our
log as lists, similar to the abstraction used in [BCK+14]. We also assume that the
random checking is veried, and participants can see the same log.
We model the protocol roles D (domain server), M (mapping log maintainer),
C (certicate log maintainer), and CA (certicate authority) by a set of rewrite
rules. Each rewrite rule typically models receiving a message, taking an appropriate
action, and sending a response message. Our modeling approach is similar to the
one used in most Tamarin models. Our modeling of the roles directly corresponds
to the protocol descriptions in the previous sections. Tamarin provides built-in
support for a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, i.e., one who is in full control of
the network. We additionally specify rules that enable the attacker to compromise
service providers, namely the mapping log maintainer, certicate log maintainers
and CAs, learn their secrets, and modify public logs.
Our nal DTKI model (presented in Appendix A) consists of 959 lines for the
base model and ve main property specications, examples of which we will give
below.
Proof goals We state several proof goals for our model, exactly as specied in
Tamarin's syntax. Since Tamarin's property specication language is a fragment
of rst-order logic, it contains logical connectives (|, &, ==>, not, ...) and quantiers
(All, Ex). In Tamarin, proof goals are marked as lemma. The #-prex is used to
denote timepoints, and \E @ #i" expresses that the event E occurs at timepoint i.
The rst goal is a check for executability that ensures that our model allows for
the successful transmission of a message. It is encoded in the following way.
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* without the adversary compromising any party. */
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& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
"
The property holds if the Tamarin model exhibits a behaviour in which a
domain server received a message without the attacker compromising any service
providers. This property mainly serves as a sanity check on the model. If it did
not hold, it would mean our model does not model the normal (honest) message
ow, which could indicate a aw in the model. Tamarin automatically proves this
property in 49 steps and generates the expected trace in the form of a graphical
representation of the rule instantiations and the message ow.
We additionally proved several other sanity-checking properties to minimize the
risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is a secrecy property with respect to a classical attacker,
and expresses that when no service provider is compromised, the attacker cannot
learn the message exchanged between a user and a domain server. Note that K(m)
is a special event that denotes that the attacker knows m at this time.
lemma message_secrecy_no_compromised_party:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and no party has been compromised */
& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
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& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i5. K(m) @ #i5)
)
"
Tamarin proves this property automatically (in 575 steps).
The above result implies that if a domain server D, whose domain name is Did
such that Did is an instance of regular expression rgx, receives a message that was
sent by a user, and the attacker did not compromise server providers, then the
attacker will not learn the message.
The next two properties encode the unique security guarantees provided by our
protocol, in the case that even all service providers are compromised.
The rst main property we prove is that when all service providers (i.e. CAs,
the MLM, and CLMs) are compromised, and the domain owner has successfully
veried his master certicate in the log, then the attacker cannot learn the message
exchanged between a user and a domain owner. It is proven automatically by
Tamarin in 5369 steps.
lemma message_secrecy_compromise_all_domain_verified_master_cert:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and at an earlier time, the domain server has verified his
master certificate */
& Ex #i2.
VerifiedMasterCert(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD) @ #i2
& #i2 < #i1
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i3. K(m) @ #i3)
)
"
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The property states that if a domain server D receives a message that was sent by
a user, and at an earlier time, the domain server has veried his master certicate,
then even if the attacker can compromise all server providers, the attacker cannot
learn the message.
The nal property states that when all service providers can be compromised,
and a domain owner has not veried his/her master certicate, and the attacker
learns the message exchanged between a user and the domain owner, then afterwards
the domain owner can detect this attack by checking the log. It is also veried by
Tamarin within a few minutes.
lemma detect_bad_records_in_the_log_when_master_cert_not_verified:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD flag stpkD #i1 #i2 #i3.
/* The user has sent an encrypted message aenc{m}stpkD to domain
server D whose identity is Did and TLS key is stpk, and the user
received from D a confirmation h(m) of receipt. */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and the adversary knows m */
& K(m) @ #i2
/* and we afterwards check the log */
& CheckedLog(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, flag, stpkD) @ #i3
& #i1 < #i3)
==>
( /* then we can detect a fake record in the log */
(flag = 'bad')
)
"
4.6 Performance Evaluation
Assumptions We assume that the size of a certicate log is 108 (the total number
of registered domain names currently is 2:71 108 [Dom14], though only a fraction
of them have certicates). In addition, we assume that the number of stored regular
expressions, the number of certicate logs, and the size of the mapping log are 1000
each. (In fact, if we assume a dierent number or size (e.g. 100 or 10000) for them,
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it makes almost no dierence to the conclusion). Moreover, in the certicate log, we
assume that the size of the set of data represented by dgrgx is 10, by dgid is 105, by
dga is 10, and by dgrv is 100. These assumptions are based on the fact that dgrgx
represents the set of regular expressions maintained by a certicate log; the dgid
represents the set of domains which is an instance of a regular expression; and dga
and dgrv represent the set of currently valid certicates and the revoked certicates,
respectively. Furthermore, we assume that the size of a certicate is 1.5 KB, the
size of a signature is 256 bytes, the length of a regular expression and an identity is
20 bytes each, and the size of a digest is 32 bytes.
Space Based on these assumptions, the approximate size of the transmitted data
in the protocol for publishing a certicate is 4 KB, for requesting a mapping is 3 KB,
and for verifying a certicate is 5 KB. Since the protocols for publishing a certicate
and requesting a mapping are run occasionally, we mainly focus on the cost of the
protocol for verifying a certicate, which is required to be run between a log server
and a web browser in each secure connection.
By using Wireshark, we2 measure that the size of data for establishing an HTTPS
protocol to log-in to the internet bank of HSBC, Bank of America, and Citibank
are 647.1 KB, 419.9 KB, and 697.5 KB, respectively. If we consider the average size
(588 KB) of data for these three HTTPS connections, and the average size (6
KB) of data for their corresponding TLS establishment connections, we have that
in each connection, DTKI incurs 83% overhead on the cost of the TLS protocol.
However, since the total overhead of an HTTPS connection is around 588 KB, so
the cost of DTKI only adds 0.9% overhead to each HTTPS connection, which we
consider acceptable.
Time Our implementation uses a SHA-256 hash value as the digest of a log and a
2048 bit RSA signature scheme. The time to compute a hash3 is  0:01 millisecond
(ms) per 1KB of input, and the time to verify a 2048 bit RSA signature is 0.48
ms. The approximate verication time on the user side needed in the protocol for
verifying certicates is 0.5 ms.
2We use a MacBook Air 1.8 GHz Intel Core i5, 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3.
3SHA-256 on 64 byte size block.
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Hence, on the user side, the computational cost on the protocol for verifying
certicates incurs 83% on the size of data for establishing a TLS protocol, and 0.9%
on the size of data for establishing an HTTPS protocol; the verication time on the
protocol for verifying certicates is 1.25 % of the time for establishing a TLS session
(which is approximately 40 ms measured with Wireshark on the TLS connection to
HSBC bank).
4.7 Comparison
Following our evaluation of existing proposals (as shown in Table 3.2), the only
feature that DTKI does not oer is oine verication. This is the sacrice that
DTKI made in exchange for a strong security guarantee.
As mentioned previously, DTKI builds upon a wealth of ideas from SK [Eck12],
CT [LLK13], CIRT [Rya14], and AKI [KHP+13]. It is more interesting to see the
comparison among these systems in the same category, i.e. certicate management
transparency. Figure 4.2 shows the dimensions along which DTKI aims to improve
on those systems.
Compared with CT, DTKI supports revocation by enabling log providers to oer
proofs of absence and currency of certicates. In CT, there is no mechanism for
revocation. CT has proposed additional data structures to hold revoked certicates,
and those data structures support proofs of their contents [LK12]. However, there is
no mechanism to ensure that the data structures are maintained correctly in time.
Compared to CIRT, DTKI extends the log structure of CIRT to make it suitable
for multiple log maintainers, and provides a stronger security guarantee as it prevents
attacks rather than merely detecting them. In addition, the presence of the mapping
log maintainer and multiple certicate log maintainers create some extra monitoring
work. DTKI solves it by using a detailed crowd-sourcing verication system to
distribute the monitoring work to all users' browsers.
Compared to AKI and ARPKI, in DTKI the log providers can give proof that
the log is maintained append-only from one step to the next. The data structure in
A(RP)KI does not allow this, and therefore they cannot give a veriable guarantee
to the clients that no data is removed from the log.
DTKI improves the support that CT and A(RP)KI have for multiple log providers.
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In CT and AKI, domain owners wishing to check if there exists a log provider that
has registered a certicate for him has to check all the log providers, and therefore
the full set of log providers has to be xed and well-known. This prevents new log
providers being exibly created, creating an oligopoly. In contrast, DTKI requires
the browsers only to have the MLM public key built-in, minimising the oligopoly
element.
In DTKI, trusted monitors are optional, as it uses crowd-sourced verication.
More precisely, a trusted monitor's verication work can be done probabilistically
in small pieces by users' browsers.
Unlike the mentioned previous work, DTKI allows the possibility that all service
providers (i.e. the MLM, CLMs, and mirrors) to collude together, and can still
prevent attacks. In contrast, SK and CT can only detect attacks, and to prevent
attacks, A(RP)KI requires that not all service providers collude together. Similar to
A(RP)KI, DTKI also assumes that the domain is initially registered by an honest
party to prevent attacks, otherwise A(RP)KI and DTKI can only detect attacks.
Similar to CT and AKI, DTKI also protects user privacy { instead of asking users
to query all proofs from the log maintainer, the domain servers gather the proof
of presence and proof of currency from the log maintainer, and send the certicate
along with these proofs to the users. The user still needs to query the proof of
consistency, but this does not expose the browsing history.
4.8 Discussion
Responding to incorrect proofs How should the browser (and the user) respond
if a received proof (e.g., a proof of presence in the log) is incorrect? Such situations
should be handled in the background by the software in the browser that veries
proofs, and be sent to domain owners for further investigations. The browser can
also present errors to the user in the same way as the current state of the art. So,
the user interface will remain the same. For example, a user might be shown two
options, i.e. either to continue anyway, or not to trust the certicate and abort this
connection. Another possible way is to hard fail if the verication has not been
succeeded, as suggested by Google certicate transparency. However, this might be
an obstacle for deploying DTKI in early stages.
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SK [Eck12] CT [LLK13] AKI [KHP+13] ARPKI [BCK+14] DTKI
Terminology
Log provider Time-line
server
Log Integrity log server
(ILS)
ILS Log maintainer
Log extension - Log consistency - - Log extension
Trusted party Mirror Auditor &
monitor
Validator Validatory -
Whether answers to queries rely on
trusted parties or are accompanied
by a proof
Certicate-in-log query: Rely Proof Proof Proof Proof
Certicate-current-in-log query: Rely Rely Proof Proof Proof
Subject-absent-from-log query: Rely Rely Proof Proof Proof
Log extension query: Rely Proof Rely Rely Proof
Non-necessity of trusted monitors
The role of trusted monitors can be
distributed to browsers
No No No+ No+ Yes
Trust assumptions
Not all service providers collude together Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Domain is initially registered by an
honest party
No No Yes* Yes* Yes*
Security guarantee
Attacks detection or prevention Detection Detection Prevention Prevention Prevention
Oligopoly issues
Log providers required to be built into
browser (oligopoly)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Only the MLM
Monitors required to be built into
browser (oligopoly and trust non-agility)
Yes No Yes Yesy No
+ The system limits the trust in each server by letting them to monitor each other's behaviour.
* Without the assumption, the security guarantee is detection rather than prevention.
y The trusted party is optional.
Table 4.2: Comparison of log-based approaches to certicate management. Termi-
nology helps compare the terminology used in the papers. How queries rely on
trusted parties shows whether responses to browser queries come with proof of
correctness or rely on the honesty of trusted parties. Necessity of trusted par-
ties shows whether the TP role can be performed by browsers. Trust assumptions
shows the assumption for the claimed security guarantee. Oligopoly issues shows
the entities that browsers need to know about.
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Coverage of random checking As mentioned previously, several aspects of the
logs are veried by user's browsers performing randomly-chosen checks. The number
of things to be checked depends on the size of the mapping log and certicate logs.
The size of the mapping log mainly depends on the number of certicate logs and
the mapping from regular expressions to certicate logs; and the size of certicate
logs mainly depends on the number of domain servers that have a TLS certicate.
Currently, there are 2:71  108 domains [Dom14] (though not every domain has a
certicate), and 3109 internet users [Int14]. Thus, if every user makes one random
check per day, then everything will on average, be checked 10 times per day.
Another way to see this is that the probability of a given domain not being
checked on a given day (or. week) is (1   1
2:71108 )
3109  1:56  10 5 (resp. ((1  
1
2:71108 )
3109)7  2:25  10 34). Thus, the expected number of unchecked domains
per day (resp. per week) is 4:23 103 (resp. 6:10 10 26).
Gossip protocol A potential problem in CT or CIRT arises if an attacker shows
dierent versions of the log to dierent clients. This is sometimes called the \bubble"
problem; two clients in dierent bubbles could see dierent keys for the same subject.
A gossip protocol is a mechanism that allows clients of a log to directly exchange
digests of the log, in order to ensure that they have the same view of the log. If
Alice holding digest dgA receives a digest dgB from Bob, she can challenge the log
maintainer to prove that dgA and dgB are related by extension. Gossip protocols for
log transparency are currently being specied [Nor14a, Nor14b, CSP+15]. In DTKI,
we also assume gossip protocols [JVG+07] are used to disseminate digests of the log.
Accountability of mis-behaving parties The main goal of new certicate man-
agement schemes such as CT, CIRT, AKI, ARPKI and DTKI is to address the
problem of mis-issued certicates, and to make the mis-behaving (trusted) parties
accountable.
In DTKI, a domain owner can readily check for rogue certicates for his domain.
First, he queries a mirror of the mapping log maintainer to nd which certicate log
maintainers (CLMs) are allowed to log certicates for the domain (section 4.4). Then
he examines the certicates for his domain that have been recorded by those CLMs.
The responses he obtains from the mirror and the CLMs are accompanied by proofs.
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If he detects a mis-issued certicate, he requests revocation in the CLM. If that is
refused, he can complain to the top-level domain, who in turn can request the MLM
to change the CLM for his domain (after that, the oending CLM will no longer
be consulted by browsers). This request should not be refused because the MLM
is governed by an international panel. The intervening step, of complaining to the
top-level domain, reects the way domain names are actually managed in practice.
Dierent top-level domains have dierent terms and conditions, and domain owners
take them into account when purchasing domain names. In DTKI, log maintainers
are held accountable because they sign and time-stamp their outputs. If a certicate
log maintainer issues an inconsistent digest, this fact will be detected and the log
maintainer can be blamed and blacklisted. If the mapping log misbehaved, then its
governing panel must meet and resolve the situation.
In certicate transparency, this process is not as smooth. Firstly, the domain
owner doesn't get proof that the list of issued certicates is complete; he needs to
rely on monitors and auditors. Next, the process for raising complaints with log
maintainers who refuse revocation requests is less clear (indeed, the RFC [LLK13]
says that the question of what domain owners should do if they see an incorrect log
record is beyond scope of their document). In CT, a domain owner has no ability
to dissociate himself from a log maintainer and use a dierent one.
AKI addresses this problem by saying that log maintainer that refuses to un-
register an record will eventually lose credibility through a process managed by
validators, and will be subsequently ignored. The details of this credibility man-
agement are not very clear, but it does not seem to oer an easy way for domain
owners to control which log maintainers are relied on for their domain.
Master certicate concerns One concern is that a CA might publish fake mas-
ter certicates for domains that the CA doesn't own and are not yet registered.
However, this problem is not likely to occur: CAs are businesses, they cannot af-
ford the bad press from negative public opinion and they cannot aord the loss of
reputation. Hence, they will only want to launch attacks that would not be caught.
(Such an adversary model has been described by Franklin and Yung [FY92], Canetti
and Ostrovsky [CO99], Hazay and Lindell [HL08], and Ryan [Rya14]). In DTKI, if
a CA attempts to publish a fake master certicate for some domain, it will have to
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leave evidence of its misbehaviour in the log, and the misbehaviour will eventually
be detected by the genuine domain owner.
Another concern is the assumption that the domain owners can securely handle
their master keys. In practice, the domain owners might have problems looking after
their master keys due to lack of awareness of good practices. This problem arises in
any web PKI: it is assumed that domain owners can securely handle their TLS keys.
Our system adds one more key (the master key) to that requirement. A possible
practical solution for domain owners is to use a trustworthy service to handle TLS
keys (and the master key); the details are beyond the scope of the thesis.
Avoidance of oligopoly As we mentioned in the introduction, the predecessors
(SK, CT, CIRT, AKI, ARPKI) of DTKI do not solve a foundational issue, namely
oligopoly. These proposals require that all browser vendors agree on a xed list of
log maintainers and/or validators, and build it into their browsers. This means there
will be a large barrier to create a new log maintainer.
CT has some support for multiple logs, but it doesn't have any method to allocate
dierent domains to dierent logs. In CT, when a domain owner wants to check
whether mis-issued certicates are recorded in logs, he needs to contact all existing
logs, and download all certicates in each of the logs, because there is no way to
prove to the domain owner that no certicates for his domain is in the log, or to
prove that the log maintainer has showed all certicates in the log for his domain
to him. Thus, to be able to detect fake certicates, CT has to keep a very small
number of log maintainers. This prevents new log providers being exibly created,
creating an oligopoly.
In contrast to its predecessors, DTKI does not have a xed set of certicate log
maintainers (CLMs) to manage certicates for domain owners, and it allows oper-
ations of adding or removing a certicate log maintainer by updating the mapping
log. In DTKI, the public log of the MLM is the only thing that browsers need to
know.
The MLM may be thought to represent a monopoly; to the extent that it does, it
is likely to be a much weaker monopoly than the oligopoly of CAs or log maintainers.
CAs and log maintainers oer commercial services and compete with each other, by
oering dierent levels of service at dierent price points in dierent markets. The
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MLM should not oer any commercial services; it should perform a purely adminis-
trative role, and is not required to be trusted because it behaves fully transparently
and does not manage any certicates for web domains. In addition, the MLM is ex-
pected to be operated by an international panel with a lot of members. In practice,
we expect ICANN to be the MLM, as it is responsible for coordinating name-spaces
of the Internet, and is governed by a Governmental Advisory Committee containing
representatives from 111 states. However, there might be concerns here, including
the concern that ICANN might not be interested to be the MLM, due to the fact
that the service won't generate any revenue. Our solution does not address political
issues around making decisions of whether to add or remove some CLMs or not.
Additional latency DTKI introduces additional round-trips in the TLS connec-
tion to verify certicates and prevent potential attacks. This will add some extra
latency to the TLS connection. This may be considered justied by the fact that
DTKI oers a strong security guarantee.
In fact, the additional latency can be eliminated by delaying the added verica-
tion process from the user side. In this case, users obtain a slightly weaker security
guarantee: they are still able to verify the authenticity of received certicates after-
wards and therefore can detect mis-issued certicates.
Synchronisation concerns The synchronisation among a large number (e.g.
thousands) of participants is normally a dicult task. However, in DTKI, the
synchronisation among the MLM and CLMs is not expected to be a problem. First,
the mapping log is rarely changed { it will be changed only if a new CLM has been
added or terminated. In the steady state, this is likely to be no more than a few
times per year. Second, the MLM can send the corresponding update request to
CLMs in advance, and the synchronisation process is allowed to take an acceptable
time period. During this time period, users will use the current logs until all logs
are synchronised. Third, the MLM can terminate a CLM that has failed to update
on time (e.g. have not nished the update process in a certain time period). So, in
a long run, all parties will be able to do their work properly.
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4.9 Conclusion
In the category of certicate management transparency, sovereign keys (SK), certi-
cate transparency (CT), accountable key infrastructure (AKI), certicate issuance
and revocation transparency (CIRT), and attack resilient PKI (ARPKI) are recent
proposals to make public key certicate authorities more transparent and veriable,
by using public logs. CT is currently being implemented in servers and browsers.
Google is building a certicate transparency log containing all the current known
certicates, and is integrating verication of proofs from the log into the Chrome
web browser.
Unfortunately, as it currently stands, CT risks creating an oligopoly of log main-
tainers (as discussed in section 4.8), of which Google itself will be a principal one.
Therefore, adoption of CT risks investing more power about the way the internet is
run in a company that arguably already has too much power.
We proposed DTKI { a transparent public key validation system using an im-
proved construction of public logs. DTKI can prevent attacks based on mis-issued
certicates, and minimises undesirable oligopoly situations by using the mapping
log. In addition, since devising new security protocols is notoriously error-prone,
we provide a formalisation of DTKI, and formally proved its security properties by
using Tamarin prover.
Part III
Key compromise in secure
communication
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CHAPTER 5
KEY USAGE DETECTION
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduces how to provide the authenticity of public keys
when an attacker is able to compromise certicate authorities. However, even if the
authenticity of keys is guaranteed, the condentiality of encrypted data still relies
on another assumption that the associated decryption key has not been exposed to
attackers. In particular, it requires that the device performing the crypto operations
is free of malware. In practice, this assumption is hard to justify.
This chapter explores ways in which some security guarantees can be obtained,
even if the end-point devices have software vulnerabilities that allow an attacker
to obtain keys and/or control the device. Although we consider situation in which
the device is controlled by an adversary, we assume that devices are periodically
trustworthy. That is, a device may become vulnerable or infected at any time, but
at some later time it will be again made secure. In other words, we assume that
users periodically successfully perform malware scans, operating system upgrades,
and software updates, bringing their devices back into a trustworthy state.
If a device is compromised by exploiting software vulnerabilities, and is then
made secure again, the attacker remains in possession of secrets (such as keys) he
obtained during the compromise. Since victims do not know when compromises take
place, they are not motivated to revoke their keys. In reality, it is impractical to
ask users to manually revoke their keys and distribute new ones after every security
update.
We develop messaging protocols that allow users to detect if their long-term
keys have been compromised and are being used by an attacker. It is clear that if
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a recipient's device becomes temporarily compromised and leaks all of its secrets,
it is impossible to ensure the secrecy of messages sent during the compromised
period. Informally speaking, we achieve the following unique security guarantee: if
an attacker abuses previously compromised secrets to learn the contents of messages
sent during trustworthy periods, for example by using the recipient's long-term key
to impersonate him, then the recipient will detect this has happened. This detection
is done by presenting information about which devices (keys) have been used, which
the user can verify against her own experience and recollection (see Figure 5.3).
We achieve this by exploiting temporary asymmetric keys to limit attack windows,
whose public keys are sent to a log server to enable attack detection. We call this
approach \key usage detection" (KUD).
We minimise the burden placed on users: in particular, reecting the fact that
it is perceived as a burden to do so, we do not require that users routinely change
passwords and regenerate long-term keys. This means that an attacker that has
compromised a device and obtained its secrets continues to possess the secrets even
after the device has been restored to a trustworthy state.
Our proposal not only detects situations in which the adversary has copied a key
and uses it, but also situations in which he has access to a key but is not able to
copy it (for example, if a key is protected in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)).
Use case We expect our protocol will be most useful for high-value targets that
may be the victim of a determined attack. This can include politicians, senior com-
pany executives and civil servants that typically conduct business using commodity
devices, as well as professional users, such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, patent
attorneys, that have to deal in condential documents and need this extra layer
of security. These are cases in which attackers may be highly motivated to breach
condentiality.
Those users will take all the precautions available to ensure the condentiality of
messages they send and receive. Our protocol oers them an extra layer of security:
it enables a user to detect if a malfeasor has obtained her private key, and is using
it surreptitiously. Our protocol doesn't defend against all attacks, but it raises the
bar for the attacker. It allows detection of key usage if the legitimate device in
possession of the key is either restored to a secure state, or is switched o.
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Key usage detection could be applied to solve other problems. One example is
to apply it to identity-based signatures (IBS) to mitigate the key escrow problem,
as it allows a signer to detect that an unauthorised signature (e.g. one made by the
identity provider) has been issued.
We proceed in the following way. We detail our attacker model and security goals
in Section 5.2 and present our key usage detection protocols in Section 5.3. The
detailed implementation of our messaging protocol is presented in Section 5.4, and
its security is formally proved in Section 5.5. We present performance evaluations
in Section 5.6, and conclude this chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Threat model and design goals
Assumptions We assume a role called sender, that sends messages, and another
one called receiver, that receives messages. Users can perform one or both of those
roles. Each user has one or more devices, and can pick any of his/her devices to
send a message, and can receive messages on any of them. We use Sally and Robert
to refer to an arbitrary sender and receiver, respectively.
Threat model The attacker has control over the network, but not completely. This
means he can eavesdrop, modify, insert and suppress any messages, and as many of
them he wants, but he cannot suppress or modify all the messages. In other words,
we assume that Sally and Robert can eventually exchange an unmodied message1.
In addition, the attacker may compromise any user's devices at any time. After
compromising a device, the attacker fully controls it, and can retrieve and store all
the data (including secret keys) that are stored on it.
Periodically and routinely, users detect and remove malware on their devices,
upgrade the operating system, and install software patches that remove known vul-
nerabilities. This can put the device back into a trustworthy state. The users do
not regenerate long-term keys or change passwords.
Thus, we assume that devices are periodically trustworthy. An attacker compro-
mises the device by exploiting a vulnerability, and sometime later the device owner
1In practice, this can be achieved in many ways, such as by using diverse channels. For example,
although two Hotmail users can be intercepted completely when the adversary controls the Hotmail
servers, they can still get an unmodied message through by using Gmail.
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compromised compromised compromised
: : : : : :
secure secure secure
t1 t01 t2 t
0
2
tn t0n
Figure 5.1: A device is compromised at time t1, and then restored into a secure
state at time t01. This cycle is repeated. Thus, the device is in a compromised state
during the intervals f(tj; t0j) j j 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :gg.
restores it into a secure state. This cycle repeats, as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The problem Once a device is compromised, then the victim's secrets stored in
the device are exposed to the attacker. Performing security updates and removing
malware is insucient to prevent the attacker masquerading as the victim.
Security goals To solve this problem, our system detects key usages by the at-
tacker. We state our security goal here, and explain how to achieve the goal in
the following sections. In the security statements below, we assume a parameter ,
which is a time period set by the user. A shorter  brings greater security. How-
ever, devices are automatically unregistered from the system if they are not used for
periods longer than , and have to be re-registered. Thus, a very short  reduces
usability. Typically,  would be about two days. We discuss  and other system
parameters later.
In the next section, we develop two protocols: the basic KUD protocol and full
KUD messaging application. These oer slightly dierent guarantees.
 Basic KUD protocol.
Suppose receiver Robert's device is compromised during the periods f(tj; t0j) j
j 2 Ng. Suppose a message is sent by sender Sally at time t from a device in
a trustworthy state, and the plaintext is obtained by the attacker. Robert can
detect this attack provided his device
{ was well within a trustworthy state when the message was sent; that is,
t0j +   t  tj+1    for some j.
 Messaging application (many users each with many devices).
Suppose Robert's devices are periodically compromised, as before: Di is com-
promised during the intervals
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f(ti;j; t0i;j) j j 2 Ng. Suppose a message is sent by Sally at time t from a device
in a trustworthy state, and the plaintext is obtained by the attacker. Robert
can detect this attack provided, for each of his devices Di,
{ Di was well within a trustworthy state when the message was sent; that
is, t0i;j +   t  ti;j+1    for some j, or
{ Di was in a compromised state, but had not been used by Robert since
t  .
The last condition reects the fact that one can tell that a device has been
compromised if the device was not being used at the time its key was used.
Later, in Section 5.3.2, we show the user interface that allows a user to check
this.
As part of our solution, we introduce an auxiliary role called the log maintainer.
In practice, there can be one or more agents acting as log maintainers. We do not
require that any of these log maintainers are trusted and assume that the attacker
controls them.
5.3 Overview
We present an overview of two protocols for Key Usage Detection (KUD). In the
rst, the participants are a single sender and a single receiver, assisted by a log
maintainer. This situation is too simple to be useful, but serves to illustrate the
core concepts. The second protocol is more involved; there are multiple senders
and receivers, and each of them has multiple devices. This reects a more realistic
situation, and the multiple devices assist in the detection of attacks.
5.3.1 The basic protocol
Our solution involves three roles: senders, receivers, and a log maintainer. We
assume all of these can be compromised. We assume a log maintainer is capable of
receiving data and storing it in an append-only log.
During the bootstrapping phase, the receiver Robert obtains or generates a long-
term signing and verication key pair (skR; vkR), and the sender Sally obtains an
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authentic copy of vkR. The log maintainer has a signing key skL, and Robert and
Sally have an authentic copy of the corresponding verication key vkL. How these
keys are securely distributed is not the subject of this chapter; we assume it can be
done through PKIs such as the DTKI presented in the previous chapter.
The log maintainer signs and publishes digests of the log, and provides supported
proofs as presented in the previous chapter.
Sally and Robert track the digests issued by the log, all the time checking the
proofs issued by the log that later digests represent extensions of earlier ones. Sally
and Robert also periodically directly exchange the digests they know about, and
request and check proofs of extension of those digests with respect to those they
already have. Our assumption that the attacker cannot suppress all messages ensures
that they are being presented with the same version of the log.
The transmission part of the basic KUD protocol then runs as follows (see Figure
5.2).
 To prepare for receiving a message, Robert's device creates an ephemeral en-
cryption and decryption key pair (ek; dk), and certies it with his long-term
signing key skR. He publishes the certicate CertskR(R; ek) in the log. Pub-
lishing the certicate in the log assures Sally that it is a valid encryption key
belonging to Robert.
 To send a message, Sally's device retrieves CertskR(R; ek) from the log along
with a proof of its currency in the log. She encrypts the message with ek and
sends it to Robert. Sally will not use a key whose certicate is not in the log.
 Robert's device receives the encrypted message and decrypts it.
Additionally, Robert's device periodically checks (where the period is determined
by the parameter ) that all the keys ek0 for which a certicate CertskR(R; ek
0) exists
in the log were put there by him. If he nds entries in the log not corresponding to
his actions, then he knows that his long term credentials have been disclosed and
abused by an attacker.
The basic protocol assumes that Robert is online at the time that Sally wants
to send a message. In the messaging application protocol below, we generalise this
to work when Robert is oine.
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Sally Robert
- Generate ephemeral key pair (ek; dk)
- Create a certicate  = CertskR(R; ek)
- Sends  to the log maintainer
for insertion in log

- Request proofs from the log maintainer
to check that  is present in log
- Verify obtained proofs
- Encrypt message m using ek
Encek(m)
- Use dk to decrypt message
- Request proofs from the log maintainer
to check that all keys in log for \Robert"
are genuine
Figure 5.2: The basic KUD protocol. Robert has a pair (skR; vkR) of long term
keys for signature signing and verication. He generates an ephemeral key pair
(ek; dk) for encryption, creates the certicate  = CertskR(R; ek) on ek, and sends
the certicate to the log maintainer for insertion into the public log. Meanwhile,
Robert also sends the certicate to Sally. After receiving , Sally requests from the
log maintainer proofs that the certicate is present in the log. If the proof is valid,
Sally sends a message m to Robert encrypted with ek. Robert requests proofs from
the log maintainer to enable him to verify whether the log contains signatures that
he did not generate.
Intuitively, our protocol design detects compromise attacks because an attacker
in possession of Robert's long term key would have to leave evidence of its usage of
the key in the log. We give examples of how this detection works in Section 5.3.3.
We perform a formal analysis of our designs in Section 5.5.
5.3.2 Messaging application
The messaging application generalises the basic protocol, allowing the users to have
multiple devices. Sally can choose any of her devices to send a message, and Robert
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is able to receive the message on all of his devices. Although this makes the protocol
a bit more complicated, it also allows us to obtain a stronger security guarantee,
because even if one of Robert's devices is in an untrustworthy state we are able to
leverage security from the other ones.
As before, we assume a log, with the same capabilities mentioned above. We also
assume that Robert and the log maintainer have long-term signing and verication
key pairs (skR; vkR) (skL; vkL) respectively, and all parties have authentic copies of
the verication keys they need.
The parameters ,  and  The protocol is parameterised by three values:
  is the period between the times at which device registration requests are
processed. It is set by the log maintainer. We expect it to be typically one
hour.
  is the period between the times at which key update requests are processed.
We refer to such periods as \epochs". It is also set by the log maintainer, and
is typically one day.
  is the maximum lifetime of a key. It is set by the user. Dierent users can
choose dierent values of , subject to the constraint   . We expect it to
be about two or three days.
The messaging protocol has three main sub-protocols: enrolling, message trans-
mission, and key updates. We describe these in turn.
Enrolling a device To enroll a device D`, Robert needs to install skR onto it. We
assume that skR is derived from a passphrase that Robert types into D`. Next, D`
needs to create a device key and publish its certicate in the log. More precisely:
 D` generates a new ephemeral encryption key pair (ek`; dk`) and sends the
certicate CertskR(D`; ek`; t`) to the log maintainer. Here, t` is the key cre-
ation time. The key will be used from the current time until the next epoch
beginning, for the purpose of encrypting messages for Robert's device.
 After time , the log maintainer has inserted the certicate into the log and
sends to D` the list of device certicates CertskR(Di; eki; ti) for Robert present
in the log, together with a proof that the list is complete, and current in the
log.
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Figure 5.3: An example of envisaged GUI that presents the table (Di; ti) for i =
f1; 2g to Robert. Section 5.3.3 describes how Robert uses this information. The
gure gives an impression of the kind of user interface we envisage. Usability is
important and dicult to get right, and we need to work with HCI experts to
design the interface fully.
 D` veries the proof of currency for CertskR(D`; ek`; t`). It displays the table
(Di; ti) (for each i) to Robert, so he can check that the devices mentioned
are indeed recently used. If Robert sees a device mentioned that he has not
recently used, it is evidence of an attack (x 5.3.4). Figure 5.3 presents an
example of the envisaged GUI to show how the information is likely to be
presented to Robert.
The device is now ready to be used. When Sally encrypts a message, her device will
obtain all the current device keys for Robert from the log, and encrypt the messages
with each of them.
Remark 5.1. The method of displaying on a user's device the user's activities on
other devices is well-known (for example, in Gmail, a user can click \last account
activity" to see a table of the sessions open by other devices). A crucial dierence in
our protocol is that the displaying device can fully verify the veracity of the account
activity provided by the untrusted log maintainer.
Sending and receiving a message
 To send a message, Sally retrieves CertskR(Di; eki; ti) (for each available i)
from the log along with proofs of currency. Her device encrypts a copy of the
5.3. Overview 90
message with a fresh symmetric key k, and encrypts k with each received eki.
It sends the encrypted message and together with the encrypted k to each of
Robert's devices.
 Robert picks up any of his devices, receives the encrypted message, and de-
crypts it.
Updating the keys Whenever Robert invokes the messaging app on a device
D`, the device checks to see if it is the rst time it has run the app during that
-long epoch. If so, it generates a new device key which will become the key for the
following epoch. More precisely, on the rst invocation during an epoch:
 D` requests and veries proof of currency for all of the current epoch's device
certicates CertskR(Di; eki; ti) for each available i. It veries that ek` is indeed
the one it created and sent the previous epoch; if this verication fails, it
is evidence of an attack (x 5.3.4). D` displays the table (Di; ti) (each i) to
Robert, so he can check that the devices mentioned are indeed recently used.
If Robert sees a device mentioned that he has not recently used, it is again
evidence of an attack.
 D` next creates a new ephemeral encryption key pair (ek0`; dk0`) and sends the
certicate CertskR(D`; ek
0
`; t`) to the log maintainer. Here, t` is the key creation
time.
 By the next epoch, the log maintainer has inserted into the log all the device
keys thus received. If a device does not send a new key during an epoch, the
old key is retained in subsequent epochs until a period  has elapsed. At that
time, keys of devices that did not send new keys are revoked.
 When a new key becomes valid, D` securely removes the old key in the device.
In other words, devices change their key every epoch, and if they don't do so
(because the application is not invoked during a particular epoch) then their key is
reused for a certain period, and then revoked. In this last case, the device can't be
used until it re-registers.
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5.3.3 Detecting attacks: examples
To provide intuition on how our protocol allows users to detect attacks, we ex-
plain some potential attack detection scenarios. We will present our formal security
analysis in Section 5.5.
Attacks from a third party Suppose one of Robert's devices, say his phone,
is infected with malware, allowing an adversary to mis-use all the keys stored on
the device. The adversary may decrypt messages encrypted with ephemeral keys,
and may create new signed ephemeral keys by using the phone's long term key
and inserting them into the log. While the phone remains under the control of the
attacker, the decryption activity is not detected. However, the long-term key usage
is detected if the user notices unexpected usage of phone using the GUI of Figure
5.3. The gure shows the GUI displayed on another device of Robert's. It informs
him that (so far in the current epoch) the keys corresponding to his phone and his
ipad have been active. If Robert has not used his phone in the epoch, then he learns
that it has been compromised. The GUI also conrms that the proofs about the
usage statement have been veried.
Suppose Robert regains control of his phone, through routine malware scanning
and software patching. If the adversary continues to use the phone's long-term key
to create ephemeral keys, the phone can detect this activity via the log, and report
it to the user.
Attacks on or by the log maintainer Suppose the log maintainer is malicious
or compromised. It may provide fake proofs, or provide no proofs at all. This is
readily detected by client software. It may maintain the log incorrectly, either by not
correctly recording signed ephemeral keys or by incorrectly recording fake ephemeral
keys. These attacks are detected when the key owner requests a complete proof of
presence.
A more interesting attack arises if the log maintainer shows dierent versions
of the log to dierent users. A receiver may see a version in which his ephemeral
keys are correctly recorded, while the sender sees a version in which attacker-owned
keys are present instead. This would allow the attacker to play man-in-the-middle
attacks, preventing the sender and receiver ever exchanging information about the
log digests they have. Such an attack would be extremely hard in practice, because
5.4. Detailed messaging implementation 92
the attacker would have to persistently control all the messages sent between a
sender and receiver. (For that reason, similarly to [LLK13, Rya14], we ruled out an
attacker that completely controls the network.) As mentioned in the last chapter,
gossip protocols have been introduced to further reduce the feasibility of this attack.
5.3.4 Responding to attacks
If Robert detects unexpected activity on a device, or some verication fails, this is
evidence of an attack. Robert's response should be to x the software on his devices.
He should generate a new long-term key, in order to prevent attacks occurring (and
being detected) due to the disclosure of his current long-term key. The corresponding
public key can be distributed using the method used in the bootstrapping phase.
Furthermore, he can inform Sally that some of her recent messages to him may have
been compromised.
Robert can also detect failure when he veries the actions of the log maintainer.
His response is to change to a dierent provider.
5.4 Detailed messaging implementation
This section presents the details of our proposal. We rst present the log structure
in Section 5.4.1. We then turn to describing the full protocol details in Section 5.4.2.
The procedures that ensure that we detect malicious log maintainers are described
in Section 5.4.3. After presenting the details, we discuss privacy concerns in Sec-
tion 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Log structure
Similar to the public log employed in DTKI, the public log employed here is also
organised as a tree of trees: the top-level tree is append-only, and its leaves are
lexicographically ordered trees.
The ChronTree T (as shown in Figure 5.4) records the entire update history.
Items in T are stored only in leaves and ordered chronologically, and each leaf is
labelled by the root hash value of another Merkle tree T 0 (presented in Figure 5.5).
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h(h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4)); h(d5; d6))
h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4))
h(d1; d2)
d1 := Root(T
0
1)
d2 := Root(T
0
2)
h(d3; d4)
d3 := Root(T
0
3)
d4 := Root(T
0
4)
h(d5; d6)
d5 := Root(T
0
5)
d6 := Root(T
0
6)
Merkle tree T
Figure 5.4: An example of the log containing six updates fd1; d2; : : : ; d6g. The log
is maintained as an append-only Merkle tree T whose leaves are ordered chronolog-
ically.
Items in T 0 are also stored only in the leaves2, but ordered according to user identity.
Each leaf of T 0 is labelled by users' identity and a list of ephemeral certicates for
dierent devices of the same user.
To recall how the proofs can be done with our log, we give some examples based
on Figure 5.4 and 5.5. We will explain how to verify that the log is maintained
correctly | i.e. the log maintainer only appends data in T , and items in every T 0
are ordered lexicographically | in x5.4.3.
Example of proof of presence To prove that data d02 for Bob is in T
0
6 (see Figure
5.5), the log maintainer only needs to give the data needed to compute the label of
parent node from d02 to the root of the tree.
PoP(T 06; d
0
2) = [w; d
0
1; h(3;4); h(5;7)]
where w = l  l  r is the path to d02, and l (resp. r) indicates the path to the left
(resp. right) child. So, given d02, Root(T
0
6), and the proof PoP(T
0
6; d
0
2), one can verify
the proof by reconstructing the root value hT = h(h(h(d
0
1; d
0
2); h(3;4)); h((5; 7))). If
hT = Root(T
0
6), then the proof is valid.
Example of proof of currency The proof of currency is the same as the proof
of presence, but there is an extra constraint for the verier to check, namely that
the path to the root of the lexicographic tree only contains (an arbitrary number
2Note that the T 0 is implemented in a way that is slightly dierent to the LexTree in the
previous chapter: in LexTree, data items are stored in both leaves and non-leaf nodes.
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h(1;7)
h(1;4)
h(1;2)
d01 := (Alice;
DA;1; tA;1; h(certA;1)
DA;2; tA;2; h(certA;2))
d02 := (Bob;
DB;1; tB;1; h(certB;1)
DB;2; tB;2; h(certB;2)
: : :
DB;5; tB;5; h(certB;5))
h(3;4)
d03 d04
h(5;7)
h(5;6)
d05 d06
d07 := (Robert;
DR;1; tR;1; h(certR;1)
DR;2; tR;2; h(certR;2)
DR;3; tR;3; h(certR;3)
DR;4; tR;4; h(certR;4))
Merkle tree T 06
Figure 5.5: An example of the data structure T 0 recording data in each update. Items
in T 0 are ordered lexicographically. For all a; b 2 [1; 7], h(a;b) is the root hash value
of a Merkle tree containing data from d0a to d
0
b. For example, h(1;2) = h(d
0
1; d
0
2), and
h(1;7) = h(h(1;4); h(5;7)). Each leaf of T
0 is labelled by (h(ID); (Dj; tj; h(certj))nj=1),
such that certj is a certicate on (Dj; ekj; tj) issued by ID, where Dj is the identity
of the jth device of ID, ekj is an (ephemeral) public encryption key, and tj is the
issuing time.
of) \r".
Example of proof of extension To prove that the current version of the log
represented by T (see Figure 5.4) is an extension of a previous version (Told) con-
taining four updates (i.e. Root(Told) = h(h(d1; d2); h(d3; d4)) and Size(Told) = 4), the
log maintainer gives h(d5; d6) as the proof. Given the two digests and this proof, the
verier can verify that T is extended from Told by reconstructing Root(T ).
Example of Proof of absence To prove that no certicates for user identity `Bill'
is included in T 06 (see Figure 5.5), the log maintainer needs to prove that any node
whose label containing Bill is absent from T 06, by performing the following steps.
 Locate node A such that the user identity contained in its label is lexicograph-
ically the largest one smaller than Bill. In our example, the label of node A is
d01 which contains user identity `Alice'.
 Locate node B such that the user identity contained in its label is lexicograph-
ically the smallest one greater than Bill. In our example, the label of node B
is d02 which contains user identity `Bob'.
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 Prove that d01 and d02 are present in T 06, and they are siblings (so no node is
placed in between of them). The former is proved by using proof of presence,
and the latter one can be veried by checking the path to d01 and d
0
2.
5.4.2 Messaging protocol details
We provide our main protocol with detailed message sequence here. It would help
readers to see the exact exchanged messages. Also, it will be useful later to read-
ers for understanding our formal model (presented in Appendix B) implemented
in Tamarin prover [MSCB13], which we used to give a rigorous formal machine-
checked verication on the core security property of KUD (in the next section).
Enrolling a device (Figure 5.6)
We assume that all Robert's devices have shared his long-term signing key skR. To
enrol a device D`, it generates a new ephemeral certicate, and publishes it in the
log. In more detail, as presented in Figure 5.6:
 D` generates a new ephemeral key pair (dk`; ek`) for decryption and encryption,
respectively. Then, D` issues a self-signed certicate CertskR(D`; ek`; t`) on
(D`; ek`; t`) by using skR, where t` is the key creation time; and sends the
signed registration request
m1 = (req1; R; dgold;CertskR(D`; ek`; t`)) to the log, where req1 is the request
identity, R is the identity of Robert, and dgold = (Root(Told); Size(Told)) is the
digest of the log that Robert possibly has previously stored (it is likely to
happen if Robert is re-enrolling his device D`).
 After the log maintainer receives the request, it veries the signature and the
certicate, and that t` is in the time interval of the current update epoch .
If they are all valid, it stores the request, and issues a signed conrmation
signfRoot(log); Size(log);CertskR(D`; ek`; t`)gskL , where log is organised as T ,
as explained in x5.4.1. If dgold is provided, the log maintainer also generates a
proof P of extension that the current log is extended from the log represented
by dgold, and sends the proof together with signed conrmation as the message
m2 to Robert.
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skR, dgold, 
old
L
Robert's device D`
skL, log
Log maintainer
- Generate (dk`; ek`)
- Issue CertskR(D`; ek`; t`)
- dgold = (Root(Told); Size(Told))
m1 = (req1; R; dgold;CertskR(D`; ek`; t`))
- Verify the received certicate and t`
- Store m1
- dgnew := (Root(T ); Size(T ))
- L := signfdgnew; h(CertskR(D`; ek`; t`))gskL
- P1 := PoE(T; dgold)
m2 = (dgnew; L; P1)
- Verify L and P1
- dgold := dgnew
- oldL := L
- Remove expired keys if there is one
After  time
m3 = (req01; R;D`; dgnew)
- Update the log from T to Tnew
- T := Tnew
- Last(T ) := Root(T 0n+1)
- nd d in T 0n+1 such that R is contained in d
- P2 := PoC(T; Last(T ))
- P3 := PoP(T
0
n+1; d)
- P4 := PoE(T; dgnew)
- md := all data associated to d
- dg0new := (Root(T ); Size(T ))
- mL := (dg0new; Last(T ); fPig4i=2;md; t)
- 0L := signfmLgskL
m4 = (mL; 0L)
- Verify 0L and all received proofs
- Verify that CertskR(D`; ek`; t`) is in md
- (dgnew; L) := (dg0new; 0L)
- Display all (Di; ti) to Robert
Figure 5.6: The protocol for (re-)enrolling a device. In the protocol, if Robert is re-
enrolling his device, then dgold and 
old
L are the previously stored digest and signature
received from the log maintainer, respectively.
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 D` veries the received signature and proof, stores the new digest dgnew with
signature L, and sends the request m3 containing a request identity req
0
1,
Robert and the device's identity (R;D`), and current observed digest to the
log maintainer after  time.
 After each period of length , the log maintainer updates the log according to
the list of device enrollment requests received from its customers. The list of
request should be in the form of
(Ri; (CertskRi (Di;j; eki;j; ti;j))
P
j=1)
M
i=1
where Ri is the client identity, P is the number of devices that a client has
requested to enrolling this update, and M is the total number of clients who
has sent the enrollment request for this update.
To update the log, the log maintainer retrieves the current T 0n such that
Root(T 0n) = Last(T ), and creates T
0
n+1 by adding each request to the appropri-
ate node of T 0n, where n is the size of the current log. It then extends T with
a new rightmost node T 0n+1.
In addition, the log maintainer proves that the list of certicates (including
the ones in the enrollment request) for each participant Ri is complete, and
current in the log. If Ri has previously observed a digest dgold of the log,
then log maintainer also generates a proof of extension that the current log
is extended from the log represented by dgold. To do so, the log maintainer
locates the node labelled with d for Ri in T
0
n+1, and generates:
{ PoP(T 0n+1; d) that d is present in T
0
n+1;
{ PoC(T; T 0n+1) that the root hash value of T
0
n+1 is the label of the rightmost
leaf in T ; and
{ PoE(T; dgold) that the current log is extended from the log represented by
dgold.
So Ri can verify that d|which contains a full list of certicates for his devices
(including the newly enrolled ones) | is present in the latest update of the
log.
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 D` veries the received proofs and signatures. Additionally, it displays the
table (Di; ti) (for all i 2 [1; P ]) to Robert, so he can check that the devices
mentioned are indeed recently used. If Robert sees a device mentioned that
he has not recently used, it is evidence of an attack that an attacker who has
used his long-term key without authorisation and has inserted a certicate for
him.
The device is now ready to be used. A similar process will be used to un-register
a device with the log maintainer.
Sending and receiving a message (Figure 5.7)
To send a message to Robert, Sally's device retrieves all the current device certi-
cates for Robert from the log, and encrypts the messages with each of them. More
precisely (as presented in Figure 5.7), to send a message:
 Sally sends requestm1 = (req2; R; r; dgold) to the log, where req23 is the request
identity, R is the identity of Robert, r is a random number, and where dgold =
(Root(Told); Size(Told)) is the digest of the log that Sally received in the last
session.
 After receiving the request, the log maintainer locates the leaf whose label d
contains R in the latest update T 0 (that is represented by the rightmost leaf
of T ), and generates the proof P1 that Root(T
0) is current in T , proof P2 that
d is in T 0, and proof P3 that the current log is an extension of the log that
Sally has previously observed. It then sends m2, which is the signed message
(`CertResp'; dgnew; Last(T ); P1; P2; P3; r;md; t) to Sally, where `CertResp' is a
tag, dgnew = (Root(T ); Size(T )), md = (R; (Dj; tj; ekj;Certj)
P
j=1) is the data
associated to d, and t is the time to identify the current epoch.
 After receiving the message from the log maintainer, Sally veries if t is cor-
responds to the current epoch, and veries the received signature, proofs, and
certicates. If all verications succeed, she replaces dgold and 
old
L by dgnew and
L, respectively, where L is the signature from the log maintainer. Her device
encrypts a copy of the message with a fresh symmetric key k, and encrypts k
3This request corresponds to the `CertReq' in our Tamarin code.
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skL, log, vkR
Log maintainer
dgold, 
old
L , vkR, vkL
Sally
skR, dki
Robert's device Di
- Generate random number r
- dgold := (Root(Told); Size(Told))
- m1 = (req2; R; r; dgold)
m1
- Last(T ) := Root(T 0)
- Find d in T 0 such that R is contained in d
- P1 := PoC(T; Last(T ))
- P2 := PoP(T
0; d)
- P3 := PoE(T; dgold)
- md := all data associated to d
- dgnew = (Root(T ); Size(T ))
- mL := (`CertResp'; dgnew; Last(T ); fPig3i=1;md; t)
- L := signfmL; rgskL
- m2 := (mL; L)
m2
- Verify t
- Verify L
- Verify all received proofs
- Verify received certicates
- dgold := dgnew
- oldL := L
- Extract ephemeral encryption key eki
from each received certicates
- Create symmetric key k
- m3 := (fmgk; fkgeki) for all possible i
m3
- Decrypt fkgeki by using dki
- Decrypt fmgk by using k
Figure 5.7: The protocol for sending and receiving a message. In which, oldL is the
signature received from the log maintainer in the last session. If any of the stated
verication fails, the agent aborts the protocol.
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with each received eki. It sends the encrypted message and together with the
encrypted k to each of Robert's devices.
 Robert picks up any of his devices, receives the encrypted message, and de-
crypts it.
Note that in the protocol, if there is no certicate for Robert in the latest update,
then a proof of absence that the identity of Robert is not in the latest update is
provided to the user.
Remark 5.2. The signed t is used to prevent attacks that replay a selected version
of the log from the (compromised) log maintainer. Let x be the version of the log that
Sally has previously observed, and z be the latest update. The replay attack is that the
log maintainer picks and sends a version y of the log to Sally, such that x < y < z,
and Robert's ephemeral key that is valid in the version y has been compromised by
the attacker. In this case, if we do not have the signed t, then even with a gossip
protocol, all verications will succeed, because version y is also a genuine version of
the log.
Updating the keys (Figure 5.8)
Devices change their key every epoch w.r.t. , and if they don't do so (because the
application is not invoked on a particular day), then their key will be reused for a
certain period (e.g. a few more ), and then will not be included in the log for the
next further update epoch. In this last case, the device can't be used for receiving
and reading messages until Robert uses the device again | it will re-register the
device automatically. So, after Robert can use this device again in  time (e.g. one
hour). Note that if Robert has un-registered the device, then the device will not
automatically re-register itself; and Robert has to re-register it manually in this
case.
More precisely, whenever Robert invokes the messaging app on a device D`, the
device checks to see if it is the rst time it has run the app during that epoch w.r.t.
. If so,
 D` creates a new ephemeral key pair (dk`; ek`), issues a certicate CertskR(D`; ek`; t`),
which will become the valid key in next epoch, where t` is the key creation
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skR, dk
old
` , Certold, dgold, 
old
L
Robert's device D`
skL, log
Log maintainer
- Generate (dk`; ek`)
- Issue CertskR(D`; ek`; t`)
- dgold = (Root(Told); Size(Told))
- m1 := (req3; R; dgold;CertskR(D`; ek`; t`))
m1
- Verify the received certicate
- Verify t`
- dgnew := (Root(T ); Size(T ))
- L := signf`Conrmation'; dgnew; h(CertskR(D`; ek`; t`))gskL
- Last(T ) := Root(T 0)
- Find d in T 0 such that R is in d
- P1 := PoC(T; Last(T ))
- P2 := PoP(T
0; d)
- P3 := PoE(T; dgold)
- Store m1
- md := all data associated to d
- m2 := (dgnew;md; L; fPig3i=1)
m2
- Verify L
- Verify all received proofs
- Verify that h(Certold) is in md
- dgold := dgnew
- oldL := L
- Remove expired keys
- Display all (Di; ti) to Robert
At the end of the epoch w.r.t. 
Updating the log in the way similar to the one in Figure 5.6
Figure 5.8: The protocol for updating keys. In the protocol, dkold` is the current
valid ephemeral secret key, Certold is the corresponding certicate, dgold and 
old
L
are the digest and signature received from the log maintainer in the last session,
respectively.
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time. Then, he sends the signed request
m1 = (req3; R; dgold;CertskR(D`; ek`; t`)) to the log maintainer, where req3
4 is
the identity of update request, dgold = (Root(Told); Size(Told)) is the digest of
the log that he observed in the last session.
 After receiving the request, the log maintainer veries the signature, time t`,
and the received certicate. If they all valid, then it generates a commitment
L = signf`Conrmation'; dgnew; h(CertskR(D`; ek`; t`))gskL
that it will put the received new certicate in the log by the end of this epoch.
The log maintainer locates the node d for Robert in the latest update of the
log, and generates the proof P1 that the root hash value of T
0 is the label of
the rightmost leaf in T , proof P2 that d is present in T
0, and the proof P3 that
T is an extension of the log that Robert has observed in the last session. Note
that P1 and P2 together form the proof that d is the latest update for Robert
in the log. The log maintainer sends the generated signature and proofs to D`.
 Upon receiving the response, D` veries all signatures and proofs. Addition-
ally, it veries that the hashed certicate (contained in d) for D` in the latest
update is indeed corresponding to the one it created and sent in the previous
epoch. This verication ensures that no unauthorised request has been gen-
erated and recorded in the current log. (We will explain in the x5.4.3 that
why we don't need to require D` to verify all history certicates for D` in the
log are indeed generated by D`.) If all verications succeed, D` removes any
expired keys stored in D`, replaces the stored digest of the log with the new
one, and displays the table (Di; ti) (for each possible i) to Robert, so he can
check that the devices mentioned are indeed recently used. If Robert sees a
device mentioned that he has not recently used, it is evidence of an attack.
 At the turn of the epoch, the log maintainer inserts all received update request
into the log. Suppose in the current epoch, the log maintainer which maintains
the log (represented by T of size n) has the tree T 0n containing
4This request corresponds to the `UpdateReq' in our Tamarin code.
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(Alice; DA;1; tA;1; h(certA;1)
DA;2; tA;2; h(certA;2));
(Bob; DB;1; tB;1; h(certB;1)
DB;2; tB;2; h(certB;2)
: : :
DB;5; tB;5; h(certB;5));
: : : : : :
and receives
(Ri; (CertskRi (Di;j; eki;j; ti;j))
P 0
j=1)
M 0
i=1
for some identity Ri and certicates for its devices Di;j, where P
0 is the number
of a user's devices that has sent a key update request, and M 0 is the total
number of clients who has sent the key update request in this epoch.
To up date the log, the log maintainer performs the following steps:
Step 1) creates a new tree T 0n+1 by copying and pasting the entire T
0
n;
Step 2) replaces the old certicates with the corresponding new ones in T 0n+1;
Step 3) checks if any un-replaced certicate is older than ; if there is any, the
log maintainer removes them from T 0n+1;
Step 4) extends T with a new rightmost node Root(T 0n+1).
Similar to the idea explained in x5.4.2, the log maintainer can provide the proof
that the list of certicates (including the ones in the key update request) for
Ri is complete, and current in the log; and the proof that the current log is
an extension of the log that Ri has previously observed.
If a device has not updated ephemeral keys and has been excluded from the
latest update by the log maintainer, then the device will automatically re-
register itself when the owner has used the device again, so the device will be
included in the log and be ready to receive and decrypt messages in  time.
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5.4.3 Crowd-sourced verication
Since we want to guarantee some security even when the log maintainer is not
trusted, we need to monitor the log maintainer's behaviour to see if the log is
maintained correctly. This can be easily veried if we introduce a trusted party to
monitor the entire log. Alternately, similar to the approach used in the previous
chapter, to avoid having a trusted party, we can use crowd-sourced verication by
breaking the verication work into independent little pieces, and distribute each
piece to dierent devices.
First, we need to verify that the log update history recorded in T is maintained
in an append-only manner. This is achieved by verifying the proof of extension per-
formed in each of above protocols, namely enrolling a device, updating the keys, and
sending/receiving a message. Hence, there is no need for any additional verication.
Second, we need to verify that in each update T 0i , items are ordered lexicograph-
ically according to the user identity. It can be veried by asking each device to pick
a random leaf in an update T 0i , and verify that the user identity recorded in its left
(or right) neighbour leaf is lexicographically smaller (resp. greater) than the user
identity in the picked leaf.
Third, in our protocol a device only checks its latest certicate in the log, instead
of verifying all certicates recorded in the log. So, it cannot guarantee that no
attacker-generated certicates have been previously included in the log. To detect
such behaviour, we need to verify that the time of the key generation for the same
device in dierent updates of the log is only going forward. To achieve this, each
device picks a random leaf for a user in an update Ti, and veries that either the
record in an update is the same as the one in the previous update, or it is dierent
and the time in the node for the same device of the user in the left (or right)
neighbour update Ti 1 (or Ti+1) is no greater (or no smaller) than the time in the
picked leaf, respectively. Additionally, if the two times are equal, then the hash
values of the certicates should also be equal. A missing associated record in a
new update is evidence of misbehaviour. If no leaf for the user is included in the
neighbour update, then a proof of absence that a node containing the user identity
is not included in the update is provided.
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Last, to ensure that the log maintainer did not show dierent logs to dierent
users, users should exchange the digest of the log that they observed, for example,
by using a gossip protocol.
5.4.4 Privacy considerations
The public log may cause some privacy concerns. For example, one may want to
hide the user identities contained in a log, the total number of communications of a
user, or the time distribution of a user's communications, etc.
In the above examples, to hide the user identity, the log maintainer can use a hash
value of the signed user identity in the labels of leaves in each log update, rather than
containing the user identity directly in the labels (see Figure 5.5). The signature
scheme used should be deterministic and unforgeable, as suggested in [MBB+14].
Hence, users that have the recipient's address can request the signed user identity
from the log maintainer, and verify the log; but an attacker who has downloaded
the entire log cannot recover the identity of users, based on the unforgeability of
the chosen signature scheme. In this case, the nodes in each update tree T 0i will be
ordered lexicographically according to the hash value of the signed user identity. In
addition, users can also make the log to be only available to a xed set of contacts.
To hide the real number of communications associated to a given client of the log,
the client can generate some noise | for example, the client can make `spoof queries'
to the log maintainer through an anonymous channel (e.g. Tor network).
There are many other possible solutions (e.g. server side access control). We do
not detail them here as they are not the main focus of this thesis.
5.5 Security Analysis
We provide all input les required to understand and reproduce our security analysis
at Appendix B. In particular, these include the complete KUD models.
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5.5.1 Security properties
Our protocol achieves both classical security properties as well as novel ones. In a
classical sense, Sally obtains the guarantee that if Robert's devices are not compro-
mised, then the attacker will not learn the messages she sends.
The more interesting properties are achieved in the cases where Robert's devices
get compromised. In this case, we cannot avoid that messages sent by Sally in the
same epoch are also compromised. However, we prove that if any of Sally's messages
from dierent epochs are compromised, then Robert will be able to detect this.
5.5.2 Formal analysis
We analyse the main security properties of the KUD protocol using theTamarin prover
for a similar reason as explained in x 4.5.
Modeling aspects We used several abstractions during modeling. We model the
Merkle hash trees as lists, similar to the verication of DTKI.
We model the protocol roles S (sender), R (receiver) and L (log maintainer) by a
set of rewrite rules. Each rewrite rule typically models receiving a message, taking
an appropriate action, and sending a response message. Our modeling approach
is similar to most existing Tamarin models. Our modeling of the roles directly
corresponds to the protocol descriptions in the previous sections. Tamarin provides
built-in support for a Dolev-Yao style network attacker, i.e., one who is in full control
of the network. We additionally specify rules that enable the attacker to compromise
devices and learn their long and short-term secrets.
The nal KUD model consists of 450 lines for the base model, and six main
property specications, examples of which we will give below.
Proof goals The rst goal is a check for executability that ensures that our model
allows for the successful transmission of a message. It is encoded in the following
way.
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex d R skR dkR m #i.
/* R received an encrypted message m on device d */
MsgReceived(d, R, skR, dkR, m) @ #i
/* without the adversary compromising any device. */
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& not (Ex d2 A ltk dkR #j.
Compromise_Device(d2, A, ltk, dkR) @ #j) "
The property holds if the Tamarin model exhibits a behaviour in which one of
R's devices received a message without the attacker compromising any device. This
property mainly serves as a sanity check on the model. If it did not hold, it would
mean our model does not model the normal (honest) message ow, which could
indicate a aw in the model. Tamarin automatically proves this property in a few
seconds and generates the expected trace in the form of a graphical representation
of the rule instantiations and the message ow.
We additionally proved several other sanity-checking properties to minimize the
risk of modeling errors.
The second example goal is the core secrecy property with respect to a classical
attacker, and expresses that unless the attacker compromises a key, he cannot learn
any messages sent by Sally. Note that K(m) is a special event that denotes that the
attacker knows m at this time.
lemma message_secrecy:
"All R skR ekR m #i.
/* If S sent a message m to R */
( MsgSent(R, skR, ekR, m) @ #i &
/* without the adversary compromising any device */
not (Ex #j d sk dkR.
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j)
) ==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not ( Ex #j. K(m) @ #j)
) "
Tamarin also proves this property automatically.
The above result implies that if Robert receives a message that was sent by Sally,
and the attacker did not compromise his device during the current epoch, then the
attacker will not learn the message.
The next two properties encode the unique security guarantees provided by our
protocol. If the attacker compromises Robert's device in an epoch, he can use the
private ephemeral key to decrypt Sally's messages in that epoch. The rst main
property we prove is that if he uses the compromised long-term key of Robert to
learn messages sent by Sally in other epochs, then he will be detected once Robert
checks the log.
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lemma detect_usage_S_sends:
"All d skR dkR m #i1 #i2 #i3 detectionresult R k.
/* If S sent to R an encrypted message m,
where pk(dkR)=ekR */
( MsgSent(R, skR, pk(dkR), m) @ #i1 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i2 &
/* and the ephemeral key used by the sender
was not compromised, i.e., the compromise
occurred in a different epoch
*/
not (Ex #j sk .
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j ) &
/* and Robert afterwards checks the log */
CheckedLog(d, R, detectionresult, k ) @ #i3 &
#i1 < #i3
) ==>
( /* then we detect a compromise */
(detectionresult = 'bad')
) "
The property states that if Sally sends a message when Robert's device is not
controlled by an attacker in the current epoch (but might have been compromised
previously), and the attacker learns the message, then Robert detects the fact that
his key was previously compromised when he next veries the log.
The nal property extends the previous for the messages that Robert actually
receives from Sally, and shows that this also leads to detection of the key's abuse.
lemma detect_usage_R_receives:
"All d skR dkR dkR2 m #i1 #i2 #i3 #i4 detectionresult R k.
/* If S sent to R an encrypted message m,
where pk(dkR)=ekR */
( MsgSent(R, skR, pk(dkR), m) @ #i1 &
// /* and R receives it */
MsgReceived(d, R, skR, dkR2, m) @ #i2 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i3 &
/* and the ephemeral key used by the sender was
not compromised, i.e., the compromise was in
a different epoch then when m was sent.
*/
not (Ex #j sk .
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j ) &
/* and Robert afterwards checks the log */
CheckedLog(d, R, detectionresult, k ) @ #i4 &
#i2 < #i4
) ==>
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( /* then we can detect a compromise */
(detectionresult = 'bad')
) "
The last two properties encode the core security properties of our design. Both
of them are proven automatically by the Tamarin prover on a laptop within a few
minutes.
Overall, the modeling eort was in the order of weeks, with several iterations
to debug both the abstract model and the property specications. The verication
process helped us not only to prove, but also to rene the precise security properties
of our protocol.
Our initial model and property specication could not be automatically veried
by Tamarin and we used the tool's interactive mode to determine the cause of non-
termination. Ultimately, this enabled us to use Tamarin's lightweight heuristics-
inuencing mechanism, which boils down to adding two lines of code per property,
to guide the prover to nd the proofs automatically and eciently. This took several
iterations and also revealed errors in earlier specications, which made it clear that
the complexity of the model required us to specify and prove several sanity checks.
5.6 Realization in practice
5.6.1 Estimating communication cost
To check if deployment might be feasible, we estimate the expected cost of our
protocol design. As an example, we consider the following scenario. We assume
that there are 109 users, each user has 5 devices, the log has been operating for 100
years, the log update period  for registration request is 1 hour, and the log update
epoch  for certicate update is 1 day.
In this scenario, the size of T will be 100  365 + 100  365  24 = 912500 < 220,
and the size of each T 0 is 109 which is less than 230. In addition, we assume that
the size of a hash value is 256 bits (e.g. SHA256), the size of a signature is 64 Bytes
(e.g. ECDSA), and the size of a certicate is 1.5 KB.
In addition, we assume that the size of a user (or device) identity is 12 Bytes,
and time is in the 64-bit format, a random number is 28 bytes (recommended by
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Table 5.1: The size of messages in dierent protocols. In which, sizeP is the size
of proofs in the corresponding message, and sizeM is the maximum size of a message.
Message sizeP sizeM
Enrolling a device
request - 1.6 KB
response 2.2 KB 2.5 KB
Total 4.1 KB
Fetching keys from log
request - 78 B
response 2.2 KB 9.9 KB
Total 10 KB
Updating the keys
request - 1.5 KB
response 2.2 KB 2.5 KB
Total 4 KB
crowd-sourced verication
Total 5.3 KB 5.9 KB
TLS 1.2 [DR08]), each request identier is 4 bits, and the size of a digest of a log is
300 bits.
The size of a proof of presence that some data is in T and is in T 0 will be at
most 640 bytes and 960 bytes, respectively; the size of the proof that a version of
the log is extended from a previous version is at most 640 bytes. We present the
size of messages in the protocol in our example scenario in Table 5.1.
From Table 5.1 we can see that up to 5 KB data are needed to be transferred
for both enrolling a device and updating keys. The protocol for fetching keys from
the log is the most expensive one, as the sender has to download all certicates for
dierent devices of the same users. In our example, the sender needs to download 5
certicates, the size of which is already 7.5 KB.
The results of our analysis indicate that the space cost of our system is accept-
able.
5.6.2 Proof-of-concept log server prototype
To demonstrate the deployment of KUD in a real-world setting, we built a proof-of-
concept prototype of the log server. We implemented a full log server implementation
with interfaces, and client-side code for (a) adding users/devices, (b) rotating keys at
the end of each epoch, and (c) sending messages. This involves all the operations to
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manipulate the log (consisting of a tree of trees), produce various proofs, and produce
and verify the appropriate signatures. Anticipating a deployment on platforms such
as Google's App Engine, we implemented our code in Python. We use basic caching
mechanisms for previously computed results. On a quad-core 4 GHz Intel Core i7
with 32 GB of memory, we obtain the following times. The times are measured
locally and therefore do not include network latency. Performing 100000 (1e05)
enrollment requests from distinct users takes 1526 seconds, i.e., 15 milliseconds per
request on average. When 100000 (1e05) users enroll 3 devices each, enrollment
takes 1708 seconds, i.e., 5.7 milliseconds on average. The delay experienced by the
user is therefore dominated by the network latency of transmitting 4.1 KB (Table
5.1), which is certainly less than a second.
When the tree contains 10000 (1e04) entries, the server produces 100000 (1e05)
responses to message queries in 14.1 seconds, i.e., 0.14 milliseconds per message
query. Updating a tree by simultaneously adding 10000 (1e04) entries takes about 1
second, which is mostly spent in creating the leaf data structures. Once again, the
user's experience is mostly aected by the network latency, which is small because
the data transferred is a few KB.
The memory usage when 100000 (1e05) users enroll one device is 410 MB (com-
puted using \heapy" for the full process, not just reachable objects). If they enroll
three devices each, memory usage increases to 900 MB.
Thus, even though our proof-of-concept implementation is not yet optimized for
eciency or storage, its performance already indicates our scheme is feasible.
5.7 Conclusion
We have presented a novel messaging protocol that oers security guarantees even
when an attacker can access secret keys in a user's devices. In particular, (a) the pro-
tocol limits the impact of a compromise, since the attacker can only learn messages
sent in the same epoch without being detected, and (b) if the attacker uses compro-
mised long-term keys to impersonate users, then the protocol allows the participants
to detect this, and therefore to take remedial action. Our protocol supports multi-
ple devices per user, and the multiplicity of devices helps detect attacks by intuitive
indicators to users about which (device) keys have recently been active.
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The methods we introduce are not intended to replace existing methods used
to keep keys safe. Existing technologies such as TPMs, smart-cards, and ARM
TrustZone are all useful for securing keys. However, none of these technologies are
completely secure. For example, even if hardware security is used, malware may be
able to trigger usages of the key without having the ability to copy the key. Our
methods can also detect such cases. Thus, KUD adds an additional layer of security
that allows users to detect when other layers fail.
Part IV
Key compromise in secret
distribution
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CHAPTER 6
SELF-HEALING DISTRIBUTED
STORAGE
6.1 Introduction
Cloud storage has been widely adopted to relieve the pain of maintaining dedicated
hardware locally. For data owners, however, the condentiality of outsourced data
storage is a big concern. In particular, in the presence of system bugs, malware, and
cyber attacks, the security of cloud servers cannot be guaranteed [Rya13, AKV15].
The data owner can encrypt the data before outsourcing it to the cloud. But
this still leaves open the question of where to store the decryption keys. We would
like a solution in which clients do not need to store any decryption keys. A client
will authenticate itself to the server in order to request decryption.
One way to achieve such a solution is distributing the decryption keys of the
encrypted data to many cloud servers. Secret sharing is a well-known technique to
achieve this securely. In this case, an attacker would have to compromise a sucient
number of servers to break the security of the system. This makes the attacker's
work more dicult. However, this solution is not good enough, as an attacker may
be able to attack each server one-by-one over a long period. Eventually the attacker
would be able to compromise suciently many servers and recover the decryption
key.
To address this problem, we further develop the idea of storing secrets on several
servers, with the aim of preventing gradual attacks over a long time. We assume
that time is divided into periods. A server that is compromised in a time period
may be repaired by its maintainers in the next time period [SCL+15, YR15]. At
the end of each time period, servers update all their secrets needed to recover the
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decryption key, before they start the next time period. The intuition is that, after
a server has been repaired and has updated its secrets, the secrets learnt by an
attacker in previous periods are rendered useless.
Unfortunately, the fact that the servers' secrets could be compromised and are
changed periodically causes a problem for how a client should authenticate the
servers. To solve this, we require a way for servers to have a public key for authenti-
cation that remains constant, even though the associated secrets held by the server
are updated in each period. Achieving this requirement means that the clients do
not need to be involved in (or even aware of) the server's regime for updating secrets.
In summary, we identify the following list of requirements:
1. The clients do not need to store any keys for performing decryption.
2. The system is secure even if all servers are compromised over a long time,
provided that no more than a threshold number of servers are compromised
in a given period.
3. The system provides a xed public key for authentication, valid for all time
periods.
4. The number of messages exchanged between the servers during the update
period is independent of the number of data items stored.
5. As with any security protocol, there needs to be a well-dened adversary
model, and a formal security proof.
This chapter presents a system based on bilinear pairings for distributed cloud
storage, which we call \self-healing" cloud storage. The system satises the require-
ments mentioned above. One notable feature is that even though the service secrets
change in each time period, the public key to be known by data owners remains
constant. This feature could be used as a building block that allows us to tackle a
more general server authentication issue, where the servers are compromisable cross
time periods.
To formally prove the security guarantee of our self-healing scheme, we started
our security verication rst by using Tamarin prover. However, we found (and
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reported) bugs in Tamarin prover when modelling bilinear paring based protocols.
Since compared to DTKI and KUD protocols the scheme here has a heavy use of
crypto, we proved this scheme by using classical game-based approach.
Before presenting this system in Section 6.3, we rst formally dene attacker
model and security goals in Section 6.2. A rigorous formal security proof of the
proposed system under the dened security model is presented in Section 6.4.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed system is the rst self-healing dis-
tributed storage, with a formal security model and a formal security proof.
6.2 Attacker model and security goal
This section rst informal presents an attacker model and our security goal, in
Section 6.2.1 and Section 6.2.2, respectively. It then denes the formal security
model in Section 6.2.3.
We consider the scenario that an attacker wants to steal the sensitive data of
users on cloud servers, by gradually breaking into servers of the system.
6.2.1 Attacker model
Suppose an attacker compromises a server. Then the attacker can fully control the
server and has access to all its short-term and long-term secrets. Suppose sometime
later, the maintainer of the server applies software patches and malware removal.
Depending on the nature of the compromise, that action might restore the server
into a secure state, or it might not.
As shown in Table 6.1, we use SPAC to present the set of permanently attacker-
controlled servers; STAC to present the set of temporarily attacker-controlled servers
(as illustrated in Figure 6.3); and SSec to present the set of secure servers. For
client side, we only consider two possibilities, namely the set CAC of permanently
attacker-controlled client and the set CSec of secure clients.
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show the possible transformation between dierent
types of servers and clients, respectively. Generally, any secure server in SSec may
become a temporarily attacker-controlled server; and any server in STAC may become
a secure server; and any server in SSec or STAC may become a permanently attacker-
controlled server. On the client side, we consider that any secure client may become
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Table 6.1: The explanation on dierent types of participants.
Notation Description
SPAC The set of servers that are permanently controlled by attackers.
Security actions, e.g. software patches and malware removal, can
not succeed in restoring the servers to a secure state.
STAC The set of servers that are temporarily controlled by attackers.
Security actions, e.g. software patches and malware removal, can
succeed in restoring the servers to a secure state
SSec The set of servers that are currently secure.
CAC The set of clients that are controlled by attackers.
CSec The set of clients that are currently secure.
SAlice The set of servers selected by client Alice.
S The complete set of all servers, such that S = SPAC [ STAC [ SSec
C The complete set of all clients, such that C = CAC [ CSec
P The complete set of all participants, such that P = S [ C.
an attacker-controlled client.
6.2.2 Security goal
All servers update their secrets simultaneously at pre-determined times. We say T
is an epoch if T starts from the beginning of the process for updating secrets, and
ends at the beginning of the next process for updating secrets. Note that since we
allow an adversary to corrupt servers at any moment during an epoch, if a server is
corrupted during an update phase from epoch T to the next epoch T 0, we consider
the attacker being able to obtain secrets in both the T -th and T 0-th epochs.
Let SAlice be set of servers selected by Alice. At a given epoch T , let SPAC(T )
be the number of permanently attacker-controlled servers in SAlice, and STAC(T )
the number of temporarily attacker-controlled servers in SAlice. Our security goal
is that an attacker cannot learn any secret of Alice, provided the total number of
attacker-controlled servers in T and T 0 is less than the number of servers chosen by
Alice, i.e. SPAC(T 0) + STAC(T ) + STAC(T 0) < jSAlicej.
Remark 6.1. Loosely speaking, it says that the system should be secure if the total
number of compromised servers in two adjacent epochs is less than the number of
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SPAC STAC SSec
CreateAttackerControlledServer()
CreateSecureServer()
TakeOwnershipServer()
TakeOwnershipServer()
CompromiseServer()
SecurityAction()
Figure 6.1: A gure presenting the possible transformation between dierent types
of servers, i.e. permanently attacker-controlled server SPAC ; temporarily attacker-
controlled server STAC ; and secure server SSec. In our formal security model, these
transformations can be achieved by using oracle queries as dened in Section 6.2.3.
CAC CSec
CreateAttackerControlledClient()
CreateSecureClient()
CompromiseClient()
Figure 6.2: A gure presenting the possible transformation between dierent states
of clients, i.e. secure client CSec and attacker-controlled client CAC . In our formal
security model, these transformations can be achieved by using oracle queries as
dened in Section 6.2.3.
servers chosen by Alice. Note that SPAC(T ) is the number of permanently compro-
mised servers at epoch T , and these servers will be included in the set of permanently
compromised servers in future epochs as well. So we have SPAC(T )  SPAC(T 0).
However, this is not true for STAC().
6.2.3 Formal Model
We rst dene the scenario we are considering, i.e. attackers can periodically com-
promise cloud servers for storage. Then we formally dene the ability of an attacker,
and the security of a self-healing distributed cloud storage system.
Denition 6.1. A periodically compromised system environment (PCSE)
is an environment in which an attacker can periodically control honest participants
of a protocol. It consists of
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compromised compromised compromised
: : : : : :
secure secure secure
t1 t01 t2 t
0
2
tn t0n
Figure 6.3: A timeline presenting a server's security state transformation between a
temporarily attacker controlled server STAC and a secure server SSec. For all i > 0,
we assume that the server is compromised in the time interval between ti and t
0
i,
and is secure in the time interval between t0i and ti+1.
1. Protocol : the underlying security protocol;
2. Security checking oracle SecurityCheck(; S; t): given a server S 2 S in
protocol  at time t, it outputs a boolean value VS;t to indicate if S is vulnerable
at t. If VS;t = True, then an attacker is able to compromise S; otherwise, S is
secure. This models the security status of a server.
3. Security action oracle SecurityAction(; S; t): given a server S and time t,
it outputs a strategy for S such that if S is a temporarily attacker-controlled
server, i.e. S 2 STAC, and it executes the strategy at time t, then the server
will become a secure server, i.e. SecurityCheck(; S; t0) = False, where t0 is
the time point right after t.
We dene our security model through a game with two participants, namely a
challenger and a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A. The attacker's
goal is to win the game that is initialised by the challenger. A is able to ask the
following oracle queries.
1. O1: Settings(). By sending this query, the attacker is given all the public
parameters of .
2. O2: Execute(;P 0). Upon receiving this query, the set of participants P 0  P
executes protocol , if applicable. The exchanged messages will be recorded
and sent to A. This oracle query models an attacker's ability to eavesdrop
communications between participants in .
3. O3: CreateAttackerControlledClient(; C). Upon receiving this query with
a fresh identity C, the oracle creates an attacker-controlled client C in 
according to the attacker's choice. After this query has been made, we have
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that CAC := CAC [ fCg. We say an identity is \fresh" if and only if the
identity is unique and has not been previously generated. This oracle models
an attacker's ability to register a new client of its choice.
4. O4: CreateAttackerControlledServer(; S). Upon receiving this query, the
oracle creates a fresh server S, and sends the corresponding secret key and
public key to the attacker. After this query has been made, we have that
SPAC := SPAC [fSg. This oracle allows A to adaptively register permanently
attacker-controlled servers of its choice.
5. O5: CreateSecureClient(; C). Upon receiving this query, the oracle creates
a fresh client C in . After this query has been made, we have that CSec :=
CSec [ fCg. This oracle query allows an attacker to introduce more clients,
which are initially secure.
6. O6: CreateSecureServer(; S). Upon receiving this query, the oracle creates
a fresh server S in . After this query has been made, we have that SSec :=
SSec [ fSg. This oracle query allows an attacker to introduce more servers,
which are initially secure.
7. O7: CompromiseClient(; C). Upon receiving this query for some C 2 CSec
in , the oracle forwards all corresponding secrets of C to A. From now on the
attacker controls C so that C 2 CAC and C =2 CSec after this query has been
made. This oracle query allows A to adaptively and permanently compromise
a client of its choice.
8. O8: TakeOwnershipServer(; S). Upon receiving this query for some S 2
SSec or S 2 STAC in , the oracle forwards all corresponding secrets of S to
A, and from now on the attacker controls S. So, S is moved from its current
set in to SPAC after this query has been made. This oracle query allows A to
adaptively and permanently compromise a server of its choice.
9. O9: CompromiseServer(; S). Upon receiving this query, the oracle outputs
all secrets of S 2 SSec in . We have S =2 SSec and S 2 STAC after this query
has been made. This oracle query models A's ability to adaptively compromise
a temporarily attacker-controlled server of its choice.
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10. O10: Dec(; Enc(M;PKSC ); C). Upon receiving this query for some client
C 2 CSec with secret M , the set SC of servers collectively executes the decryp-
tion protocol to decrypt the encrypted message Enc(M;PKSC ), and sends the
decryption result M to the attacker, where PKSC is the common public key
of the set SC servers selected by C for encryption/decryption.
We now consider the distributed cloud storage scenario. If a powerful attacker
A can fully control a data owner's device when the device is creating or recovering
a secret s, then A can easily learn s. As mentioned before, we do not consider this
case, as there is nothing we can do and it is not interesting. To focus on the more
interesting cases, we only consider that A cannot learn s by compromising the data
owner's device during the secret creation or recovery time.
Denition 6.2. A self-healing distributed storage protocol  is (k; n)-secure if the
advantage AdvA;n;k() = jPr[b = b0]   12 j of A to win the following game, denoted
Game-PCSE, is negligible in the security parameter .
Game-PCSE:
 Setup(; ). The challenger sets up protocol  according to the security pa-
rameter . Initially, S = C = ;.
 Query phase. The attacker can ask a polynomially bounded number of oracle
queries Oi for i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 10g. Let j4, j8, and j9 be counters counting the
total number of O4, O8, and O9 queries asked by the attacker, respectively.
We have that j4 + j8 + j9 < k.
 Security action phase. The challenger makes security checking oracle queries
on all servers, and then makes security action oracle queries on the servers
that are temporarily controlled by the attacker. At the end of this phase, the
counter j9 will be reset to \0".
 The query phase and the security action phase are repeated a polynomially
bounded number of times.
 Challenge(Cb; C). The attacker selects a target client C who has not been
asked through Oi for i 2 f3; 7g, i.e. C 2 CSec; and selects two messages M0
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and M1, s.t. jM0j = jM1j. The attacker then sends them to the challenger.
The challenger tosses a coin. Let b 2 f0; 1g be the result of the coin toss.
The challenger then encrypts Mb according to , and sends the ciphertext
Cb = Enc(Mb; PKS) back to the attacker.
 The query phase and the security action phase are repeated a polynomially
bounded number of times. Additionally, we require that the target client C can-
not be asked through O3 and O7, and Dec(; Cb; C) cannot be queried through
O10.
 Guess(b). The attacker makes a guess b0 of the value of b, and outputs b0. The
attacker wins if b = b0.
Remark 6.2. In the game dened above, the execution of a query phase followed
by a security action phase simulates an epoch of the protocol.
Remark 6.3. In a (k; n)-threshold cryptosystem, an attacker can break the security
if the attacker is able to compromise k secrets/parties during the lifetime of the
system. However, in the above dened (k; n)-secure system in the PCSE, an attacker
cannot break the security even if the attacker can compromise all n parties in the
lifetime of the system, provided at any time point t between two updates, at most
k   1 parties are compromised by the attacker.
6.3 Our solution
We present our solution, rst in a non-threshold form (i.e., we stipulate that the
minimum number k of servers needed for performing decryption is equal to n, the
total number of servers). Later, in section 6.5.1, we generalise it to a threshold-based
solution where we allow one to choose k < n.
6.3.1 Basic idea
Alice selects a set of servers, and encrypts her secret by using the combined public
key of the selected servers.
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Setup
SA : (a; g
a), SB : (b; g
b), SC : (c; g
c), PK = gabc
Zero-th Update
SA : (a0; g
a0), SB : (b0; g
b0), SC : (c0; g
c0), H0 = g
(a0b0c0=abc)
First Update
SA : (a1; g
a1), SB : (b1; g
b1), SC : (c1; g
c1), H1 = g
(a1b1c1=abc)
The j-th Update
SA : (aj; g
aj), SB : (bj; g
bj), SC : (cj; g
cj), Hj = g
(ajbjcj=abc)
Encryption at any time
C = ( = gabck;  = sZk), for some secret s and random number k
Decryption at the j-th epoch
Compute  = e(;Hj), then decrypt (; ) by using (aj; bj; cj)
Figure 6.4: The data associated with the servers SA, SB and SC at dierent stages
of the protocol, and the encryption and decryption computations.
Time is divided into epochs. At the end of each epoch, the servers execute
a protocol during which they generate new decryption keys and destroy the old
ones. If a server is compromised in an epoch, the attacker obtains all its (shares
of) decryption keys. However, the protocol ensures that decryption keys from a
server in one epoch cannot be used together with decryption keys from a server in a
dierent epoch. Each change of epoch renders useless the decryption keys obtained
by the attacker in previous epochs. Thus, to decrypt the secret, and attacker would
have to compromise a threshold number of servers within the same epoch.
6.3.2 Abstract construction
We explain the protocol with three servers, SA, SB, and SC . Let G1, G2 be two
cyclic groups of a suciently large prime order p, such that jpj = , with a bilinear
map e : G21 ! G2, and g 2 G1 is a generator and Z = e(g; g) 2 G2 (as dened in
Chapter 2). The data associated with the servers at dierent stages of the protocol
are presented in Figure 6.4.
Setup and zero-th epoch. SA generates a private key a 2 Zp, and a public
key ga. Similarly, SB and SC generate (b; g
b) and (c; gc), such that b; c 2 Zp. Then
SA, SB, SC collectively compute and publish their joint public key g
abc.
Next, SA generates a new key a0 2 Zp and public key ga0 , and similarly SB and
SC generate (b0; g
b0) and (c0; g
c0), such that b0; c0 2 Zp. Then SA, SB, SC collectively
6.3. Our solution 124
compute and publish helper data H0 = g
(a0=a)(b0=b)(c0=c) with proofs that they have
correctly performed the computation. They destroy the secrets a, b, c.
At the end of the (j   1)-th epoch. The servers replace their decryption
keys aj 1, bj 1, and cj 1 with new ones aj, bj, and cj. Then SA, SB, SC collectively
compute and publish helper data Hj = g
(aj=a)(bj=b)(cj=c) with proofs that they have
correctly performed the computation. The values a; b; c are not required to compute
Hj. They destroy the secrets aj 1, bj 1, cj 1.
Encryption of secret s. At any time during the server lifecycle (i.e. any epoch
j), a client Alice can encrypt her data with the (unchanging) public key gabc. To
encrypt secret s, she selects a new random k and computes C = ( = gabck;  = sZk).
Decryption of ciphertext (; ) at the j-th epoch.
After authenticating client Alice's request for decryption, the servers can collec-
tively decrypt a ciphertext (; ) during any epoch. To decrypt (; ), the servers
compute  = e(;Hj) = Z
ajbjcjk. Then the servers use their secrets aj, bj, and cj to
collectively compute Zk, and then they can recover the secret s from  = sZk. Note
that duing this decryption process, Alice should apply masking to the  to prevent
servers from learning the plaintext. More details are presented in the next section.
Remark 6.4. Note that the public key used by clients for encryption remains con-
stant regardless of the secret updates on the server side (requirement 3 in Sec-
tion 6.1). Also, the update procedure is independent of the number of stored ci-
phertexts (requirement 4). That is because in the update phase the servers need only
collectively compute the helper data. The ciphertext (; ) of each data item remains
unchanged.
6.3.3 Detailed construction
Initialisation Setup. Let S1; S2; : : : ; Sn be the servers selected by Alice. Si creates
setting-up key pair (si; g
si), for some si 2 Zp, respectively. They also compute a
common public key PK = g
Q
si , which is available to the client in an authentic
matter, e.g., via a certicate. This key can be established as follows:
 Each Si computes and publishes Pi = gsi .
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 S2 computes PK12 = (P1)s2 . This computation can be veried by checking
e(PK12; g) = e(P1; P2).
 Si computes PK1:::i = (PK1:::(i 1))si , which again can be veried by checking
e(PK1:::i; g) = e(PK1:::(i 1); Pi).
Now, each Si has a secret key si and a common public key PK.
Zero-th epoch. This epoch is to generate the rst decryption keys. Each Si
chooses another secret key si0, computes ui0 = si0=si, computes and publishes Pi0 =
gsi0 , P 0i0 = g
ui0 and deletes si. The correctness of these values can be checked as
e(P 0i0; Pi) = e(Pi0; g).
By using ui0, Si works with other servers to get H0 = g
Q
si0=si in the same way
as computing PK, and then deletes ui0.
At the end of the initialisation, Si only holds si0 at secret. This value can be
used for decryption (if needed) and is used for the next decryption key update. In
addition, Si also holds two public values, namely a helper data H0 and a common
public key PK.
Note that the common public key is used for data encryption by the clients. This
implies that the clients do not have to follow the server key updating processes, and
they will keep using the key PK for a reasonably long time.
Updating the decryption keys The decryption key update process is similar
to the computation of the rst decryption keys presented in the previous phase. At
the end of the (j   1)-th epoch for some j  1, the servers replace their decryption
keys si(j 1) with new ones, sij. This is achieved as follows.
 With the input si(j 1), Si chooses sij, computes uij = sij=si(j 1), computes
and publishes Pij = g
sij and P 0ij = g
uij , and deletes si(j 1). The correctness of
these values can be checked as e(P 0ij; Pi(j 1)) = e(Pij; g).
 By using uij, Si works with other servers to get Hj = H
Q
sij=si(j 1)
j 1 = g
Q
sij=si
and then deletes uij. The correctness of these values should also be veried in
the same way as computing PK.
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At the end of (j   1)-th update, Si only holds sij. This value is used for both
decryption and update in the (j)-th epoch.
Encryption To encrypt a secret s, Alice selects a new random k, and computes
PKk = gk
Q
si and sZk. Alice sends ( = PKk;  = sZk) to each server.
Servers only accept (; ) as some encrypted data from Alice if a valid proof of
knowledge of s (or k) is provided. This is used to prevent replay attacks in which an
attacker who has observed (; ) sets up an account with the servers, and provides
(; ) as the attacker's encrypted data, then requests servers to decrypt it for the
attacker. Any secure zero knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) can be used. For
example, the proof can be a Schnorr ZKPK of k, where the prover knows k and the
verier knows PKk. If the prover shows knowledge of k, this implies that she also
knows s.
At the end, Alice destroys s and k after all servers are convinced and accepted
the ciphertext.
Decryption An abstract protocol for decrypting an encrypted secret is presented
in Figure 6.5.
In more detail, in the j-th epoch for some j  0, Alice sends a request to a
selected server for retrieving the encrypted data. After successfully authenticating
Alice, the server calculates  = e(;Hj) = Z
kQ sij , and sends (; ) to Alice.
Alice selects a new random k0 2 Zp, sends Zk0 to each of the servers as her
commitment on k0, computes k
0
= Zkk
0Q sij , and asks each server to remove its sij
from the exponent. The nal output should be Zkk
0
. She then can recover Zk by
computing (Zkk
0
)
1=k0
, and thus be able to decrypt sZk.
Before a server decrypts some message requested by a user, the server expects
a proof that the requested decryption is indeed a step to help the user to recover a
key that the user actually owns, i.e. to prove that
(Z;Zk
0
; Zk
Q
sij ; Zkk
0Q sij)
is a DDH tuple. This can be done by using classic non-interactive ZKPK schemes, for
proving that (g; gx; gy; gxy) is a DDH tuple (e.g. Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92],
6.4. Security analysis 127
Alice SAlice
Request
Authentication process
- If the authentication succeeded, then
compute  = e(;Hj) = Z
kQ sij
(; )
- Select k0 2 Zp
- Compute k
0
- Generate proof P that
(Z;Zk
0
; Zk
Q
sij ; Zkk
0Q sij ) is a DDH tuple
(k
0
; P )
- Verify P
- Compute Zkk
0
by collectively decrypting k
0
Zkk
0
- Compute Zk = (Zkk
0
)
1=k0
- Decrypt sZk
Figure 6.5: An abstract presentation of the protocol for decrypting a distributed
and encrypted secret.
as reviewed in Chapter 2). Each server also needs to check the received values from
other servers in the same way.
6.4 Security analysis
Our goal is to prove the security of our protocol per Denition 6.2; that is, we prove
that the advantage that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A has to
win the Game-PCSE is negligible.
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We rst introduce a new assumption, called \modied decisional bilinear Die-
Hellman inversion (M-DBDHI)", and show how this assumption is related to our
system. We then dene a game based on the M-DBDHI assumption. The game has
multiple rounds. We call such a game with j rounds as j-round modied decisional
bilinear Die-Hellman inversion game, denoted Game-j-R-MDBDHI.
We then prove that if an adversary can win Game-j-R-MDBDHI with a non-
negligible advantage, then we can break the M-DBDHI assumption.
Finally, we simulate our protocol and adversary model by using Game-j-R-
MDBDHI, and prove in our theorem that if an adversary can win Game-PCSE with
a non-negligible advantage , then we can make use of this adversary to win Game-j-
R-MDBDHI with advantage (1+2)(N N
00)(N N 0)
8N2
, which is also non-negligible. (Here,
the values N , N 0 and N 00 are quantities of servers participating in the protocol.)
6.4.1 Hardness assumption and discussion
We rst dene the Modied Decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman Inversion (M-DBDHI)
assumption as follows.
Denition 6.3 (M-DBDHI Assumption). Given (g; ga; gb; gx; g1=x; gx=b), where g 2
G1 is a generator, a; b; x 2 Zp, it is hard to distinguish e(g; g)a=b from random.
Remark 6.5. Roughly speaking, the connection with our protocol is the following.
Let k be an element in Zp such that ga = gbk and let the common public key be
PK = gb. Then the ciphertext of a message m is
(; ) = (PKk;m  e(g; g)k) = (ga;m  e(g; g)a=b)
So, if an adversary is able to distinguish e(g; g)a=b from random, then we can make
use of the adversary to determine whether (ga;m  e(g; g)a=b) is a correct encryption
of m or not.
As far as we know, the M-DBDHI assumption is not provable from other similar
assumptions in the literature. However, a weaker form of it follows from the q-
Decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman Inversion (q-DBDHI) assumption (see Chapter
2).
We show how to prove the weaker assumption as follows.
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Lemma 6.1. Assume q-DBDHI. Given (g; ga; gb), where g 2 G1 is a generator,
a; b 2 Zp, it is hard to distinguish e(g; g)a=b from random.
Proof. It can be proved hard by contradiction: If there exists an adversary A which
has a non-negligible advantage  to distinguish e(g; g)a=b from random, then we can
construct a PPT Turing machine B to break the q-DBDHI assumption.
Let (g; gx; gx
2
; : : : ; gx
q
) 2 (G1)q+1 be the given (q + 1)-tuple in q-DBDHI, and
the challenge for B is to decide if a given challenge Q is e(g; g)1=x. We now explain
how to make use of A to break q-DBDHI assumption.
To generate a challenge for A, B rst randomly picks a 2 Zp, and sends (g; ga; gx)
and challenge Qa to A. A should send a decision to state if Qa = e(g; g)a=x or not.
B then uses the received decision as his decision on whether Q = e(g; g)1=x or not.
So, the advantage that B can break the q-DBDHI assumption is also , which is
non-negligible. This contradicts our assumption.
The M-DBDHI assumption is stronger because, in addition to (g; ga; gb) which
are the elements that an attacker can learn in a single epoch of the protocol, the
adversary is given the extra elements (gx; g1=x; gx=b) in the given tuple. In fact,
these elements are the knowledge that an attacker can learn from other epochs of
our protocol (more details can be found in the proof of Lemma 6.2).
Intuitively, the M-DBDHI is expected to be a hard problem, as the extra infor-
mation (gx; g1=x; gx=b) does not help one to distinguish e(g; g)a=b, due to the discrete
logarithm problem and Decisional Die-Hellman Problem on G2. How to formally
prove the relationship between M-DBDHI and any well-known hard problem is an
open question.
6.4.2 Formal security analysis
We dene the j-round modied decisional bilinear Die-Hellman inversion game
(Game-j-R-MDBDHI) as follows.
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Game-j-R-MDBDHI
1. The challenger sets j = 1, selects r0 2 f0; 1g uniformly at random, and gener-
ates a tuple (g; ga0 ; gb0 ; Q0) according to security parameter , where g 2 G1
is a generator, a0; b0 2 Zp such that jpj = . If r0 = 0, then Q0 = e(g; g)a0=b0 ;
otherwise Q0 is randomly chosen from G2. The challenger sends the tuple to
the adversary.
2. Query phase. The adversary selects and makes one of the following two re-
quests to the challenger.
a) Update. Upon receiving this request, the challenger selects new random
aj; bj 2 Zp, and outputs gbj=bj 1 , selects rj 2 f0; 1g uniformly at random,
and an updated tuple (g; gaj ; gbj ; Qj). If rj = 0, then Qj = e(g; g)
aj=bj ;
otherwise Qj is randomly chosen from G2.
b) Reveal and update. Upon receiving this request, the challenger outputs
(aj 1; bj 1), and updates the tuple as presented above.
After a challenger answers a request, the challenger sets j = j + 1.
3. The query phase is repeated a polynomially bounded number of times.
4. The adversary outputs a decision on whether Qi = e(g; g)
ai=bi , for any i 2
f0; 1; : : : ; jg, such that the value of (ai; bi) and (ai+1; bi+1) is not revealed to
the adversary through request (b), if applicable. The adversary wins the game
if the decision is correct.
5. After the adversary outputs a decision, the current (aj; bj) will be revealed to
the adversary.
Remark 6.6. In the above game, the request (a) will be used indirectly to help us to
simulate the protocol for updating decryption keys; and the request (b) will be used
indirectly to help us to simulate oracles of compromising a server's decryption key in
Game-PCSE. The last step, i.e. revealing (aj; bj), only happens after the adversary
has made a decision. So this has no value for the game. However, it will also
indirectly help us to simulate the protocol in the Game-PCSE.
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Lemma 6.2. Assuming M-DBDHI, an adversary can win Game-j-R-MDBDHI only
with a negligible advantage.
Proof. This lemma can be proved by contradiction. Let the j0-th round challenge
be the target challenge, for some j0 2 [0; j]. Apart from the initial knowledge
(g; ga0 ; gb0 ; Q0), an attacker also has the following extra knowledge:
 all secrets (i.e. (ai; bi)) associated to the i-th challenge can be learnt by the
attacker, for all i such that i 2 f0; 1; 2; : : : ; j0   1; j0 + 2; : : :g. In other words,
the j0-th and (j0 + 1)-th secret cannot be learnt by the attacker;
 the attacker can also learn gbi=bi 1 for all i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; j0; : : :g.
Since the secrets related to the j0-th tuple are selected from random, it is inde-
pendent of the rst (j0 2) rounds. The connection between j0-th tuple and (j0 1)-th
tuple is that when the request (b) is asked on the (j0 1)-th tuple, then the attacker
learns aj0 1; bj0 1; gb
0
j=bj0 1 . It is easy to see that the attacker will not gain any extra
information associated to the j0-th round, due to the discrete logarithm assumption
and Die-Hellman assumption.
For the secret revealed after (j0 + 1)-th round, the extra knowledge an attacker
has is (aj0+2; bj0+2; g
bj0+2=bj0+1 ; aj0+3; bj0+3; g
bj0+3=bj0+2 ; : : :). Since the secrets generated
after (j0 + 2)-th round are also random, and they are not linked to the j0-th round
in any format, they are independent of the j0-th round. So, the actual related
knowledge the attacker has is
(g; ga
0
j ; gb
0
j ; gbj0+1 ; gbj0+1=b
0
j ; bj0+2; g
bj0+2=bj0+1 ; Q0j)
We now prove that given the above tuple, an adversary cannot determine if
Q0j = e(g; g)
a0j=b
0
j with non-negligible advantage. This can be proved by contradic-
tion, namely, if an adversary can determine if Q0j = e(g; g)
a0j=b
0
j with non-negligible
advantage, then we can construct a PPT Turing machine B to break M-DBDHI
assumption.
Given a challenge (g; ga; gb; gx; g1=x; gx=b; Q) as stated in M-DBDHI assumption,
B selects a new random r, and computes (g1=x)r, then sends (g; ga; gb; gx; gx=b; r; gr=x; Q),
which is of the same form as the knowledge the attacker has related to the challenge
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given in the j0-th round. If the adversary can determine whether Q = e(g; g)a=b or
not with non-negligible advantage, then B can re-direct the adversary's answer to
break M-DBDHI assumption with non-negligible advantage, which forms a contra-
diction.
Thus, if an adversary can win Game-j-R-MDBDHI with a non-negligible ad-
vantage, we can make use of it to break M-DBDHI assumption. This forms a
contradiction.
Theorem 6.3. Assuming M-DBDHI, the proposed system is secure in the sense of
Denition 6.2.
Proof. We prove our theorem by contradiction. If an attacker A is able to win
Game-PCSE (Denition 6.2), with non-negligible advantage, then we can construct
a PPT Turing machine B to win Game-j-R-MDBDHI.
We now explain how to construct B to make use ofA to win Game-j-R-MDBDHI,
in the following steps.
Let  be the security parameter used in this game.
B, as an adversary, starts Game-j-R-MDBDHI with a challenger Chl, and ob-
tains (g; ga0 ; gb0 ; Q0) from Chl. Then, B, as a challenger, sets up Game-PCSE with
A as follows.
 B sets up our proposed protocol through Setup(; ). A declares the number
N of servers that will be created.
 Query phase. We present how B answers the following oracle queries made
by A. To answer O1 (i.e. Settings()), B outputs current public parameters.
We will present how to answer O2, i.e. to execute the protocol, later. To an-
swer Oi for i 2 f3; 4; 5; 6g, i.e. create new participants, B creates a participant
accordingly, and if i 2 f3; 4g, then B sends the corresponding key pair to A.
B can also answer Oi for i 2 f7; 8; 9g, i.e. compromise or take ownership of
participants, since B creates them and knows all associated secrets. Similarly,
B can answer the decryption oracle O10. Note that there is a special case on
answering the O8 and O9, which we will discuss after we present how to answer
O2.
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To answer O2, we need to present how to simulate our protocol. In the setup
phase, all participants are created through the adversary's create-participant
oracle. For the rst received O6 (CreateSecureServer(; Si)), B will use gb0
provided by Chl as Si's initial public key g
si . We call this server a \trap"
server. From A's point of view, there is no dierence between the trap server
and other servers. When all N servers are created, B creates the common
public key PK.
To generate the rst decryption key, B can directly generate decryption keys
for all the servers he created, since B knows all corresponding initial secrets.
For the trap server, B does not know the corresponding secret b0, however, B
can still generate the rst decryption key by making request (a) in Game-j-R-
MDBDHI. The output of request (b) is (g; ga1 ; gb1 ; Q1) and g
b1=b0 . The gb1 will
be used as the public value associated to the rst decryption key b1, and the
value gb1=b0 is in fact the gui0 associated to the trap server Si in our protocol,
and this value will be used to calculate helper data H0.
At the end of the j-th epoch, the decryption keys of servers (apart from the trap
server) can be easily updated, since B creates them and knows all the secrets.
For the trap server, B can simulate the decryption key update in the same
way as generating the rst decryption key. B asks the request (a) in Game-j-
R-MDBDHI, i.e. update the tuple from (g; gaj ; gbj ; Qj) to (g; g
aj+1 ; gbj+1 ; Qj+1)
for the (j + 1)-th epoch.
The encryption process does not need the knowledge of bj, so B can pick a
random k 2 Zp, and simulates the encryption. B will store the value of k in
order to be able to simulate the decryption oracle without knowing bj.
Now we can see that the special case of answering O8 and O9 is when the trap
server is being asked, since B does not know the value of bj. In the j-th epoch
for some j 6= 1, when CompromiseServer(; Si) is being made on the trap
server Si, B asks Chl to reveal the current secret through request (b). Chl
reveals bj, and updates the tuple as stated in Game-j-R-MDBDHI. B then
redirects bj to A.
If at the rst epoch the CompromiseServer(; Si) is being made on the trap
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server, or if at any epoch the TakeOwnershipServer(; Si) is being made
on the trap server Si, then B make a random guess as the decision on the
currently challenge Qj from Chl, and the game Game-j-R-MDBDHI is over.
Note that B is still able to continue with A, as bj is revealed at the end of
Game-j-R-MDBDHI.
 Security action phase. B makes security action oracle queries on all tem-
porarily attacker-controlled servers, and executes the received strategy for the
associated server. Then B updates the decryption keys of all servers as de-
scribed above in the query phase.
 Challenge phase. After receiving two messagesM1 andM2 from A, B tosses
a coin, and b 2 f0; 1g is the result of the coin tossing. B computes PK 0 such
that PK 0 is the result of replacing b0 in PK by using a0. B can do this because
that B knows ga0 and all other initial secrets. B then sends (PK 0;Mb  Q0)
back to A as the ciphertext Cb.
 If B has received a correct guess from A, then B says to Chl that Q0 =
e(g; g)a0=b0 . Otherwise, B makes a random guess. Note that as previously
explained, we can think of the a0=b0 as the random number k picked by a
client in the encryption phase. So, if (PK 0;Mb Q0) is a correct encryption of
message Mb under public key PKS , then we have that Q0 = e(g; g)a0=b0 .
Note that the above simulation opts out the case that an attacker requests the
servers to decrypt the target ciphertext. The attacker can do it by providing the
ciphertext to servers for decryption. However, our protocol prevents an attacker to
do so by using the two secure zero knowledge proof schemes: one is used for verifying
the ownership during the encryption process, and one is used to verify that the to-
be-decrypted ciphertext is the one belongs to a client during the decryption process.
Let N 0 be the number of TakeOwnershipServer(; Si) queries made by A in
Game-PCSE ; and let N 00 be the number of CompromiseServer(; Si) queries made
by A in the rst epoch.
The probability that B wins the game associated to Qj with Chl is analysed as
follows.
6.4. Security analysis 135
 The probability that the adversary chooses to perform CompromiseServer(; Si)
in the rst epoch on the trap server is N
00
N
. In this case, the probability that
B wins Game-j-R-MDBDHI is 1
2
, as B can only make random guess. This is
due to the fact that if the oracle query has been asked at the rst epoch, then
(a1; b1) will be revealed B, and Q0 is not a valid challenge anymore.
 The probability that CompromiseServer(; Si) is not made in the rst epoch
on the trap server, and TakeOwnershipServer(; Si) is performed on the trap
server in Game-PCSE, is (1  N 00
N
)  N 0
N
. In this case, the probability that B wins
Game-j-R-MDBDHI is 1
2
, as B can only make random guess. This is due to
the fact that all secrets associated to the Game-j-R-MDBDHI will be revealed
to B in order to simulate the TakeOwnershipServer(; Si) oracle query, so
B cannot make use of A to win Game-j-R-MDBDHI.
 The probability that CompromiseServer(; Si) is not made in the rst epoch
on the trap server, and trap server has not been asked through
TakeOwnershipServer(; Si) in Game-PCSE is (1   N 00N )  (1   N
0
N
). In this
case, the probability that B wins Game-j-R-MDBDHI has two cases:
{ if Qj = e(g; g)
aj=bj , then the probability that B wins is
(
1
2
+ )  1 + (1
2
  ))  1
2
(Recall that if A wins (the probability is 1
2
+ ), then B will win with
probability 1; and if A does not win, then B makes a random guess.)
{ if Qj 6= e(g; g)aj=bj , then the probability of B wins is 12 , as B does not
have any advantage by using A, since the encryption is not in a correct
format.
These two cases occur with equal probability.
So the advantage AdvB;N;N() B has to win the game associated to Qj with Chl
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is
AdvB;N;N () =
N 00
N
 1
2
+ (1  N
00
N
)  N
0
N
 1
2
+ (1  N
00
N
)  (1  N
0
N
)  1
2
((
1
2
+ )  1 + (1  ( 1
2
+ ))  1
2
)
+ (1  N
00
N
)  (1  N
0
N
)  1
2
 1
2
  1
2
=
(1 + 2)(N  N 00)(N  N 0)
8N2
Since  is non-negligible, N   N 0  1, and N   N 00  1, so we have that the
advantage B has to win Game-j-R-MDBDHI is non-negligible. This contradicts our
assumption.
6.5 Discussion and related work
6.5.1 Extension to a threshold system
As mentioned in previous sections, our system requires the presence of all servers for
recovering a secret. Inspired by [Rab98], the proposed system can be easily extended
to a threshold-based system, by using any classical (veriable) secret sharing schemes
to back-up all ephemeral secret keys of servers.
To be more precise, let \key servers" be the servers in our standard protocol
and \back-up servers" be the secret sharing servers. Each time a new key of a key
server is generated, the key will be distributed to a set of back-up servers through
secret sharing schemes, and the shares associated to the old keys will be destroyed.
So, when a key server is dead, our system can still continue by recovering the dead
server's secret keys from shares, and take actions from there to re-build the server.
Intuitively, the extended threshold system is secure even if we additionally allow
an attacker to compromise less than a threshold number of back-up servers at any
epoch, provided that the set of back-up servers are not overlapped with the set of
key servers, and all key servers uses the same threshold with the same set of back-up
servers for sharing their keys. Loosely speaking, since the shares of dierent epochs
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are completely independent to each other, the compromise of shares in an epoch
does not help an attacker to recover secrets shared in other epochs.
In fact, we can easily improve the security guarantee of the extended threshold
system by letting key servers use dierent sets of back-up servers for sharing their
keys. In this way, an attacker would need to compromise a threshold number of
back-up servers to only obtain the secret of a single key server, rather than being
able to recover all key servers' secrets. A more rigorous security analysis of the
extended threshold system will be our future work.
6.5.2 Related work
A similar adversary model, called \mobile adversary", was introduced by Ostrovsky
and Yung [OY91]. The mobile adversary considers viruses that migrate between
computers. A system that is secure against a mobile adversary is called proactively
secure. Research [CH94, HJKY95, NN04, HJJ+97, FGMY97b, FGMY97a, FMY01,
FMY99, Rab98] on proactively secure systems is mainly focusing on secret sharing
schemes and signature schemes.
Proactive secret sharing (PSS) (e.g., [HJKY95, NN04, SLL10, BDLO14]) is a
technique for sharing a secret among a set of servers; it is secure against an attacker
that can compromise servers, one by one, over a long period. In PSS, as in our
protocol, time is divided into epochs. In each epoch, the servers that hold shares of
the secret engage in a protocol to update their shares. An attacker may compromise
some servers in a given epoch, but the learnt secrets are useless in other epochs.
Thus, even if all the servers are eventually compromised over dierent epochs, the
secret remains intact provided that in each epoch there was at least one server that
remained honest.
One might try to solve the problem of this paper by treating the service's secret
key as the secret to be shared among multiple servers. This does not solve the
problem, however, because decrypting a message encrypted with the service's public
key would require reconstructing the secret key. An attacker that compromises the
server holding the secret key at that point would obtain the secret key.
Proactively secure cryptographic systems apply the ideas of proactively secure
secret sharing to sharing decryption or signing secrets among several servers. Such
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systems have been achieved by combining a proactively secure secret sharing scheme
with an encryption or signature scheme (e.g., [FGMY97b, FGMY97a, FMY99,
FMY01, CKLS02, ADN06]). However, these constructions make use of a trusted
dealer, who creates the secret key and distributes shares of some secrets to the
servers. Unfortunately, the creation of the secret key in a single location by the
dealer prevents the decentralisation required and achieved in our protocol. Al-
though it is mentioned in a number of papers that the function of the trusted dealer
in these schemes can be done by the servers, it is well known that both distributing
a secret in Shamir's secret sharing scheme and creating and distributing an RSA
key, amongst multiple players without a trusted dealer, are complicated and costly.
In this paper, we propose a decentralised distributed decryption scheme, which does
not have such a trusted dealer and is ecient.
6.6 Conclusion
Increasing numbers of attacks on cloud servers challenge the security of distributed
storage. We have introduced a provably secure self-healing distributed storage as
a security-enhanced approach to this challenge. It does not require data owners to
store decryption keys, and is secure even if all the servers are compromised over a
long time, provided that no more than a threshold number of servers are compro-
mised in a single epoch. In addition, the system has a feature of updating decryption
keys on the server, while the public key used by data owners remains unchanged.
This solves the problem of how to authenticate servers when they are compromisable.
Part V
Conclusion
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
Cryptographic key management is arguably the hardest part of cryptography, and
having a secure way to manage cryptographic keys is one of the core assumptions
of cryptosystems. If the key management is not secure, then the security of cryp-
tosystems will fail.
The study was set out to explore solutions to defend against attacks on the key
management, with a focus on the unauthorised uses of private keys. In particular,
this thesis sought to tackle the following challenges:
Challenge 1. How to ensure the authenticity of public keys when an attacker is able
to compromise certicate authorities?
Challenge 2. How to mitigate the damage caused by the compromised private keys
in secure messaging applications?
Challenge 3. How to provide a better guarantee on the condentiality of a dis-
tributed secret when an attacker is able to gradually compromise all
distributed storage servers?
The main ndings to the above challenges are part specic and were summarised
within the respective parts (i.e. Part II, Part III, and Part IV, respectively). This
chapter summarises our ndings to the above challenges: it discusses each of our
solutions to the challenges, and gives several thoughts on the possible directions of
further research.
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7.2 Key compromise in web PKI
Many alternatives are proposed to address the challenge of protecting the authen-
ticity of public keys against compromised certicate authorities. They each have
dierent pros and cons, and it is hard to judge which one is better and whether they
have addressed the problem completely or not.
To understand the current state of the art, Part II of this thesis rst identi-
ed 15 fundamental criteria. Second, based on the nature of the proposals' design
concept, we classied these proposals into three categories, namely dierence ob-
servation, scope restriction, and certicate management transparency. Third, we
provided an analysis on each of the proposals based on our identied criteria. We
observed that although no system satises all criteria, systems in the category of
certicate management transparency provide more desired features than systems in
other categories.
Based on the observations, we presented our new research result on a distributed
and transparent key infrastructure, which we call \DTKI". Compared to its prede-
cessors, DTKI has the advantage of minimising the oligopoly of certicate manage-
ment, and is the rst to prevent attacks when all service providers collude together.
However, DTKI does not provide oine verication. As a result, DTKI in-
troduces extra network latency. In addition, the avoidance of oligopoly provided
by DTKI requires an international panel to serve as the mapping log maintainer
(MLM). In practice, there might be concerns around this requirement, such as how
to decide which party should be the MLM, how to organise the governing represen-
tatives from many countries to minimise the oligopoly, and how the log maintainers
should be funded. To deploy DTKI, further research addressing these concerns is
needed.
Overall, we provided what we hope is a clear picture on the current status of the
research on solving the rst challenge. We contributed a framework for evaluating
the potential solutions, presented our improvement (i.e. DTKI) on the current web
PKI alternatives, and formally modelled and veried security properties of DTKI
using the Tamarin prover.
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7.3 Key compromise in secure communication
Part III developed two key usage detection (KUD) protocols to mitigate the private
key compromise in secure communication.
The rst protocol is a basic protocol used to explain the concept of KUD, and
it requires the recipient being online when a sender wants to send a message. The
second protocol is a more developed protocol for secure messaging. It does not
require the sender and the recipient being online at the same time, supports multiple
devices per user, and the multiplicity of devices helps detect attacks by reporting
device activities to the device owner.
Assuming compromised devices can be made secure again, rather than com-
pletely lose the game, our protocols could additionally either guarantee the con-
dentiality of messages sent to a device, or (under certain conditions) allow the
victim to detect that condentiality failed. We formally modelled the detailed KUD
protocol, and proved its security properties by using Tamarin prover.
Intuitively, the concept of KUD can also detect situations in which an attacker
has access to a key rather than retains a copy of it. For example, it could detect the
abuse of keys that are protected using a Trusted Platform Module. However, the
detailed use cases and security guarantee requires further study.
Overall, although KUD protocols do not completely solve the problem of key
compromise in secure communication, it raises the bar for the attacker, and provides
an extra level of security guarantee to the existing messaging systems.
7.4 Key compromise in secret distribution
Part IV aimed to provide a better security guarantee on the system for distributing
secrets when an attacker is able to gradually compromise all distributed storage
servers, without requiring the secret owner to store any keys for performing decryp-
tion.
We developed a security-enhanced self-healing scheme based on bilinear pairings
for distributing a secret. With the proposed system, data are encrypted by using a
common public key derived from the public keys of the set of servers selected by the
owner. Servers update their part of decryption keys periodically, while the common
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public key remains constant. The system provides a proactive security guarantee:
an attacker can learn a secret only if s/he can compromise all servers simultaneously
in a short period. We proved the security guarantee by using game-based approach.
Our scheme requires the involvement of all selected servers to perform secret
recovery, although there is an easy way to extend it to a threshold-based system
as discussed in Section 6.5, further research on the exact security guarantee of the
threshold-based scheme and its performance is needed.
Overall, although our solution still allows an attacker to launch attacks, it makes
the attacker's work a lot dicult by rendering useless the decryption keys obtained
by the attacker in previous epochs.
7.5 Research questions and directions
We list some research questions emerging from the work presented in this thesis, and
these questions might lead to possible research directions associated to our presented
research.
Eliminating the use of gossip protocols. Both DTKI and KUD are log-based
systems, and they require a gossip protocol to exchange their view (i.e. the digest)
of the log to prevent \bubble" attacks. One research question is that is it possible
to use distributed logs (such as the blockchain used by Bitcoin) to avoid the use of
gossip protocol? Also, if this is possible, then what is the security assumption the
new system relies on, and what is the advantage of the new system over the one
using a gossip protocol?
Providing transparency to all security systems. Both DTKI and KUD pro-
vide a transparent key management by using public logs. It forces attackers to leave
evidence of their attacks, and enables victims to verify behaviours of participants.
Loosely speaking, if an attacker is fully malicious, then the log-based system might
help victims to detect attacks; if an attacker is malicious but cautious, which means
that the attacker would not launch attacks if the attack will be detected, then it
would prevent attacks from the attacker. A research question is that can we apply
this concept to all other security systems to make the behaviours of participants
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transparent for achieving a better security guarantee?
Applying KUD to other systems. This thesis only explored the messaging ap-
plication of our KUD concept in the settings of public key cryptography. Intuitively,
our KUD concept can be applied to the symmetric key cryptosystem as well. Future
research could explore more on what are other possible applications. (For example,
can we apply KUD to TLS protocol or to security protocols for the Internet of
Things?) The related research questions are that can we apply the KUD concept
to other cryptosystems, and can we improve the system to achieve a better security
guarantee such as attack prevention rather than merely detecting attacks?
Improving the self-healing scheme. This thesis explored how to securely dis-
tribute secrets through a self-healing system. The proposed system enables the
secret owner to recover the secret when needed. A security concern is that when
the secret is being recovered, if the data owner's device is compromised, then the
secrets would be exposed to the attacker.
Solutions to address the above concern are future research directions. For exam-
ple, one research direction is designing a self-healing storage system in the way that
a secret can only be accessed for performing some computation (such as message
decryption, signature generation, and user authentication), but cannot be recovered
directly. This would limit the damage caused by compromised data owner devices.
7.6 Conclusion
Key management is often the most vulnerable part of cryptosystems. This chapter
concluded our research on mitigating the private key compromise in three cases,
namely private key compromise in web PKI, private key comprise in secure commu-
nication, and private key compromise in secret distribution. In addition, to drive the
research further, this chapter asked several research questions and indicated possible
future research directions.
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APPENDIX A
TAMARIN CODE FOR DTKI
The version of the Tamarin prover we use to perform our proofs is git commit
f1a215550d95d57d3e59267a4fb268dfbf6e826e. One can run the following command
to check the well-formedness of our modeling.
$ tamarin-prover file-name.spthy
To verify properties, run the following command.
$ tamarin-prover --prove file-name.spthy
DTKI.spthy
theory DTKI
begin
builtins: multiset
functions: adec/2, aenc/2, fst/1, h/1, pair/2, pk/1, sdec/2, senc/2,
sign/2, snd/1, false/0, true/0, verify/3
equations:
adec(aenc(x.1, pk(x.2)), x.2) = x.1,
fst(<x.1, x.2>) = x.1,
sdec(senc(x.1, x.2), x.2) = x.1,
snd(<x.1, x.2>) = x.2,
verify(sign(x.1, x.2), x.1, pk(x.2)) = true
/*Initialisation: Mapping log maintainer. */
rule INIT_MLM:
[ Fr(~ltkM) ]
--[ Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Only_One(`INITMLM') // The MLM is unique in DTKI
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]->
[
!Ltk($M, ~ltkM),
!Pk($M, pk(~ltkM)),
Out(pk(~ltkM))
]
/*Initialisation: Certificate log maintainer CLM1. */
rule INIT_CLM_RGX_1:
[ Fr(~ltkC) ]
--[ Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Only_One(`INITCLM_RGX_1') // We only allow two CLMs in this
// proof, it can be extended to many
// CLMs. We predefined two regular
// expressions, namely RGX1 and RGX2,
// and each CLM is authorised for
// either of them. This one is
// authorised for regular expression
// 1.
]->
[ !Ltk($C, ~ltkC),
!Pk($C, pk(~ltkC)),
Rgx($C, pk(~ltkC), `RGX1'),
StStateInitCLM($C, pk(~ltkC), `RGX1'),
Out(pk(~ltkC))
]
/*Initialisation: Certificate log maintainer CLM2. */
rule INIT_CLM_RGX_2:
[ Fr(~ltkC) ]
--[ Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Only_One(`INITCLM_RGX_2') // We only allow two CLMs in this
// proof, it can be extended to many
// CLMs. We predefined two regular
// expressions, namely RGX1 and RGX2,
// and each CLM is authorised for
// either of them. This one is
// authorised for regular expression
// 2.
]->
[ !Ltk($C, ~ltkC),
!Pk($C, pk(~ltkC)),
Rgx($C, pk(~ltkC), `RGX2'),
StStateInitCLM($C, pk(~ltkC), `RGX2'),
Out(pk(~ltkC))
]
/*Initialisation: Mapping log. */
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rule INIT_MLOG:
[
!Ltk($M, ltkM),
Fr(~mlogid)
]
--[ Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Only_One(`INITMLOG') // Each log maintainer has only one log.
]->
[
L_Mlog($M, ~mlogid, `nil') // `nil' is just a normal constant.
// I use this constant to fill this
// position when no record is available.
]
/*Initialisation: Certificate log. */
rule INIT_CLOG_RGX1:
[
!Ltk($C, ltkC),
StStateInitCLM($C, pk(ltkC), `RGX1'),
Fr(~clogid)
]
--[ Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Only_One(`CLOG1') // Each log maintainer has only one log.
]->
[
L_Clog($C, ~clogid, `RGX1', `nil') // the log maintained by the
// CLM is for domains whose
// name is an instance of
// regular expression RGX1
]
rule INIT_CLOG_RGX2:
[
!Ltk($C, ltkC),
StStateInitCLM($C, pk(ltkC), `RGX2'),
Fr(~clogid)
]
--[ Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Only_One(`CLOG2') // Each log maintainer has only one log.
]->
[
L_Clog($C, ~clogid, `RGX2', `nil') // the log maintained by the
// CLM is for domains whose
// name is an instance of
// regular expression RGX2
]
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/* Adding a new Clog into Mlog. Phase 1, a CLM sends a request to the MLM.*/
rule MLOG_ADD_NEW_CLOG_PHASE_1_CLM:
let Request = sign(<`AddCLMRequest', $C, clogid, rgx, pk(ltkC)>, ltkC)
in
[
!Ltk($C, ltkC),
Rgx($C, pk(ltkC), rgx),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C)
]->
[
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog),
Out(Request)
]
/* Adding a new Clog into Mlog. Phase 2, the MLM records the verified request in the mlog.*/
rule MLOG_ADD_NEW_CLOG_PHASE_2_MLM:
let
Request = sign(<`AddCLMRequest', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltkC)
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltkM)
in
[
In(Request),
!Ltk($M, ltkM),
!Pk($C, ltpkC),
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Eq(verify(Request, <`AddCLMRequest', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltpkC), true ),
Eq(ltpkC,pk(ltkC)),
Start_Role(<`MANCP2M',`M',rgx>, <$M,$C,rgx>) // To find the basic
// trace and spead
// up the proof, we
// only have one
// instance of each
// role.
]->
[
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog + <$C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>),
Out(Proof_MLM)
]
/* The MLM can modify its own log */
160
rule MODIFY_MLOG:
let record = <$C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>
in
[
In(record),
!Ltk($M, ltkM),
StCompromisedMLM($M,ltkM),//only a malicious log maintainer
//would modify logs in this way.
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Modify_Mlog($M, mlogid, ltkM)
]->
[L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog + record)]
/* Adding a new Clog into Mlog. Phase 3, generating a proof for
convincing other participants. This also enables a malicious MLM
to create any fake proof about the mlog.*/
rule MLOG_ADD_NEW_CLOG_PHASE_3_CLM:
let
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltkM)
in
[
In(Proof_MLM),
!Pk($M,ltpkM)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Eq(verify(Proof_MLM, <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltpkM), true )
]->
[
!Mapping(Proof_MLM)
]
/* Initialisation: Certificate authorities*/
rule INIT_CA:
[ Fr(~ltkCA) ]
--[
Is_Type(`CA', $CA),
Only_One(`CA')
]->
[ !Ltk($CA, ~ltkCA),
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!Pk($CA, pk(~ltkCA)),
Out(pk(~ltkCA))
]
/* Compromise a CA */
rule COMPROMISE_CA:
[ !Ltk($CA, ltkCA)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CA', $CA),
Compromise_CA($CA,ltkCA)
]->
[
Out(ltkCA)
]
/* Compromise the MLM */
rule COMPROMISE_MLM:
[ !Ltk($M, ltkM)
]
--[
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Compromise_MLM($M,ltkM)
]->
[
Out(ltkM),
StCompromisedMLM($M,ltkM)
]
/* Compromise a CLM */
rule COMPROMISE_CLM:
[ !Ltk($C, ltkC)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Compromise_CLM($C,ltkC)
]->
[
Out(ltkC),
StCompromisedCLM($C,ltkC)
]
/*Initialisation: domain server Did, s.t. Did is an instance of RGX1. */
162
rule INIT_DOMAIN_RGX1:
[ Fr(~ltkD),
Fr(~Did)
]
--[ Is_Type(`Domain', $D)]->
[ !Ltk($D, ~ltkD),
!Pk($D, pk(~ltkD)),
!DomainInfo($D, ~Did, `RGX1', pk(~ltkD)),
L_LocalRecord($D, ~Did, `RGX1', `nil'),
MasterKey($D, ~Did, `RGX1', pk(~ltkD)),
Out(pk(~ltkD))
]
/*Initialisation: domain server Did, s.t. Did is an instance of RGX2. */
rule INIT_DOMAIN_RGX2:
[ Fr(~ltkD),
Fr(~Did)
]
--[ Is_Type(`Domain', $D)]->
[ !Ltk($D, ~ltkD),
!Pk($D, pk(~ltkD)),
!DomainInfo($D, ~Did, `RGX2', pk(~ltkD)),
L_LocalRecord($D, ~Did, `RGX2', `nil'),
MasterKey($D, ~Did, `RGX2', pk(~ltkD)),
Out(pk(~ltkD))
]
/* Request a master certificate from CAs */
rule REQUEST_MASTER_CERT:
let request= <`RequestMasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>
in
[
!DomainInfo($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD),
MasterKey($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CA', $CA)
]->
[
Out(request)
]
/* A CA certifies a master key. The verification of domain name and
key is done by linking !Pk($D, ltpkD) to the ($D, ltpkD) in the
request.*/
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rule CREATE_MASTER_CERT_PHASE_1:
let request= <`RequestMasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
in
[
In(request),
!Ltk($CA, ltkCA),
!Pk($D, ltpkD)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CA', $CA),
Start_Role(<`CMCP',`CA'>,<$CA, $D>)
]->
[
Out(Cert_M)
]
/* If a statement is signed by a CA, then this is a certificate. The
reason that we don't put !MasterCert(Cert_M) in the last rule,
namely CREATE_MASTER_CERT_PHASE_1, is that the last rule would have to
link the certificate to the real pk since !Pk is used. However,
in the real world, a CA is able to certify any public key. Thus
we have this extra rule to give the CA's ability to certify any
pk for any domain.*/
rule CREATE_MASTER_CERT_PHASE_2:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
in
[
In(Cert_M),
!Pk($CA,ltpkCA)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CA', $CA),
Eq(ltpkCA,pk(ltkCA)),
Eq(verify(Cert_M, <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltpkCA), true )
]->
[!MasterCert(Cert_M)]
/*Generate TLS keys. Any domain owner with a secret key corresponding
to a master certificate can issue TLS certificates.*/
rule UPDATE_DOMAIN_TLSKEY_PHASE_1:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, pk(~stkD)>, ltkD)
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in
[ !Ltk($D, ltkD),
!MasterCert(Cert_M),
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record),
Fr(~stkD) // a new short term (TLS) key
]
--[ Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
D_Key($D, Did, rgx, ltkD, ~stkD),
Eq(pk(ltkD),ltpkD),
Start_Role(<`UDTP',`D',rgx>, <$D,$C>)
]->
[!Stk($D, Did, ~stkD),
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record+<$D, Did, ltpkD, pk(~stkD)>),
Out(Cert_TLS),
Out(pk(~stkD))
]
/*For the reason similar to generating master certificates, we have
two phases for enabling anyone who has the secret corresponding to a
master certificate to generate TLS certificates.*/
rule UPDATE_DOMAIN_TLSKEY_PHASE_2:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltkD)
in
[In(Cert_TLS),
!MasterCert(Cert_M),
!Pk($CA,ltpkCA)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CA', $CA),
Eq(ltpkCA,pk(ltkCA)),
Eq(ltpkD, pk(ltkD))
]->
[!TLSCert(Cert_TLS)]
/* To publish domain information into clog, a domain first needs to
query the mapping. This can be done by supplying the Proof_MLM
directly. */
rule REQUEST_MAPPING_DOMAIN:
let Request = <`MappingRequest', rgx, ~n>
in
[
Fr(~n),
!DomainInfo($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD)
]
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--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Start_Role(<`RMD',`D',rgx>,<$D,rgx>)
]->
[
StAskMapping(Request),
Out(Request)
]
rule PROVE_MAPPING:
let
Request = <`MappingRequest', rgx, n>
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC, n>, ltkM)
in
[
In(Request),
!Ltk($M, ltkM),
!Mapping(Proof_MLM)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Start_Role(<`PM',`M',rgx>,<$M,$D,rgx>)
]->
[
Out(Proof_MLM)
]
rule UP_CLOG_ADD_PHASE_1_Domain:
let
Request1 = <`MappingRequest', rgx, n>
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, pk(ltkD)>, ltkCA)
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltkD)
Request2=<`AddDomainRequest', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC, n>, ltkM)
in
[
StAskMapping(Request1),
In(Proof_MLM),
!Pk($M,ltpkM),//It is built into browsers.
!MasterCert(Cert_M),
!TLSCert(Cert_TLS),
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
--[
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
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Eq(verify(Proof_MLM, <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC, n>, ltpkM), true ),
IsIn(<$C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, mlog)
]->
[
Out(Request2),
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
rule UP_CLOG_ADD_PHASE_2_CLM:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltkD)
Request2=<`AddDomainRequest', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltkM)
Proof_CLM= sign( <`AddedByCLM', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>, ltkC)
in
[
In(Request2),
!Ltk($C, ltkC),
!Pk($CA, ltpkCA),
!Pk($M, ltpkM),
!Mapping(Proof_MLM),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
]
--[ Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Eq(ltpkC, pk(ltkC)),
Eq(verify(Cert_M, <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltpkCA), true),
Eq(verify(Cert_TLS, <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltpkD), true),
Eq(verify(Proof_MLM, <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltpkM), true ),
Start_Role(<`UCAP',`C',rgx>, <$D,$C>)
]->
[
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog + <$D, Did, ltpkD, stpkD>),
Out(Proof_CLM)
]
/* A CLM can modify its own log */
rule MODIFY_CLOG:
let record = <$D, Did, ltpkD, stpkD>
in
[
In(record),
!Ltk($C, ltkC),
StCompromisedCLM($C,ltkC),//only malicious log maintainers
//would modify logs in this way.
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
]
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--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Modify_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, ltkC)
]->
[L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog + record)]
/* The CLM can provide fake information about Domains*/
rule UP_CLOG_ADD_2:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, pk(ltkD)>, ltkCA)
Proof_CLM= sign( <`AddedByCLM', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>, ltkC)
in
[
In(Proof_CLM),
!Pk($C,ltpkC)
]
--[
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Eq(verify(Proof_CLM, <`AddedByCLM', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>, ltpkC), true )
]->
[!TLS_Cert_In_Clog(Proof_CLM)]
/* Start secure communication */
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_USER_1:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD>, ltkCA)
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltkD)
Proof_MLM = sign( <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, ltkM)
Proof_CLM= sign( <`AddedByCLM', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>, ltkC)
in
[
Fr(~n),
!Pk($C, ltpkC),
!Pk($M,ltpkM),
!MasterCert(Cert_M),//if the random verification is successfully
//verified with positive result, then all
//users will see the same master certificate
//of the same domain.
!Mapping(Proof_MLM),
!TLS_Cert_In_Clog(Proof_CLM),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog),
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Is_Type(`CLM', $C),
Is_Type(`MLM', $M),
Eq(verify(Proof_MLM, <`AddedByMLM', $C, clogid, rgx, pk(ltkC)>, ltpkM), true ),
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Eq(verify(Proof_CLM, <`AddedByCLM', Cert_M, Cert_TLS>, ltpkC), true ),
Eq(verify(Cert_TLS, <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltpkD), true ),
IsIn(<$D, Did, ltpkD, stpkD>, clog),
IsIn(<$C, clogid, rgx, ltpkC>, mlog),
Start_Role(<`SCU',`U'>,<$D>)
]->
[
Out(aenc{`1', ~n}stpkD),
StSend($D, Did, ~n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog),
L_Mlog($M, mlogid, mlog)
]
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_DOMAIN_1:
let m=aenc{`1', n}stpk
Cert_TLS=sign( <`TLSCert', $D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD>, ltkD)
in
[
In(m),
!Stk($D, Did, stkD),
!Ltk($D, ltkD),
!TLSCert(Cert_TLS)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Eq(fst(adec(m, stkD)), `1'),
Start_Role(<`SCD',`D'>,<$D>)
]->
[
Out( h(snd(adec(m, stkD))) )
]
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_USER_2:
[ StSend($D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD),
In( h(n) ) // Receive hashed secret from network
]
--[ Com_Done($D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) ]-> // It states that the secret `n'
// was sent to domain $D
[
StDone($D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD)
]
/* Domain owners should verify that their master certificate are
correctly recorded in the log */
rule DOMAIN_CHECK_MASTER_CERTIFICATE:
let
Cert_M= sign( <`MasterCert', $D, Did, rgx, pk(ltkD)>, ltkCA)
in
[
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!Pk($D,ltpkD),
!MasterCert(Cert_M),
!DomainInfo($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD)
]
--[
Is_Type(`Domain', $D),
Eq(pk(ltkD),ltpkD),
VerifiedMasterCert($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD)
]->
[
Master_Cert_Verified(Cert_M)
]
/* Detection */
rule DOMAIN_PERIODICAL_VERIFICATION_GOOD:
[
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
,StDone($D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD)
]
--[
SubsetEq(clog, record),// clog is a subset of D's local
// history. It means that all records
// about D in the clog are generated
// by the domain owner D.
CheckedLog($D, Did, rgx, `nil', `good', `nil')
]->
[
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
]
rule DOMAIN_PERIODICAL_VERIFICATION_BAD:
let
Cuckoo = <$D, Did, ltpkD, stpkD>
clog = Cuckoo+rest
in
[
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record),
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
,StDone($D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD)
]
--[
NotIn(Cuckoo, record),
CheckedLog($D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, `bad', stpkD) // a bad key is found in
// clog
]->
[
L_LocalRecord($D, Did, rgx, record),
170
L_Clog($C, clogid, rgx, clog)
]
axiom only_one:
"(All x #i #j. (Only_One(x)@i & Only_One(x)@j) ==> (#i = #j))"
axiom types_distinct:
"(All t1 t2 x #i #j. (Is_Type(t1,x)@i & Is_Type(t2,x)@j) ==> (t1 = t2))"
axiom eq_check_succeed:
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y"
axiom neq_check_succeed:
"All x y #i. Neq(x,y) @ i ==> not (x = y)"
axiom notin_check_succeed:
"All x l #i. NotIn(x,l) @ i ==> not (Ex rest. x+rest = l)"
axiom in_check_succeed:
"All x l #i. IsIn(x,l) @ i ==> Ex rest. x+rest = l"
axiom subseteq_check_succeed:
"All l m #i. SubsetEq(l,m) @ i ==> ( ( l = m ) | (Ex rest. l+rest = m) )"
axiom one_role_instance:
"(All #i #j role param1 param2 .
(
Start_Role(role,param1) @ i &
Start_Role(role,param2) @ j
)
==>
( #i = #j )
)"
/* We can run this protocol correctly without having any compromised party*/
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex D Did n rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* The user received a confirmation, i.e. hashed secret the user
has sent, from the network */
Com_Done(D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* without the adversary compromising any party. */
& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
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& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
"
lemma message_secrecy_no_compromised_party:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* If a user received a confirmation, i.e. hashed secret the user
has sent, from the network */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and no party has been compromised */
& not (Ex #i2 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i2)
& not (Ex #i3 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i4)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i5. K(m) @ #i5)
)
"
lemma message_secrecy_compromise_all_domain_verified_master_cert:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1.
/* If a user received a confirmation, i.e. hashed secret the user
has sent, from the network */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and at an earlier time, the domain server has verified his master
certificate */
& Ex #i2.
VerifiedMasterCert(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD) @ #i2 &
#i2 < #i1
/* and all parties can be compromised*/
)
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==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not (Ex #i3. K(m) @ #i3)
)
"
/* Sanity check on verification: can finish trace with good log*/
lemma protocol_can_finish_with_good_log:
exists-trace
"/* It is possible that */
Ex D Did n rgx ltpkD stpkD #i1 #i2.
/* The user received a confirmation, i.e. hashed secret the user
has sent, from the network */
Com_Done(D, Did, n, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and we check the log afterwards and find no fake records */
& #i1 < #i2
& CheckedLog(D, Did, rgx, `nil', `good', `nil') @ #i2
/* and the adversary did not compromise any party */
& not (Ex #i3 CA ltkCA.
Compromise_CA(CA,ltkCA) @ #i3)
& not (Ex #i4 C ltkC.
Compromise_CLM(C,ltkC) @ #i4)
& not (Ex #i5 M ltkM.
Compromise_MLM(M,ltkM) @ #i5)
"
lemma detect_bad_records_in_the_log_when_master_cert_not_verified:
"
All D Did m rgx ltpkD flag stpkD #i1 #i2 #i3.
/* If a user received a confirmation, i.e. hashed secret the user
has sent, from the network */
(Com_Done(D, Did, m, rgx, ltpkD, stpkD) @ #i1
/* and all parties can be compromised*/
/* and the master certificate of the domain was not initially verified */
/* and the adversary knows m */
& K(m) @ #i2
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/* and we afterwards check the log */
& CheckedLog(D, Did, rgx, ltpkD, flag, stpkD) @ #i3
& #i1 < #i3)
==>
( /* then we can detect a fake record in the log */
(flag = `bad')
)
"
end
APPENDIX B
TAMARIN CODE FOR KUD
The complete work for modeling and proving the detailed KUD protocol contains
seven les:
 Makele (see x B.1).
The Makele is used to generate \spthy" les from each \m4" le. To run
Makele, put all les in the same directory, and run \make" in the terminal.
 kud-base.inc (see x B.2).
This le contains the modeling of the detailed KUD protocol, as presented in
x 5.
 kud-correctness.m4 (see x B.3).
The corresponding spthy le proves the correctness of our modeling.
 kud-secrecy.m4 (see x B.4).
The corresponding spthy le proves the basic secrecy property.
 kud-trace-log-good.m4 (see x B.5).
The corresponding spthy le provides a sanity check on our verication, to
show that it can nd trace with a non-corrupted log.
 kud-trace-log-bad.m4 (see x B.6).
The corresponding spthy le provides a sanity check on our verication, to
show that the detection of attacks will raise an alert.
 kud-detect.m4 (see x B.7).
The corresponding spthy le proves the key usage detection property.
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B.1 Makele
SOURCES := $(shell find . -name '*.m4')
OBJECTS := $(SOURCES:%.m4=%.spthy)
DEPENDS := kud-base.inc
all: $(OBJECTS)
%.spthy: %.m4 $(DEPENDS)
m4 $< >$@
clean:
\rm -f $(OBJECTS)
B.2 kud-base.inc
//theory KUD
begin
builtins: multiset
functions: adec/2, aenc/2, fst/1, h/1, pair/2, pk/1, sdec/2, senc/2,
sign/2, snd/1, false/0, true/0, verify/3
equations:
adec(aenc(x.1, pk(x.2)), x.2) = x.1,
fst(<x.1, x.2>) = x.1,
sdec(senc(x.1, x.2), x.2) = x.1,
snd(<x.1, x.2>) = x.2,
verify(sign(x.1, x.2), x.1, pk(x.2)) = true
/*Initialisation: key owner. */
rule INIT_R:
[ Fr(~ltkR),
Fr(~devid) ]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
R_Key($R, pk(~ltkR), ~ltkR),
LogDeviceStatus(~devid, $R, 'nil'),
Start_Role('R',~devid)
]->
[ !Ltk($R, ~ltkR),
!Pk($R, pk(~ltkR)),
Out(pk(~ltkR)),
Device(~devid, $R, ~ltkR, 'secure'), // a user's device is initially secure,
// i.e. no vulnerability found so far.
LogDevice(~devid, $R, 'nil') // the log stored in Robert's device
]
/*Initialisation: log server. */
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rule INIT_L:
[ Fr(~ltkL) ]
--[ Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Only_One('INITL') // we only allow one log maintainer $L
]->
[ !Ltk($L, ~ltkL),
!Pk($L, pk(~ltkL)),
Out(pk(~ltkL))
]
rule INIT_LOG:
[
Fr(~lcid)
]
--[ Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
Only_One('INITLOG'), // each user can only have one log with the
// log maintainer; which is a reasonable
// restriction.
LogCloudStatus(~lcid, $R, 'nil','start')
]->
[
LogCloud(~lcid, $R, 'nil') // the log maintained by the log maintainer
// in the cloud
]
/* Robert generates short-term keys, signs them, sends a request to the
log maintainer.*/
rule UPDATE_EPHEMERAL_KEY_R_1:
let cert_R = sign( <'cert', pk(~stk), $R>, ltkR)
Req = sign( <'UpdateRequest', cert_R, h(LogD) >, ltkR)
in
[ Fr(~stk), //stk is the short term (ephemeral) key
!Ltk($R, ltkR),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
--[ Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
DeviceSecret(devid, $R, ~stk),
Start_Role(<'UE','B'>,<$R,$L>)
]->
[ LogToAdd($R, cert_R),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD),
StUpdateEphKeyR1(~stk, $R, ltkR, $L, ~stk, devid),
Out(Req),
Out(<pk(~stk),h(LogD)>) // [USS] Unfold potential secrets in signature
]
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/* The log maintainer verifies the signed request, signs the
confirmation that he has inserted the data into the log; */
rule UPDATE_EPHEMERAL_KEY_L_1:
let
cert_R = sign( <'cert', stpk, $R> , ltkR)
LogCNew = LogC+<$R, cert_R>
Req = sign( <'UpdateRequest', cert_R, h(LogD) >, ltkR)
Confirmation = sign( (< 'Confirmation', $R, $L, h(LogCNew), cert_R> ), ltkL)
in
[ In(Req),
!Ltk($L, ltkL),
!Pk($R, ltpkR),
LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogC)
]
--[ Eq(verify(cert_R, <'cert',stpk, $R>, ltpkR), true ),
Eq(verify(Req, <'UpdateRequest', cert_R, h(LogD)>, ltpkR), true ),
Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
LogCloudStatus(lcid, $R, LogCNew, 'update'),
Start_Role(<'UE','L'>,<$R,$L>)
]->
[
Out(Confirmation),
CurrentCert($R, cert_R), // this fact shows the current valid
// certificate of Robert
LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogCNew),
Out(h(LogCNew)) // [USS] Unfold potential new secrets in signature
]
/* Robert verifies the confirmation, and updates keys and log in the
device; */
rule UPDATE_EPHEMERAL_KEY_R_2:
let
cert_R = sign(<'cert',stpk, $R>, ltkR)
Req = sign( <'UpdateRequest', cert_R, h(LogD)>, ltkR)
Confirmation = sign( <'Confirmation', $R, $L, h(LogC), cert_R>, ltkL)
LogDNew = LogD+<$R, cert_R>
in
[ StUpdateEphKeyR1(tid, $R, ltkR, $L, stk, devid),
In(Confirmation),
!Pk($L, ltpkL),
LogToAdd($R, cert_R),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Eq(verify(Confirmation, <'Confirmation', $R, $L, h(LogC), cert_R>, ltpkL), true),
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Eq(h(LogC), h(LogD+<$R, cert_R>)),
Eq(stpk,pk(stk)),
LogDeviceStatus(devid, $R, LogDNew)
]->
[
StoresKey(devid, $R, stk, cert_R), //this fact represents that Robert
//stores the short-term key in his
//device, the associated certificate
//is cert_R
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogDNew) // append the new cert into
// his log
]
/* An attacker is allowed to compromised a device, and then get the
long term secret and short term secret stored in it.
We also add two individual rules to simplify some of the property
specifications.
*/
rule COMPROMISE_DEVICE_BOTH:
let
cert_R = sign(<'cert',pk(stk), R>, ltkR)
in
[ !Ltk(R, ltkR),
StoresKey(devid, R, stk, cert_R),
Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'secure')
]
--[ Compromise_Device(devid, R, ltkR, stk),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', R),
Start_Role('Compromise',<R,devid>)
]->
[ Out(<stk,ltkR>),
StoresKey(devid, R, stk, cert_R),
Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'compromised')
]
rule COMPROMISE_DEVICE_LTKEY:
[ !Ltk(R, ltkR),
Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'secure')
]
--[ Compromise_Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'none'),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', R),
Start_Role('Compromise',<R,devid>)
]->
[ Out(ltkR),
Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'compromised')
]
/* Device can be patched. To reduce the verification space and the
number of open chains, we only allow to fix the device once. In
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other words, rather than having a repected cycle
Secure--compromised--fixed--compromised again -- fixed...
we have only one part of the cycle, namely
secure--compromised--fixed--compromised
and the device will remain to be broken. In theory, the
verification should remain the same.*/
rule FIX_DEVICE:
[ !Ltk(R, ltkR),
Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'compromised')
]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', R),
Only_One('FIXDEVICE')
]->
[ Device(devid, R, ltkR, 'secure') ]
/* Sally gets a short-term public key stpk of Robert from the log,
verifies the signature, encrypts message m by using stpk, then
sends the ciphertext to Robert. */
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_S_1: // Sally requests cert
let
m_1=<'CertReq', $R, ~N>
in
[ Fr(~N),
!Pk($R, ltpkR),
!Pk($L, ltpkL)
]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Start_Role(<'SC','S'>,<$R,$L>)
]->
[ Out(m_1),
StSecureCommS1(~N, $L, $R, ~N, ltpkR, ltpkL)
]
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_L_1: // Log maintainer finds the current valid
// cert, and gives it to Sally.
let
m_1=<'CertReq', $R, N>
cert_R = sign(<'cert',stpk, $R>, ltkR)
m_2=sign(<'CertResp',$R, cert_R, N>, ltkL)
in
[ In(m_1),
CurrentCert($R, cert_R),
!Ltk($L, ltkL)
]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
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Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
Start_Role(<'SC','L'>,<$R,$L>)
]->
[ Out(m_2)
]
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_S_2: // Sally verifies the cert, and sends m
// encrypted with the associated stpk
let
cert_R = sign(<'cert',stpk, $R>, ltkR)
m_2 = sign(<'CertResp',$R, cert_R, N>, ltkL)
m_3 = aenc{~m}stpk
in
[ Fr(~m),
StSecureCommS1(tid, $L, $R, N, ltpkR, ltpkL),
In(m_2)
]
--[ Eq(verify(m_2, <'CertResp',$R, cert_R, N>, ltpkL), true ),
Eq(verify(cert_R, <'cert',stpk, $R>, ltpkR), true ),
Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
Is_Type('LogMaintainer', $L),
MsgSent($R, ltkR, stpk, ~m)
]->
[
Out(m_3)
]
rule SECURE_COMMUNICATION_B_1: // Robert uses the current valid short
// term key to decrypt the received
// message.
let
cert_R = sign(<'cert',stpk, $R>, ltkR)
m_3 = aenc{m}stpk
in
[ !Ltk($R, ltkR),
StoresKey(devid, $R, stk, cert_R),
In(m_3)
]
--[ Is_Type('KeyOwner', $R),
MsgReceived(devid, $R, ltkR, stk, m),
Start_Role(<'SC','B'>,<$R,$L>)
]->
[ ]
rule PERIODICAL_VERIFICATION_GOOD:
[
LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogC),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
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--[ CheckedLog(devid, $R, 'good', 'null'),
SubsetEq(LogC, LogD) // LogC is a subset of LogD
]->
[
LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogC),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
rule PERIODICAL_VERIFICATION_BAD:
let
cert_R = sign( <'cert',stpk, $R> , ltkR)
Cuckoo = <$R, cert_R>
LogC = Cuckoo+rest
in
[ LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogC),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
--[ NotIn(Cuckoo, LogD),
CheckedLog(devid, $R, 'bad', stpk) // a bad key is in LogC but not in LogD
]->
[
LogCloud(lcid, $R, LogC),
LogDevice(devid, $R, LogD)
]
axiom only_one:
"(All x #i #j. (Only_One(x)@i & Only_One(x)@j) ==> (#i = #j))"
axiom types_distinct:
"(All t1 t2 x #i #j. (Is_Type(t1,x)@i & Is_Type(t2,x)@j) ==> (t1 = t2))"
axiom eq_check_succeed:
"All x y #i. Eq(x,y) @ i ==> x = y"
axiom neq_check_succeed:
"All x y #i. Neq(x,y) @ i ==> not (x = y)"
axiom notin_check_succeed:
"All x l #i. NotIn(x,l) @ i ==> not (Ex rest. x+rest = l)"
axiom subseteq_check_succeed:
"All l m #i. SubsetEq(l,m) @ i ==> ( ( l = m ) | (Ex rest. l+rest = m) )"
// vi:ft=spthy
B.3 kud-correctness.m4
/* Provide hints for Tamarin's heuristics.
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In this case, we tell Tamarin to delay (make "Last", "L_") finding the
sources for the LogDevice fact, since it doesn't provide useful information
and can lead to non-termination. It is similar for LogCloud, but the trace
is found faster if we don't use L_ for that. */
define(`LogCloud',`L_LogCloud($*)')
define(`LogDevice',`L_LogDevice($*)')
theory kud_protocol_correctness
/* Include kud model */
include(`kud-base.inc')
// To find the basic trace faster, we first exclude the verification protocol
axiom no_checks:
"not (Ex #i devid A f k.
CheckedLog(devid, A, f, k) @ i )"
/* The protocol can run correctly. */
lemma protocol_correctness:
exists-trace
" /* It is possible that */
Ex d R skR dkR m #i.
/* R received an encrypted message m on device d */
MsgReceived(d, R, skR, dkR, m) @ #i
/* without the adversary compromising any device. */
& not (Ex d2 A ltk dkR #j.
Compromise_Device(d2, A, ltk, dkR) @ #j)
"
end
// vi:ft=spthy
B.4 kud-secrecy.m4
/* Provide hints for Tamarin's heuristics.
In this case, we tell Tamarin to delay (make "Last", "L_") finding the
sources for the LogCloud and LogDevice facts, since they don't provide useful information
and can lead to non-termination. */
define(`LogCloud',`L_LogCloud($*)')
define(`LogDevice',`L_LogDevice($*)')
define(`Device',`F_Device($*)')
theory kud_secrecy
/* Include kud model */
include(`kud-base.inc')
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/* Basic secrecy property */
lemma message_secrecy:
"All R skR ekR m #i.
/* If S sent a message m to R */
( MsgSent(R, skR, ekR, m) @ #i &
/* without the adversary compromising any device */
not (Ex #j d sk dkR.
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary cannot know m */
not ( Ex #j. K(m) @ #j)
)
"
end
// vi:ft=spthy
B.5 kud-trace-log-good.m4
/* Provide hints for Tamarin's heuristics.
In this case, we tell Tamarin to delay (make "Last", "L_") finding the
sources for the LogCloud and LogDevice facts, since they don't provide useful information
and can lead to non-termination. */
define(`LogCloud',`L_LogCloud($*)')
define(`LogDevice',`L_LogDevice($*)')
//
changequote`'changequote(`',`')dnl
define(DeviceStatus,F_DeviceStatus($*))
define(Cert,sign(<'cert',pk($2),$1>,$3)) // Cert(R,stk,ltk)
// Fix vim syntax coloring mixup: ')
theory kud_log_good_trace
/* Include kud model */
include(kud-base.inc)
// To find the basic trace faster, we only have one instance of each
// role.
axiom one_role_instance:
"(All #i #j role param1 param2 .
(
Start_Role(role,param1) @ i &
Start_Role(role,param2) @ j
)
==>
( #i = #j )
)"
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// Similarly, we restrict to only one log check
axiom one_check:
"(All #i1 #i2 devid1 devid2 A1 A2 f1 f2 k1 k2.
(
CheckedLog(devid1, A1, f1, k1) @ i1 &
CheckedLog(devid2, A2, f2, k2) @ i2
)
==>
( #i1 = #i2 )
)"
/* Sanity check on verification: can finish trace with good log
*/
lemma log_good_trace2:
exists-trace
"Ex devid ltkR stk m #i1 #i2 R.
( /* If S sent to R an encrypted message m */
MsgReceived(devid, R, ltkR, stk, m) @ #i1 &
/* and we check the log afterwards and find no compromise */
( #i1 < #i2 ) &
CheckedLog(devid, R, 'good', 'null' ) @ #i2 &
/* and the adversary did not compromise anything */
not (Ex #j devid2 R2 ltkR2 stk2.
Compromise_Device(devid2, R2, ltkR2, stk2) @ j
)
)
"
end
// vi:ft=spthy
B.6 kud-trace-log-bad.m4
/* Provide hints for Tamarin's heuristics.
In this case, we tell Tamarin to delay (make "Last", "L_") finding the
sources for the LogCloud and LogDevice facts, since they don't provide useful information
and can lead to non-termination. */
define(`LogCloud',`L_LogCloud($*)')
define(`LogDevice',`L_LogDevice($*)')
//
changequote`'changequote(`',`')dnl
define(DeviceStatus,F_DeviceStatus($*))
define(Cert,sign(<'cert',pk($2),$1>,$3)) // Cert(R,stk,ltk)
// Fix vim syntax coloring mixup: ')
theory kud_log_bad_trace
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/* Include kud model */
include(kud-base.inc)
// To find the basic trace faster, we only have one instance of each
// role.
axiom one_role_instance:
"(All #i #j role param1 param2 .
(
Start_Role(role,param1) @ i &
Start_Role(role,param2) @ j
)
==>
( #i = #j )
)"
// Similarly, we restrict to only one log check
axiom one_check:
"(All #i1 #i2 devid1 devid2 A1 A2 f1 f2 k1 k2.
(
CheckedLog(devid1, A1, f1, k1) @ i1 &
CheckedLog(devid2, A2, f2, k2) @ i2
)
==>
( #i1 = #i2 )
)"
axiom one_compromise:
"(All #i1 #i2 devid1 devid2 R1 R2 ltkR1 ltkR2 stk1 stk2.
( Compromise_Device(devid1, R1, ltkR1, stk1) @ #i1 &
Compromise_Device(devid2, R2, ltkR2, stk2) @ #i2 )
==>
( ( #i1 = #i2 ) & ( stk1 = 'none') )
)
"
/* Sanity check on verification: detection may raise an alert
*/
lemma log_bad_trace2:
exists-trace
" Ex devid ltkR stpk m #i1 #i2 #i3 #i4 R k stkalt.
( /* If S sent to R an encrypted message m */
MsgSent(R, ltkR, stpk, m) @ #i1 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i2 &
/* compromise the long-term key, not the specific ephemeral
key */
Compromise_Device(devid, R, ltkR, stkalt) @ #i3 &
not (pk(stkalt) = stpk) &
/* and we check the log and find a compromise */
CheckedLog(devid, R, 'bad', k ) @ #i4
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)
"
end
// vi:ft=spthy
B.7 kud-detect.m4
/* Provide hints for Tamarin's heuristics.
In this case, we tell Tamarin to delay (make "Last", "L_") finding the
sources for the LogCloud and LogDevice facts, since they don't provide useful information
and can lead to non-termination. */
//xdefine(`LogCloud',`L_LogCloud($*)')
define(`LogDevice',`L_LogDevice($*)')
//
changequote`'changequote(`',`')dnl
define(Device,F_Device($*))
define(StoresKey,F_StoresKey($*))
define(Cert,sign(<'cert',pk($2),$1>,$3)) // Cert(R,stk,ltk)
// Fix vim syntax coloring mixup: ')
theory kud_detect
/* Include kud model */
include(kud-base.inc)
axiom only_one_device:
" All devid1 devid2 #i #j.
( Start_Role('R',devid1) @ i &
Start_Role('R',devid2) @ j )
==>
( #i = #j )
"
axiom only_one_Lora:
" All l1 l2 #i #j.
( Is_Type('LogMaintainer',l1) @ i &
Is_Type('LogMaintainer',l2) @ j )
==>
( l1 = l2 )
"
axiom at_most_two_of_a_role:
" All r p1 p2 p3 #i1 #i2 #i3 .
( Start_Role(r,p1) @ #i1 &
Start_Role(r,p2) @ #i2 &
Start_Role(r,p3) @ #i3 )
==>
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( ( #i1 = #i2 ) | ( #i1 = #i3 ) | ( #i2 = #i3 ) )
"
axiom limit_receives:
" All devid a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2 d1 d2 #i1 #i2 .
( MsgReceived(devid, a1, b1, c1, d1) @ #i1 &
MsgReceived(devid, a2, b2, c2, d2) @ #i2 )
==>
( #i1 = #i2 )
"
// We want this to hold even if there is only one compromise
axiom one_compromise:
"(All #i1 #i2 devid1 devid2 A1 A2 ltk1 ltk2 k1 k2.
(
Compromise_Device(devid1, A1, ltk1, k1) @ i1 &
Compromise_Device(devid2, A2, ltk2, k2) @ i2
)
==>
( #i1 = #i2 )
)"
// Similarly, we restrict to only one check
axiom one_check:
"(All #i1 #i2 devid1 devid2 A1 A2 f1 f2 k1 k2.
(
CheckedLog(devid1, A1, f1, k1) @ i1 &
CheckedLog(devid2, A2, f2, k2) @ i2
)
==>
( #i1 = #i2 )
)"
/* Sanity check: can we actually reach the situation we aim for in the
* 'detect' check? */
lemma detect_usage_trace_flag2:
exists-trace
" Ex devid ltkR stk m #i1 #i3 #i4 flag R k.
( /* If an honest paty sent to R an encrypted message m */
( MsgSent(R, ltkR, pk(stk), m) @ #i1 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i3 &
/* and this stk was not specifically compromised */
/* in other words, the compromise was in a different epoch
*/
not (Ex #j ltk . Compromise_Device(devid, R, ltk, stk) @ j ) &
/* and we afterwards check the log */
CheckedLog(devid, R, flag, k ) @ #i4 &
#i1 < #i4
)
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)
"
/* Basic secrecy property, proven elsewhere */
axiom message_secrecy2:
" All R ltkR stpk m #i.
( /* If S sent a message m to R */
( MsgSent(R, ltkR, stpk, m) @ i &
/* without the adversary having compromised a device of R at
some point */
not (Ex #r devid stk. Compromise_Device(devid, R, ltkR, stk) @ r)
)
==>
( /* then the adversary does not know it */
not ( Ex #j. K(m) @ j)
)
)
"
/* Main detection of usage property.
*/
lemma detect_usage_S_sends:
"All d skR dkR m #i1 #i2 #i3 detectionresult R k.
/* If S sent to R an encrypted message m,
where pk(dkR)=ekR */
( MsgSent(R, skR, pk(dkR), m) @ #i1 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i2 &
/* and the ephemeral key used by the sender
was not compromised, i.e., the compromise
occurred in a different epoch
*/
not (Ex #j sk .
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j ) &
/* and Robert afterwards checks the log */
CheckedLog(d, R, detectionresult, k ) @ #i3 &
#i1 < #i3
)
==>
( /* then we detect a compromise */
(detectionresult = 'bad')
)
"
/* Main detection of usage property.
*/
lemma detect_usage_R_receives:
"All d skR dkR dkR2 m #i1 #i2 #i3 #i4 detectionresult R k.
/* If S sent to R an encrypted message m,
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where pk(dkR)=ekR */
( MsgSent(R, skR, pk(dkR), m) @ #i1 &
MsgReceived(d, R, skR, dkR2, m) @ #i2 &
/* and the adversary knows m */
K(m) @ #i3 &
/* and the ephemeral key used by the sender was
not compromised, i.e., the compromise was in
a different epoch then when m was sent.
*/
not (Ex #j sk .
Compromise_Device(d, R, sk, dkR) @ #j ) &
/* and Robert afterwards checks the log */
CheckedLog(d, R, detectionresult, k ) @ #i4 &
#i2 < #i4
)
==>
( /* then we can detect a compromise */
(detectionresult = 'bad')
)
"
end
// vi:ft=spthy
